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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Statement of the Problem. 
This study will be an attempt to trace the develop-
ment of the theory and practice of anthropologists, from 
the early interest in the unique and different, through the 
development of the concepts of "culture" and "cultural 
relativisri'l n as a protest against unilinear evolution and 
ethnocentrism and as an attempt to understand each culture 
in the terms in which it is lived by its members. Atten-
tion will be given to the assumptions and implications of 
cultural relativism, to the involvement of anthropologists, 
and to the different levels of meaning of the conceptions 
of cultural relativism and relativity. There will be con-
sideration of the factors leading to the discovery of the-
matic v~lues in cross-cultural studies, of the empirical 
evidence for such thematic values and of the relation of 
these to the philosophic quest for universal norms which 
can serve in the comparison of cultures and in the resolu-
tion of conflicts. 
The hypothesis proposed is that the discovery of 
cross-cultural thematic values by anthropologists provides 
the empirical data from which we can infer, presupposing 
the validity of reason, the norm of personality, and the 
1 
criterion of coherence, that: 
1} There are basic human needs and/or problems of 
human social life •.vhich are com..'fllon to all men and all 
human societies and which must be solved by any culture 
2 
if that culture is to remain viable and/or if its mem-
bers are to achieve their full potentialities as human be- -
ings. 
2) These needs and problems do not have to be 
solved in just one way, nor can they be solved in just any 
way, but there are objectively given limits (inherent in 
the human situation) within which solutions must be found. 
3) The values and norms of a culture are relative 
not only to the background and conditions specific to that 
culture but also to an objective order---the given needs 
of human life and conditions of all social life---postulat-
ed and progressively discovered by the use of the criterion 
of coherence and the norm of personality. 
4) It is this postulated and progressively dis-
covered obj-ective order to which appeal ought to be and oft-
en is made in resolving value con~licts within the experi-
ence of a single person, or between members of a single 
culture, or in proposing or opposing social change in a 
culture, and that coherence and personality provide the 
criterion and norm by which this appeal can be made. 
5) Values and norms are comparable across cultures 
as they are within cultures and it is by appeal to the ob-
jective order through coherence that value conflicts be-
tween cultures (or between members of different cultures) 
can, in principle, bG resolved. 
2. Evidence of Interest in the Problem. 
In that sense---the sense of having some-
thing in common far more vital than the differ-
ences officially assigned to us---we were members 
of a leaderless and unrepresented group. Belong-
ing to a nation, we had a nation that could speak 
for us. Belonging to a religion, we had a religion 
that could speak for us. Belonging to an economic 
or political order, we had an economic or political 
order that could speak for us. But belonging to 
the human race, we were without a spokesm~. In-
deed, we could hardly speak to each other. 
These are the words of Norman Cousins, editor of the Satur-
day Review of Literature, as he tries to spell out the ques-
tion which is the title of his book, Who Speaks for Man? 
That men find it difficult to speak to each other 
within the framework of the Christian community is indicat-
ed by Walter G. Muelder, Professor of Social Ethics at 
Boston University. Speaking out of his experiences in the 
World Council of Churches, Muelder describes "Non-Theolog-
ical Barriers to Ecumenici ty, "2 as including national back-
grounds, ideological differences, race, color, class, 
1. Cousins, WSM, 149. For explanation of footnotes, see 
Bibliography. 
2. Chapel talk , Boston University School of Theology, 
April 29, 1953. 
4 
emotional le gacies of separation, and experiences of war. 
Reflecting a similar point of view, the editor of a 
volume on Hinduism writes in his introduction an explana~ 
tion of the use of Hindus as authors. 
We realized that our Western cultural pat-
terns and habits .of thought have been shaped both 
consciously and unconsciously by the Greek-Hebrew-
Christian tradition, and that many of the misunder-
standings which arise between East and West come 
from our inevitable tendency to describe and judge 
the people of India by our own standards. The 
religious, social, and speculative patterns of 
India have been built on assumptions and beliefs 
so different from ours that it is difficult for 
a Westerner to describe them without distort1on. 1 
The Educational Policies Commission of the National 
Education Association moves the question more explicitly 
to the level of values. Writing of Moral and Spiritual 
Values in the Public Schools, the Commission asks, "what 
• • • shall we do in a situation where the values of equal-
ity and respect for excellence conflict? Or when the value 
of brotherhood collides with the value of common con-
sent?"2 
In 1952, Mt. Holyoke College brought together 
1. Morgan, RH, iii. 
2. MSV, 31. C. De Witt Hardy lifts up two conditions that 
most profoundly affect higher education 'in the present age, 
"its uncertainty about values, and the necessity of inter-
national understanding and world peace, which can be se-
curely based only upon grounds acceptable to all men." 
Hofstadter and Hardy, DSHE, 144. 
5 
scientists and educators to discuss "Science and Human 
Values. 11 Archibald MacLeish, former assistant Secretary 
of State, concluded his comments on nHum.an Values in the 
World Today" with this question: 
Whence do our sanctions come in a time of 
increasing relativism when we are told by the an-
thropologists that all cultural values are rela-
tive to the culture from which they come; when we 
are told by the Marxists that all human values 
are relative to the stage of economic development; 
when we are told by the psychologists that it is 
perhaps after all not a very good thing to have a 
strong and dominant conscience; when we are told 
by the philosophical determinists that the individ-
ual has no freedom of choice, anyway? 
Kermit Eby, former leader in the labor movement 
now teaching social science at the University of Chicago, 
faces up to this same confusion of sanctions and standards. 
After discussing the temptations of the political idealist 
in terms of loneliness, cynicism, compromise, and absolu-
tism, he .confronts "the fifth and most insidious tempta-
tion--tolerance without bounds." The watch words of this 
temptation are "live and let live" and "everything is very 
2 
complex and relative." 
David L. Miller, a philosopher, points to the urgent 
1. Science and Human Values. 
2. Eby, K.,-xrt.(l954). See, in the same journal, the ar-
ticle by Reinhold Niebuhr on "Christianity and the Moral 
Law," in which the author points out how our moral pref-
erences "are obviousl! colored by our own interest." Nie-
buhr, R., Art.(l953). -
6 
issue of cultural relativism preventing world cooperation 
in a chall enge to social science: 
Science, at its best, as all of us can see after 
t h e innovation of atomic energy, requires the 
cooperation of the entire world. If all that the 
social scientists can tell us is that what is 
'right' in Guatemala is 'wrong' in Timbuctu and 
what is 'right' in Russia is 'wrong' in America, 
and vice versa, they had better close the books. 
Wherecooperation is desired, there can be no ba-
sis for justifying the relativity of norms, for 
in the last analysis, if a norm is peculiar to 
and t h erefore relative to a particular group, it 
is also a ·limitation, for it prevents cooperation 
with other groups. And although all norms (and 
mores) may be relative in the sense that they are 
conventional and are designed to meet certain 
present demands and effect certain desired ends, 
they are not relative in the sense that one is as 
good as the other as a basis for cooperation. 
Cooperation between groups with regard to the 
attainment of common values requires co~non norms 
and the di s solution of relative ones.l 
Part of the confusion regarding values, of course, 
has to do with the alleged separation of facts from val-
ues and the claims of scientists to be objective and val-
ue-free.2 Alan Barth, an editorial writer for the Wash-
ington Post, exposes the fallacy of this separation in 
an area of public life not unrelated to science. In 
The Loyalty of Free Men, Barth writes concerning the'un-
evalua ted" files of the F.B.I.: 
1. Miller, Art.{l951), 148. See also Edel, Art.(l953); 
Gittler, Art.{l941); Irving , SV; McKeon, Art.(l950). 
2. See III, 1, and IV, 1. See also Heumann, EVT. 
Evaluation seems an inescapable element of almost 
every step in the investigative process. It enters 
into the selection of subjects for investigation. 
It enters into the selection of sources of informa-
tion--and into determination of whether they are 
reliable or unreliable ••• The very questions 
asked by an investigftor entail evaluation of a 
most important kind. 
A recent volume, Goals of Economic ~~ illus-
trates some of the confusion concerning values. Ralph 
7 
Linton, Yale anthropologist, emphasizes the changing cli-
mate of anthropological thinking: "The modern anthropol-
ogist is fully convinced of the existence of universal 
values which can be used as datum points in developing 
ethical judgments."2 Theodore M. Greene, a philosopher 
from the same university as Linton, writing in the same 
volume, disagrees: 
The dominant trend is still toward a 'relativism' 
which denies that values have any objective reality 
and insists that they are merely human ideals aris-
ing out of, and egshrined in, social conventions 
and institutions. 
Richard N~ Bender, in a 1952 Dissertation at 
l. Barth, LFM, 170-1. For Barth's remarks on science, 
see 185-211. 
2. Linton, Art.{l953), 309. 
3. Greene, Art.(l953), 365-6. It should be noted that 
Greene, in his "Introduction," indicates agreement among 
the contributors in opposing "a nihilistic relativism 
which denies the possibility, in principle, of an inter-
societal and transcultural appraisal that is rationally 
defensible." Ward (ed.), GEL, 10. 
8 
Boston University, suggests in his "Implications for Fur-
ther Study," the ~~ramount importance of the question, 
"Are there universal values?" He concludes, "If no values 
are universal, there can be no universality of obligation, 
and thus no moral laws as here defined. 111 D. J. Fleming.J 
out of his experience as a missionary, is sure "there can 
be no cohesive world cownunity without a common foundation 
of moral principles and practice. 112 
3. Summary of Research ~ Previous Investigators. 
At least some anthropologists propose that their 
science is able to help man find a voice, to help men 
speak across cultural barriers, to help resolve conflicts 
of values, and to help make possible the understanding and 
cooperation of groups in a world community. They suggest 
that cross-cultural comparisons provide data for the dis-
covery of thematic values and universal norms. For example, 
Margaret Mead, ethnologist of the American Museum of Na-
tural History, poses for her "study of the sexes in a 
changing world"· these questions: "What is it to be a man? 
What is it to be a woman?" Miss Mead's purpose is to find 
1. Bender, PDML, 261. 
2. Fleming, WWYD, 172. For a discussion of the principle 
of consent as the basis of society, see Maciver, WG. See 
also Clyde Kluckhohn's remark that "Something more than 
policemen has been found necessary for the maintenance of 
order in all social organizations." Kluckhohn,C., WLM, 276. 
\ 
I 
\ 
' 
common elements in family life 11 that no society has yet 
found ways of ign~ing. nl 
The Bibliography indicates the number of studies 
in this field, especially since 1940. In this prelimi-
9 
nary section attention will be called to four anthropolo-
gists who have pointed up the problems and built the frame-
work on which this study seeks to proceed and to a like 
number of philosophers whose contributions have been stim-
ulated by concerns of cultural relativism. Other works 
will be referred to in direct relation to the specific 
topics of the study. 
Ralph Linton, writing in 1952 on "Universal Ethi-
cal Principles: An Anthropological View," emphasizes the 
urgency of ."comrnon understandings in the field of ethics" 
as "the only lasting foundation upon which a world State 
2 
can be built." Linton seems to be the first anthropolo-
gist to use the concept of "thematic values," although he 
acknowledges his debt to Morris E. Opler for the prelimi-
nary concept of 11 themes."3 
1. Mead, M., 1W, 4,6. 
2. Linton, Art.(l952), 645. Linton indicates the circular, 
or cumulative, nature of social change by a polar emphasis 
in his conclusion: "When people learn to think of them-
selves as members of a single world society, it will be 
easy for them to agree on a single ethical system." 660. 
3. Linton, Art.(l953), 308. Opler, Art.(l945); see IV, 3. 
Both the needs of individuals and the im-
peratives of social existence are much the same 
everywhere, and there are numerous thematic yal-
ues which can be recognized in all cultures. 
10 
Linton cautions that the anthropologist ~does not believe 
that any institution or pattern of behavior which occurs 
with gre at frequency in cultures is necessarily 1right 1 
in an ethical sense," but he does "assume that such a 
culture element must be intimately related to one or more 
2 
of the universal thematic values." Linton's other pio-
neering work in the response of anthropologists to world 
cr1ses3 and in the study of culture and personalit y 4 will 
be mentioned later. 
Clyde Kluckhohn, Harvard anthropologist whose in-
fluence will be evident throughout this study, has done 
some of the most creative thinking in theoretical anthro-
pology, especially as related to his work among the Nav-
aho.5 His most relevant work has been in the study of 
values and i mplicit culture in the interrelations of an-
t hropology and psychiatry, and, most recently, in nuni-
versal Categories of Culture."6 All this work h as 
1. Linton, Art.{l953), 308; see also 306-7. 
2. Linton, Art.(l953), 309. 
3. Linton (ed.), SMWC. 
4. Linton, CBP, see also Kardiner, PFS. 
5. See Bibliography for references. 
6. Kluckhohn, c., Art.{l953). 
assumed that 
Anthropology provides a scientific basis 
for dealing with the crucial dilemma of the world 
today: how can peoples of different appearance, 
mutually unintelligible language, and diss?milar 
ways of life get along peaceably together? 
Kluckhohn has insisted that the "richness of different 
cultures" must not be levelled into monotonous uniform-
ity2 and has done much to clarify the meaning of cul-
tural relativity in relation to Melville J. Herskovits' 
emphasis on relativism. 3 
11 
Robert Redfield, of the University of Chicago, is 
responsible for the concept of ttfolk society"4 and for a 
continuing · emphasis on anthropology's relation to the hu-
manities.5· In a 1953 volume he faces up squarely to the 
issue of cultural relativism and to the need for evalua-
tion. In a chapter designed "to anthropologize the an-
thropologists," Redfield discusses universal moral prin-
ciples rising out of "universal conditions of human liv-
ing."6 
1. Kluckhohn, C.,MM, 1. 
2. Kluckhohn, C.,MM, 273; see also 289. 
3. -Herskovits, MEW; Art.(l951). See discussion in chap-
ter III. Herskovits is at Northwestern University. 
4. Redfield, Art.(l947). 
5. Redfield, Art.(l950); Art.(l953). 
6. Redfield, PWT, 139, 142. 
12 
David Bidney, of the University of Indiana, re-
flects his dual role as philosopher and anthropologist in 
calling for a "meta-anthropology" to be 11 concerned·!with 
the problems of cultural reality and the nature of man. 111 
For him the problem is "meta-cultural" because it goes 
beyond the empirical data to "the very conditions of the 
cultural process itselr."2 In Theoretical Anthropology, 
he assumes a psychocultural point of view as opposed to 
the reductionism of either culturology or psychology. 3 
In a paper for the 1952 International Symposium on An-
thropology, Bidney asserts: 
The choice is no longer between a romantic cul-
tural pluralism and a fixed evolutionary absolu-
tism but rather between a world in perpetual crisis 
and a world order based on rational principles ca-
pable of wlnning the adherence of the nations of 
the world. 
Mead, Linton, Kluckhohn, Redfield, Bidney, and 
Herskovits, among others, seem to be moving toward a more 
explicitly philosophical analysis of anthropological mate-
rial. Muelder notes that "Over and over again the social 
1. Bidney, Art.(l949), 332. 
2. Bidney, Art.(l949), 348. 
3. Bidney, TA, see especially Chapters II and III. 
4. Bidney, Art.(l953), 698. See articles by Kluckhohn, 
Redfield and F. S.C. Northrop in Kroeber {ed.), AT. 
Northrop is another philosopher-anthropologist whose work 
will be referred to often, though critically. 
_/ 
sciences b r ing us to the threshold of a universal axiolo-
gy,111 Dealing with "The Prospect of Universal Norms," 
Muelder calls special attention to the impact of cul-
tural crises upon the thinking of social scientists and 
suggests the concept of 11 involvement 11 as basic to the 
problem of value in social science. 2 The present study 
is in large part an extension of the basic framework of 
Muelder's article, with special reference to anthropology.3 
Grace A. de Laguna, Bryn Mawr philosopher, deals 
with the problems of cultural relativism in its historical 
setting of philosophical and ethical relativism and in its 
relation to modern science.4 Mrs. de Laguna, who combines 
real appreciation for the insights of anthropologists with 
her criticisms, also writes of the place of reason and ra-
tionality in culture and in the study of culture. 5 
1. Muelder, Art.(l951)1 , 120; see also 98. 
2. Muelder, Art.(l951)1. Muelder, Linton, Kluckhohn, and 
Bid.ney have bee.n contributors to the symposia of the Con-
ference on Science, Philosophy and Religion • .. See Bibli-
ography. 
3. The British philosopher and social scientist, J. V. L. 
Casserley, has an approach similar to Muelder's. Casserl~y 
is especially helpful in regard to the assumptions and im-
plications of social science, but he lacks the whole-heart-
ed appreciation of social science and the methodological . 
rigor of Muelder. See Casserley, MMSS. 
4. de Laguna, Art.(l942). 
5. de Laguna, Art.(l949). 
14 
Eliseo Vivas, a "reformed naturalist" now at Ohio 
State University, treats critically Herskovits' relativism 
in a volume which Kluckhohn praises for its critical syn-
thesis in the fields of scientific method, values, and per-
sonality.l Vivas describes his position as axiological 
realism (values are real and antecedent to our discovery 
of them by an intuition that is not 11 beyond the reach of 
critic ism.". )2 For him radical conflicts can be theoretical-
ly resolved by testing "what we take to be the right a-
gainst a progressively ascertainable notion of what is 
truly right."3 Kluckhobn doubts whether Vivas 11 has fully 
absorbed what is· factually . demonstrated at the cross-cul-
tural level 11 and suggests that his t'view of Christianity 
is culturally parochial. u 4 
A. MacBeath, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics 
in the Queen's University of Belfast, in his 1948-1949 
Gifford Lectures, examines four non-literate cultures 
(Trobrianders, Bantu, Australian Aborigines, and Crow 
Indians) as Experiments in Living. 5 Assuming an ethics of 
1. Vivas, MLEL, see especially Chapter I. 
Kluckhohn, C., Rev.(l951) • 
2. Vivas, MLEL, 41, 171-2. 
3. Vivas, MLEL, 97, 187. Note that for Vivas the cate-
gory of "person" is axiological, not scientific, 195. See 
also his concept of "requiredness,tt 187. 
4. Kluckhohn, c., Rev.(l951)1, 568. 
5. MacBeath, EL. 
sel~-realization, MacBeath emphasizes the unity o~ cul-
ture and the relation of moral judgments to the way of li~e 
of a people, not to isolated acts. He also assumes that 
the ttnature of the moral ideal and the grounds o~ moral 
obligation are in principle the same everywhere and for 
all men. n Although Ma.cBea.th sees moral development in the 
extension of the number included within the community and 
in the cl1anging conception of the nature of personality, 
his conception o~ moral goodness as loyalty to recognized 
or operative ideals is inadequate.l 
4. Scope and Method of this Study. 
This study does not involve new data from original 
field work. It does include the theory and practice of 
anthropologi~ts among other anthropological data for phil-
osophical criticism in an attempt to develop a new concep-
tual frame1vork for anthropology. This conceptual frame-
work is in many ways implicit in the current work o~ an-
thropologists. The purpose of this study is to draw out 
the i.mplications and to relate them in a coherent system, 
1. MacBeath, EL, 429, 435, 434. See, however, his test ~or 
adequacy: "Any way of life whose general structure does not 
admit of being extended to mankind as a whole, without de-
nying the common humanity of some men and their right to 
be treated as persons, must be regarded as unsatisfactory," 
436. See also 437-442. 
16 
with what is intended to be full justice to the empirical 
method and data of anthropology. 
This study will deal specifically with recent com-
parative (i.e., cross-cultural) studies by American an-
thropologists. Certain issues, including evolution, the 
nature of culture, and the relation of culture and person-
ality will be considered only as they relate to cultural 
relativism and thematic values. Although ethical theories 
will not be treated comparatively,1 philosophical ethical 
theory will be the frame of reference in the light of 
which anthropological theory and data are studied. 
Since any attempt to formulate moral norms presup-
poses a philosophical position, the general theory of self-
realization may be t~~en as the framework of the present 
study. 2 That presuppositions are not to be taken as final 
but as subject to revision in the circular and cumulative 
process of presupposition--hypothesis--data--revision is 
itself a presupposition basic to this study. 3 
Herskovits argues for the empirical approach that 
is basic to this study: "Only through constant and · 
1. See Hill, GET; Tsanoff, Eth., MIOC; Brightman, IP. 
2. Bender, PDN~, lf; Whitehead, SMW, 25. 
3. See hypotheses, I, 1, and· V, 3, iii, for presupposed 
criterion of coherence and norm of personality. 
17 
continuing cross-reference between hypothesis and fact 
can any understanding of problems and valid interpreta-
tion of data be had. 111 Herskovits is replying to the 
economist, Frank H. Knight, who insists that "TQ.e prin-
ciples of economy are known intuitively" and deductively, 
that induction is a "wild goose chase," and that facts are 
only 11 illustrative."2 The empirical method of this study 
is one that takes account of the totality of experience, 
ttall that is at any time present in consciousness,"3 not 
the narrow empiricism limited to sense data. 4 . 
The empiricism proposed here does not reduce reason 
to a mere instrument;5 rather it is urged that experience 
1. Herskovits, EA, 524. See Robert Merton's discussion of 
the fruitful alternation between theory and practice, his 
comments on John Dewey's empiricism (94), and his sugges-
tion that the "empirical sociologist" reflects what he 
sees rather than what is. Merton, STSS, 83-lll. See also 
Anshan (ed.), OEC, viii: 
2. Knight, Art.(l952), 512, 516-7. See Linton, .Art.(l953), 
306-7, for another anthropologist's concern with empirical 
data. 
3. Brightman, PR, 2, 3; see also 128. 
4. See Enc. Brit., VIII, 411; "Empir icism--the theory that 
all knowledge is derived from sense experience. • .holds 
that the mind is originally an abs ol ute blank ••• on which, 
as it were, sense-given impressions are mechanically re-
corded ••• " See Lavely, PPH, 43-4, for a discussion of 
scientific method as only a particular form of the empir i-
cal me thod. Sense empiric i sm is subject to criticism even 
wi thou t the blank tablet theory. 
5. Anshen (ed.), FFD, 16 f. 
· ~ 
must be interpreted by reas.on to have meaning. Such an 
empirical approach does not identify the 11 is 11 with the 
noughtn, but does find in the 11 is 11 the data for the in-
ference of the 11 ought", which in turn explains the 11 is 11 • l 
Perhaps such an approach is best ~ illustrated by Margaret 
Mead 1 s comment that between the layman 1 s "Naturally no 
society would tolerate incest, 11 and the anthropologist 1 s 
"All known societies have incest r .egulations' II there lies 
2 
a mass of experience. 
The method of this study also aims to be rational, 
understanding reason as ua logically consistent and co-
herent method of interpreting experience. 113 Casserley 
calls attention to the view of reason as an instrument, 
not nto select man's ends--they are already selected for 
him by his instincts and desires--but to facilitate his 
attaining them. 114 Mrs. de Laguna sees the view of man as 
a "rationalizing" rather than a 11rational 11 being as rest-
ing "upon an outgrown intellectualism which takes 'reason' 
1. See Bender, PDML, 45, 101. See also Brightman, NV, 23. 
See further discussion of this problem under V. 
2. Mead, M., MF, 33. 
3. Brightman, PR, 536. See also Pound, Art.(l949). 
4. Casserley, MMSS, 160-1. It should be noted that Cas-
serley criticizes this view and holds that ends as well as 
means come under the scrutiny of reason. See 162-3. 
.., 
'\ 
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to be something intrinsically separable from, or opposed 
to 'feeling '." She admits that men may often rationalize, 
ttbut it is only because they are fundamentally rational 
beings that they are capable of rationalizing--or feel 
the need of it."1 
It is necessary to presuppose some norms of truth 
in order to argue that truth is unknowable, 2 and any 
thinker seeking to explain away reason in terms of ir-
rational processes must necessarily claim exemption for 
his ovm theory. 3 Tsanoff observes that skepticism is 
self-refuting dogmatism. 
For it is no small claim to knowledge, to as-
sert that no knowledge is to be had or that no 
reasonable solution of a certain problem is a-
vailable. Critical intelligence, despite the skep-
tical defiance, nroceeds with its work and vindi-
cates its capacities by the exercise of them.4 
1. de Laguna, Art.(l949), 380. See also Bidney, Art. 
(1953), 692, who argues that rationality is "a universal-
ly valid ideal." See also Frankfort, IAAM, for a de-
scription of the emancipation of "thought" from "myth." 
2. Brightman, Art.(l947), 512. See also Anshen (ed.) 
FFD, 435. 
3. Casserley, ~~SS, 170. See also Blanshard, Art.(l947), 
and Greene, Art.(1953), 382. Hegel hoped in 1821 that 
those who hold that ttknowledge of truth is a wild goose 
chase will feel themselves bound to refrain from taking 
part in the discussion." PR, 175. 
4. Tsanoff, Eth., 42. Vivas applies this to Herskovits' 
relativism, noting that if he means "that science is valid 
only intraculturally," this will have to be established 
objectively, transcending cultural determination. See 
Vivas, MLEL, 32. 
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Of course, the essence of cultural relativism is 
not that logic differs between cultures but rather that 
premises are incommensurable, 1 and, as S. F. Nadel ex-
plains, " One cannot argue about fundamental assumptions. ••2 
Kluckhohn suggests that nmissionaries would get :further 
if t h ey said, iri effect, 'Look, our morality starts from 
different assumptions. Let's talk about those assump-
tions'."3 ' It is precisely about premises and assumptions 
that men must argue and talk if conflicts are to be re-
solved. Edgar s. Brightman says, "Even moral convictions 
depend upon reason and ar e (in my thinking) subject to 
di s cussion and rational control. ''4 Assuming the valid-
i ty of reason, Brightman lists nine "norms of reason:" 
Be consistent (eliminate all contradictions). 
Be systematic (discover all relevant relations). 
Be inclusive (weigh all available experiences). 
Be analytic (consider all the elements of which 
every complex consists). 
Be syn optic (relate all the elements of any whole 
to its properties as a whole). 
Be active (use experimental method). 
1. See, among others, Kluckhohn and Kelly, Art.(l945), 
100. 
2. Nadel, FSA, 191. See also 200. Even R. M. Maciver 
seems to take this position in one of his later articles: 
'tThe lack of any court is the final fact about final 
values." Maciver, Art.(l952), 40. 
3. Klu ckhohn, c., MM, 33. See also 272. 
4. Brightman, in Bryson {ed.) PDT, 6. 
Be open to alternatives (consider many possible 
hypotheses). 
Be critical -(test and verify or falsify hypo-
theses). 
Be decisive (be com~itted to the best possible 
hypothesis). 
5. Definition of Terms. 
Most of the more technical terms, including cul-
ture, cultural relativism, and thematic values, will be 
defined in the body of the study. Only two sets of terms 
are defined her~,one dealing with anthropology, the sec-
ond with values and norms. 
Anthropology is interpreted broadly as the science 
of man and his works. Aside from applied anthropology, 
the two basic divisions are into physical anthropology 
and cultural anthropology, the latter including archeol-
ogy, folk-lore, linguistics, and ethnography, as well as 
ethnology and social anthropology. Social anthropology 
is a term used often in Great Britain, involving more 
interest in social organization than in culture.2 Eth-
nology, the comparative study of cultures and the concern 
with theoretical problems, should be distinguished from 
the branch of anthropology from which it gets its data--
ethnography, the descriptive study of individual cultures.3 
1. Brightman, NV, 106-7. 
2. See Murdock, Art.(l951); Radcliffe-Brown, Art.(l947). 
3. See Herskovits~ MHW, 9. 
The general term, anthropology, will be used in this study 
to mean that special branch of cultural anthropology la-
belled ethnology, with some overlapping into social anthro-
pology and ethnography. 
Values and norms will be defined following the 
usage of Brightman.l Valuation is the primary experience 
of ascribing value, a subjective interest, liking, or 
preference. A value is '' the actual experience of what 
ought to be." An ideal is a concept defining a value and, 
as such, may be true or false. A norm is the true ideal 
or rational concept of what ought to be. Value experiences 
point to objectively real norms, which, however, must be 
realized to become values. Greene makes a comparable dis-
tinction between "embodied values" and nideal standards. tt.2 
Linton points out that valuation can be either positive 
3 
or negative. Evaluation involves judging a value by art 
ideal or a norm. The basic norm of all values is coher-
ence.4 
It should be noted that this usage differs from 
that o£ Kluckhohn, who means by value a code or standard 
1. See Brightman, PV, 18-19; IP, 141-2. 
2. Greene, Art.(l953), 371, 374. 
3. Linton, Art.(l953), 307-8. 
4. Brightman, IP, 147. Compare Miller, Art.(l951), and 
Dewey, Art.(l925). 
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placing goals on an approval-disapproval continuum, the 
desirable as opposed to the desired, a justified pref-
1 
erence. This sounds more like Brightman's norm. How-
ever, Kluckhohn distinguishes between value and the more 
cognitive value-orientation, defined as a "generalized 
and organized conception, influencing behavior, of nature, 
of man's place in it, of man's relation to man, and of the 
desirable and non-desirable. " 2 He also defines ideal as 
nan especially valued goal of an individual or a group," 
almost coextensive with value but lacking the property 
of choice. ' 3 
6. ~ of this Dissertation. 
Chapter Two of this study will trace briefly the 
development of anthropology from its early interest in 
the unique through the theory of evolution to the reaction 
against evolutionism and ethnocentrism and to the recent 
concepts of culture and cultural relativism. Against this 
historical : background, Chapter Three will examine critical-
ly the concept of cultural relativism in terms of its as-
sumptions and implications and of the involvements of 
1. Kluckhohn, c., Art.(l951)1, 395; see also 399. 
2. Kluckhohn, c., Art.(l95l)i, 411. 
3. Kluckhohn, c., Art.(l951) , 432. 
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anthropologists which run counter to their professed ob-
jectivity. Cul tu:ral relati'lrism as method will be distin-
guished from the philosophical doctrine, and a further dis-
tinction drawn between relativism and relativity. In 
Chapter Four special attention will be given to the cultur-
al situation in which anthrop0logists began to study values 
and to their discovery of thematic values which cut across 
cultures. Suggested categories for thematic values will 
be examined in Chapter Five, searching for concepts which 
make possible the inference of universal ethical norms 
from empirical thematic values. This series of steps will 
be taken by comparing explicit theoretical statements of 
anthropologists ·with the theory implied in their actual 
practice. Finally, attention will be given to the func-
tion of universal norms in a conflict of cultures. 
J 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY 
1. Early Interest in the Unique. 
Franz Boas sees anthropology developing out of the 
interest in curiosities and unique customs, beginning 
with Herodotus and Tacitus, continuing with Marco Polo, 
1 the Spanisn Conquest and Cook's voyages. Travellers 
brought back reports of people who had never heard of 
Ancient Greece or of Christianity. 2 By these reports 
.scholars were aroused to ask the significance of strange 
ways of living. The foundations of scientific anthropol-
ogy were laid when the relation of these strange ways to 
Western civilization became the subject of investigation.3 
The first anthropologists relied on these reports from 
missionaries and adventurers rather than doing field work 
and spent their time recording almost anecdotal details. 
These "gifted amateurs," as Kluckhohn calls them, "devoted 
1. Boas, Art.(l904); Art.(l932). See also: Lowie, HET; 
Pennifan, HYA; Goldenwe~ser, Art.(l941); Linton, Art. 
(193e) ; Evans-Pritchard, Art. ( 1950). 
2. See Butterfield, OMS, 143, who indicates the rela-
tivizing influence of these stories. 
3. Boas, Art.(l904). Levi-Strauss, in Tax (ed.), AAT, 
350, outlines three approaches in the development of an-
thropological thought: 1) aesthetic, 2) historical, 3) 
scientific. 
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themselves to oddities ••• the -forms of human hair, the 
variations of skull formation, shades of skin color," as 
well as bizarre habits, justifying anthropology being 
called "the science of leftovers" from other disciplines. 1 
A sociologist writing of thirteenth century England 
observes that a man describing a society other than his 
own "often leaves out those features which the society 
has in common with his own society," taking the common-
place for granted and so distorting his description and 
missing the universal factors. The writer continues, ''But 
the things we take for granted about a social system are 
apt to be among its most important features." He notes 
that few anthropologists nmake anything of the fact that 
something like the ten commandments is establish-ed in every 
society.n2 
Alfred L. Kroebe~ sets 1860 as the date (really, 
1859-1871) when anthropology began to be an organized 
1. Kluckhohn, c., MM, 3-4. See Herskovits, hllnV, 642 f. 
2. Romans, EVTC, 382, 403. See also Kluckhohn, C., MEHV, 
104. Galas illustrates the point in historical perspec-
tive, suggesting that the anthropologist who compares 
Eliot 1 s Cocktail Party and Plato 1 s Banquet 11 is enabled 
to point out the particular circumstances required by an 
ancient Athenian and a contemporary Londoner or New York-
er to renounce the pleasures of the flesh. 11 Mead and 
Galas (eds.), PH, xxviii. 
body of theory, with Tylor, Spencer, [organ, and others 
seeking to order the choas of facts. 1 1850-1900 was the 
period of generalizations, though many works were · "pseudo-
historical", selective of evidence, comparative in a loose 
2 
rather than in a systematic sense. The main theoretical 
concept of the period, except for Durkheim, was evolution. 
2. Evolutionarv Theory. 
The concept of evolution was not the first response 
to the stories of strange "pagans" whose ways challenged 
the universality of European ways. Theologians who tried 
early to reconcile the culture of the New World Indians 
with Biblical accounts saw the Indian way of life as de-
generation, a falling away from revealed truth. 3 This 
reconciliation was easier for Catholics than for Prot-
estants, according to Paul Honigsheim, for whom the Jes-
uits are an important link in the development of anthro-
pology. The Jesuits, denying the complete perversion of 
man's reason and will, were quicker to grant relative 
value to some non-Christian civilizations and thus in-
fluence eight eeJ:?.th century philosophy toward optimism. 
1. F~oeber, NO, 144. $ee Bo as, Art.(l904), 516. 
2. Y~oeber, NO, 145. 
3. Boas, Art.(l904 ), 514. 
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Thus the enlighteners could connect nsava.gett reason ·and 
goodness with their own as lower forms in an evolution-
1 
ary scheme. Butterfield, the British historian, indicates 
the debt of the modern idea of progress to Christianity's 
providing history with meaning and purpose. Science and 
history reinforced each other in preparing the way for 
Darwin, presenting "the idea of the whole of nature ad-
vancing slowly but relentlessly to some high goal. 112 
Evans-Pritchard, a British anthropologist, writes 
that modern anthropology is a. product of the eighteenth 
century Enlighterunent and bears its marks. 3 Certainly 
Tylor an~ Morgan were opposed to any theory of cultural 
1. Honigsheim, Art.(l942}, 376~7. See his treatment of 
Rousseau's "noble savage" in. this regard and of the syn-
thesis of nineteenth century romanticism and eighteenth 
century evolutioni.sm based on the group as an essential 
factor in development. 
2. Butterfield, OMS, 166-174. See his note that even 
the eighteenth century had a divided mind about progress, 
especially concerning John Wesley's youthful trip. to 
America partly in the hope that new light might be thrown 
on the Bible if native minds, "uncorrupted by centuries 
of commentating, could suddenly be confronted with the 
scriptural revelation. n See also Bidn:ay, Art. ( 1953), 
683-4. 
3. Evans-Pritchard, Art. ( 1950), 118. 
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degradation and argued for progress and development as an 
explanation of "primitive" ways.l These men_, along with 
Maine and Coulange, tried to escape mere speculation and 
to do empirical and historical studies (often presumptive 
reconstructions) to show how monogamy developed from 
primitive promiscuity, private property from communism, 
monotheism from animism, etc., sometimes involving psyche-
.. logical origins as well as historical. 2 Tylor, who first 
formulated the concept of culture, used it "in a normative, 
1. Bidney, TA, 211, who also writes of "linear progress:n 
The philosophy of history underlying the concept of 
the un~ty of human culture and linear progress de-
rives from the Hebrew-Christian tradition of the 
unity of mankind and the Providence of God in human 
history ••• The modern theory of cultural progress 
is a synthesis of the Hebrew-Christian notion of the 
evolution of mankind under divine Providence togeth~ 
er with the rationalistic, philosophical idea of the 
indefinite perfectibility of man in time, as put 
forward at the time of the European Renaissance . and 
the Enlightenment. This theory was opposed by the 
theological t heory of divine revelation and human 
retrogression and both Tylor and Morgan found it 
necessary to argue on behalf of the progressive de-
velopment and continuity of human civilization. 219. 
See also 43-8. 
2. Evans-Pritchard, Art.(l950), 119. See Bidney, TA, _l83-
214, on 11Evolutionary Ethnology." See Swanton, Art. ( 1917), . 
regarding the particularistic causal sequences_ of these 
theories. 
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ideal sense, as well as in a relative, historical sense."l 
Bidney contends that Tylor confused cultural evolution (of 
forms) and progress (normative) but he also notes that Ty-
lor recognized that "no extant 'primitive' peoples repre~ 
sent the actual primordial state of man, 11 but have a long 
history. 2 
The evolutionary hypothesis placed institutions 
and beliefs of nineteenth century Europe and America at 
one end of a scale of progress--the top, put their anti-
theses at the other end, and worked out an order of de-
velopmental stages in between.3 Tylor aimed at a philos-
ophy of culture history, but he was criticized at the turn 
of the century as non-historical. 4 
1. Bidney, TA, 194. Tylor's incisive judgment stands out 
even in the setting of Bidney's criticism: 11 His statement 
that antiliberal arts are 'against culture' would, if fol-
lowed out, lead to the exclusion of whole segments. ~ • 
of contemporary culture, including much scientific re-
search on the atomic bomb, as anticultural." 197. 
2. Bidney, TA, 197, 199. See also 210 on Morgan. 
3. Evans-Pritchard, Art.(l950), 119. See his contention 
that the real cause of confusion was not the belief in 
progress but the assumption (from the Enlightenment) 
"that societies are natural systems or organisms which 
have a necessary course of development that can be re-
duced to ••• laws." See also Gabriel, CADT, 161 ff., 
for developments in America. 
4. Bidney, TA, 207. 
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3. Reaction to Evolutionism and Ethnocentrism. 
The evolutionary anthropologists saw fairly clear-
ly the dialectical process of history but they tended to 
limit its action to the past and to think they stood out-
side the dialectic. John R. Swanton, writing in 1917, 
says: 
Too many students, while clearly understanding 
the processes of intellectual birth, growth, and 
death as applied to previous ages vainly imagine 
that they themselves live in the era of fulfil-
ment, that the old cy cle is completed with them, 
and that the favorite principles of their age are 
the last pronouncement of truth itself.l 
The reaction to evolutionism in anthropology, and to the 
ethnocentrism it reflected, was led by Franz Boas, who op-
posed any simplistic cause-effect system and who insti- , 
tuted the movement of historical anthropology with a creed 
of first-hand field work in specific cultures. Boas ar-
gued against the reduction of cultural phenomena to psychol-
. ogy or biology, thus giving ethnology historical analysis 
as an i ndependent method and depriving cultural evolution 
of its organic basis in biological evolution. The evolu-
tionists, according to Boas, had substituted logic for 
history. 2 It should be noted that Boas was not opposed 
1. Swanton, Art.(l917 ) , 460. 
2. Bidney, TA, 68-9. 
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to the idea of evolution in general but to a monistic the-
ory with a fixed formula and to the identification of West-
ern European civilization as the norm of progress. He pre-
ferred a pluralistic theory of the evolution of cultures, 
which had obvious implications of relativism. 1 
The theory of cultural evolution also suffered be-
cause it was caught up in Marxist revolutionary dogma; 
especially the relation of sex and family morals to pri-
vate property. Hoebel points to the humor involved in 
the author of these theories, L. H. Morgan, a capitalist 
lawyer and railro·ad manager, having become a ' 1tminor com-
munist saint."2 
In large part the reaction was to intolerance and 
provincialism, not just to a theory. Thus, for example, 
Ruth Benedict, a pupil of Boas, protests our preoccupa-
tion with the uniqueness of "our own institutions and 
1. Bidney, TA, 215, 222. See also 216-7, 222. See 
Swanton's criticism of "uniformitarian't evolution and 
his protest against evolution as uunconscious.u Swanton, 
Art.(l917), 468. 
2. Hoebel, MPW, 486. See also Steward, Art.(1953), 315. 
Steward also notes that evolutionism "attributes quali-
tative distinctness to successive stages, regardless of 
the particular tradition," whereas relativism attributes 
it to the tradition~ 314. 
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achievements," our accepting the equivalence of human na-
ture and our own standards. 1 
The protests represent an effort of the anthropol-
ogist to "speak for man," to be the friend of native 
peoples, and "where possible, their spokesman in high 
places where their voices would not otherwise be heard. 11 2 
Too often, as Furnas says, the western world's self-as-
sumed burden has been to "play God without being quali-
fied for the role. 113 The protests have been on behalf of 
colonial peoples and in opposition to the disruptive influ-
ences of missionary and commercial activities and the dis-
astrous consequences of ethnocentrism. 4 Ethnocentrism 
1. Benedict, PC, 4,5. See Benedict, Art.(l934), 59. See 
also Murdock, OPC, ix: 
The reader may even come to the realization that his 
own culture is but one of many, and not in any vital 
res pect different from the others. We are perhaps 
fortunate in having chosen applied science for spe-
cial elaboration, rather than religious ceremonial, 
or war, or the potlatch, but only an incurable op-
timist could assert that our religious beliefs, our 
attitude toward sex and reproduction, and our politi-
cal institutions are uniformly more rational than 
those of our primitive contemporaries. 
Note that ~man everywhere has an equally long history 
behind him." Benedict, PC, 17. 
2. Herskovits, ~rnw, 652. 
3. Furnas, AP, 459. 
4. See ns tatement on Human Rights,tt 540; and Sumner, 
Folk., 111. 
is the attitude illustrated by the Navaho description 
of themselves as ttThe People" and by the folk of Mitla 
referring to their town as "mitad del mundo. 111 Hersko-
vits describes it as a universal aspect of culture, "the 
point of view that one's own way of life is to be pre-
0 ferred to all others."~ Cousins calls it "the fascina-
3 tion of the mirror.u The mechanism, according to Hersko-
vits, is a " factor making for individual adjustment and 
social integration," seemingly necessa~y in any society 
and dangerol.ls only when it is "made the basis of programs 
of action detrimental to the well-being of other peoplea." 4 
In the history of Western Europe and America. • • 
economic expansion, control of armaments and an 
evangelical religious tradition have translated 
the recogn~tion of differences into a summons 
to action. . . 
Any person concerned ~th world community must 
acknowledge indebtedness to these efforts to speak for 
and in behalf of exploited peoples and disrupted cultures 
and in opposition to "white supremacy" and imperialism. 
Casserly confesses the "honest mental confusion of many 
1. Parsons, MTS, 1. 
2. Herskovits, MHW, 68. See also 61, 627. 
3. Cousins, WSM, 287. 
4. Herskovits, MHW, 68. See Linton, Art.(l953), 307. 
5. ttstatement on Htfman Rights," 540. 
missionaries between the absolutes of the gospel and the 
social relativities of western society."1 
Boas' ttbasically polemical approach" has been men-
tioned.2 The truth of this description tends to hide his 
polar interests of historical perspective .and the study of 
specific cultures. There is a sense in which his reaction 
to evolutionism amounted to a denial that regularities 
exist and to a centering of attention on differen~es. 3 · 
At least this has been a practical effect of his work• 
Kluckhohn dates from 1911, the publication of Boas' The 
~ of Primitive Man, the turning of attention again in 
anthropology from stqtilarities to differences. Similar-
ities, "where recognized, were explained historically 
rather than in terms of the common nature of man. '• 4 
Murdock credits Boas and his disciples with having 
rid anthropology of the "intellectual debris" of evolu-
tionistic assumptions by 1920, especially by their 
1. Casserley, MMSS, ~0. For another aspect of this point, 
seeiii,2, i, and the topic "in-group" under IV, 4. 
2. Bennett, J. W., Art.(1944), 162. See Bidney, TA, 225; 
Art.(l953), 688. 
3. Steward, Art.(l949), 1. 
4. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l953), 511. Although the 1911 
edition of Boas' book had as Chapter VI, "The Universal-
ity of Culture Traits," with mention of the "similarity 
of mental functions in all races," this heading is omit-
ted in the 1938 edition. See Boas, MPM, 197, 172, 178-9. 
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concentration on field research and attention to the re-
quirements of concrete data in particular cultures. 1 At 
least two culturally conditioning factors may be noted. 
Primitive cultures were rapidly disappearing, and part of 
the reaction against theory was the urgency "to get in the 
field and make objective studies before the sands of time 
ran out. 112 Also the field researcher who lived among 
11 primitive peoples . and found them friendly as well as 
savage, busier with the details of everyday life than ·with 
'2; 
odd exotic rites, 11 rebelled against older theories.""' 
Among the most for'tunate aspects of the Boas tradi-
tion were an inner eclecticism that fostered many 11 inde-
4 pendent and enthusiastically experimentaln approaches, 
and the culture area concept which opened the way to the 
study of variations within cultures. Kroeber writes that 
Boas uround anthropology a playfield and jousting ground 
of opinion; he left it a science, pluralistic but criti~ 
cal," and, Kroeber adds, "somewhat bewildered.tt5 
1. Murdock, SS, xiii. See also Bennett, J. W., Art. 
(1944), 162. Rivers and Westermarck should be noted as 
making similar contributions in Great Britain. 
2. Hoebel, MPW, 4S5. 
3. Mead, M., in Mead and Galas ( eds.), PH, xix. 
4. Bennett, J. W., Art.(l944), 181. 
5. Kroeber, NC, 146-7. 
3.7 
Kroeber has carried forward Boas' historical em-
'phasis, trying to emphasize both continuity and unique~ 
ness.l History, for Kroeber, is the continuing context, 
always interpretative, dealing with relations, functions, 
meanings, and forms. Arguing against Leslie White, Kroeber 
asks what is left for evolution if meaning is restored to 
history. 2 Bidney's position is that anthropology can nei-
ther be reduced to history nor separated from it. 3 
One emphasis in the pendulum swing from evolution-
ism was on diffusion, with Graebner and Goldenweiser as 
4 leaders. The diffusionists emphasized borrowing of cul-
ture as over against its emergence "by spontaneous growth 
due to certain common social potentialities and common 
human nature. ~· 5 Diffusion as a fact can scarcely be chal-
lenged, but 'it fails to come to grips with problems of 
1. Kroeber, Art.(l936), 328. 
2. Kroeber, Art.(l946). See Hodgen, Art.(l950), on his-
torical relativism in anthropology, and the discussion 
between Evans-Pritchard and Forde in Man, 50(1950), on 
ttlaws" in anthropology. -
3. Bidney, TA, 285. 
4. See Maciver, Art.(l930), 185. For a full treatment, 
see Linton, SM, 324-346, especially the fascinating ac-
count of borrowed items in American life on 326-7. See 
Wissler, MC, 42. . 
5. Evans-Pritchard, Art.{l950), 120. 
3.8' 
cause and effect as a total method . 1 The proponents as-
sume ultimate differences among peoples and hold that it 
2 is similarities that require explanation. Kroeber's 
idea of ttstimulus-diffusion" is more adequate in indicat-
ing the experimentation and acceptance-rejection of items 
that underlie diffusion. 
Functionalism in anthropology is related to the 
general emphasis in biology, psychology, and economics 
1925-1950, stressing synchronic or cross-section studies 
without reference to passage of time, as distinguished 
3 from diachronic, or historical, studies. The essence 
of the concept is "the satisfaction of a need,"4 "the 
contribution a partial activity makes to a total activi• 
ty. 115 The emphasis is upon reciprocity and the instru-
mental char acter of culture. 6 Although Malinowski was 
a brilliant field~worker, he often identifies function 
7 ~~d origin and substitutes logic for history. 
1. Steward, Art.(l949). 
2. Bidney, TA, 206, 212. 
3. See Strong, Art.{l953), 395, and Evans-Pritchard, Art. 
(1950), 120. 
4. Malinowski, STC, 39. 
5. Radcliffe-Brown, quoted in Leighton, HRCW, 156. 
6. Murdock, Art.{l943); see also Murdock, Art.{l951). 
7. Bidney, TA, 224, 226. 
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The theory of functionalism enables students to 
see that aspects of a culture are interdependent, but 
some of its basic assumptions are unsound. For example, 
it presupposes a. rational "economic man" who "might have 
1 
stepped from any economics text. 11 Homans thinks that 
11no origin of the customs in the pure exercise of human 
intelligence ••• has ever been found." He concludes 
his emphasis on the 11 accidental," trial-and-error nature 
of the historical process: "No group of Englishmen, how-
ever intelligent , could by taking thought have devised 
a.nd then imposed on their fellows a scheme of government 
which would have worked a.s well as pa.rl iamentary govern-
ment ha.s worked. 112 Gregg a.nd Williams object to the sanc-
tification of the status quo by a. rigid functionalism, '"the 
dismal science" which makes "all social institutions appear 
right a.nd good by definition." 3 Cultures create a.s well 
as solve problems; only in part is culture adaptive or 
adjustive. 4 Benedict thinks it is "beside the point to 
l. Gregg and Williams, Art.(l948), 596. The orientation 
of the authors to the White-Ayres idea of technology is 
evident. · 
2. Homa.ns, ~rr'c, 404-5. See also Bidney, TA, 366-370. 
3. Gregg and Williams, Art.(l948), 597. See also 604. 
4. Many of these comments were stimulated by lectures 
by Clyde Kluckhohn, in 1951. 
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argue, from its important place in behavior, the social 
usefulness of a custom."1 Sword-wearing has disappeared, 
but men continue to mount horses from the left. 2 Even 
witchcraft can have a "function"· in a society. 3 Extreme 
functionalism becomes a deterministic theory 11which leads 
to absolute relativism and makes nonsense not only of the 
theory itself but of all thought."4 
Alexander Lesser, · who, along with Leslie A. White, 
is classed as a nee-evolutionist, admits that nineteenth 
century evolutionism is dead· but thinks it is time to move 
beyond polemics to a theory of cultural development con-
sistent with the facts, not unilinear, not inevitable, and 
not a closed system. 5 S. F. Nadel insists that twentieth 
century criticism was directed at the inadequacy of nine-
teenth century method, not at the evolutionary concept it-
self.6 White argues that even the nineteenth century evo-
, 
lutionists did not say that every group had to pass through 
1. Benedict, Art.{l931), 813. 
2. Linton, SM, 295. 
3. Kluckhohn, c., NW. 
4. Evans-Pritchard, Art.(l950), 120. Gregg and Williams, 
Art.(l948), '605, argue that "Nothing follows from func-
tionalist. . ! • principles with more cogent urgency than the 
doctrine of 'cultural relativism.'" See Siegel, Art. 
(1948). 
5. Lesser, Art.{l952), 134 ff. 
6. Nadel, FSA, 104-5. 
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the same series of stages. 1 According to Steward, there 
are three types of cultural evolution: 1) unilinear, with 
stages in sequence; 2) universal, of all culture, not o£ 
cultures; 3) multilinear, with limited parallel~ rather 
than universals. 2 Distinction can also be made between 
progress, implying an end in view, and evolution, meaning 
movement from a point of departure, although both concepts . 
imply advance.3 EVolution may be conceived as combining 
accident and law, with possibilities for retrogres.sion.4 
·White conceives of history as temporal sequences, science 
as non-temporal structure-£unction, or £orm, and evolu-
tionism as a temporal sequence of forms. 5 
Murdock does not think anthropologists have to 
choose between historical, functional, and psychological 
approaches, 'but sees Linton, Kluckhohn and others as using 
all these as tools in one system. 6 
4. The Concept of Culture. 
Discussing progress in anthropology 1940-1950, 
1. vVhite, in Tax {ed.), AAT, 71. 
2. Steward, Art.(l953), 315. See White, Art.{l945)1. 
3. Mead and Galas ( eds. ) , PH, xxvii. 
4. Radcliffe-Brown, Art.(l947), 80-2; Murdock, SS, 
186-190. 
5. vYhite, Art.(l945) 1 , and Art.(l947) 1 • White's crite-
rion of energy for evaluating cultures will be discussed 
in V, 2. 
6. Murdock, SS, xvi. 
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A. L. Kroeber stresses culture as the most outstanding 
concept and contribution of the period,1 while Linton 
terms it 11 the most important development in social stud-
ies.n2 The concept provides some persons with some degree 
of detachment and objectivity from their own cultural val-
ues.3 Its importance, according to Otto Klineberg, a so-
cial psychologist, is in making it possible to see group 
behavior in t erms of learned activities rather than bio-
logically-determined tendencies.4 
"Toppling of the doctrine of racism" is thus point-
ed to as one result of the conceptual advance. 5 Boas' 
The Mind of Primitive Man was perhaps most influential 
in showi ng that custom, not blood, is more determinative 
of man's behavior, t hus indicating the plastic quality 
of "human n ature" and levelling the ideas of "innate in-
fer i ority." 
There is no fundamental difference in the ways of 
thinking of primitive and civilized man. A close 
connection between race and personality has never 
been established. 
* * 
1. Kroeber, Art.(l950)1, 87. 
2. Linton, Art.(l952), 646. 
3. Kluckhohn and Kelly, Art.(l945), 104. 
4. Klineberg, TAIU, 189, who refers to Stuart Chase, The 
Proper Study of Mankind (New York: Harper and Bros., 
1941), 50. 
5. Kroeber, Art.(195o)l, 87. 
Ethnologists in their studies of culture have con-
centrated their attention upon the differences in 
cultural status and have disregarded racial ele-
ments completely. The similarity of fundamental 
customs and beliefs the world over, without regard 
to race and environment, is so general that race 
appeared to them as irrelevant.! 
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Ruth Benedict is even more specific: "Man is not commit-
ted in detail by his biological constitution to any par-
ticular variety of behavior. 11 She goes on to emphasize 
"the small scope of biologically transmitted behaviour, 
and the enormous role of the cultural process of the 
transmission of tradition. rt 2 
It se·ems strange that this very emphasis upon the 
basic unity of mankind, the similarity of mental proces-
ses of all peoples, 3 whi1e seeming to emphasize univer-
sals, should also be the conceptual basis for cultural 
relativism. · Perhaps the paradox is best illustrated in 
a single paragraph from Herskovits, who tells how the an-
thropologist "grad,ually .forced the recognition of the 
degree of variety of human culture. Himself impressed 
with the dignity and maturity of the peoples with whom 
he worked, he labored incessantly to make known the basic 
1. Boas, MPM, v, 32-3. See also 130-8. 
2. Benedict, PC, 12-14. See also Benedict, Art.(l943), 
and Race: Science and Politics (New York: Modern Age Press, 
1940-r.- -
3. See Boas, MPM, 130-8; Kluckhohn, C., MM, 274. 
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unity of human behavior."l This study will attempt to 
show in Chapter Three that anthropologists, while using 
cultural relativism as a method of understanding cultures 
and as a weapon against ethnocentrism, have never been 
able to hold to it consistently when the chips were down. 
In spite of general agreement on the importance of 
the concept of culture there has been considerable dis-
agreement on its definition. It is not equivalent to 
civilization, and certainly not to ubeing cultured," 
but is more like Durkheiin' s usocial facts." Tylor gave 
it classic definition as "that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of so-
ciety.n2 Kluckhohn and Kelly define culture as tta histor-
ically derived system of explicit and implicit designs for 
living, which tends to be shared by all or specially desig-
nated members of a group." 3 It was 1948 before a 
1. Herskovits, MHW, 642, emphasis supplied. 
2. Tylor, Art.(l924), 61, reprinted from his early Primi-
tive Culture. See also Boas, MPM, 159:" ••• the totality 
of the mental and physical reactions and activities that 
characterize the behavior of the individuals composing a 
social group collectively and individually, in relation 
to their natural environment, to other groups, to members 
of the group itsel.f and of each individual to himself." 
3. Kluckhohn and Kelly, Art.(l945), 98. See also Hoebel, 
MPW, 3-4, and Redfield, PWT, 85. 
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definition s pecif i cally mentioned values. 1 A concluding 
definition is that of Kluckhohn's: 
Culture cons :t sts of patterns, explicit and 
i mplicit, of and for behavior, acquired and trans-
mitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievements of human groups, including their em-
bodiments in artifacts. The essential core of 
culture consists of traditional (i.e., historical-
ly derived and selected) ideas and especially their 
attached values. Culture systems may, on one hand, 
be consider ed as products of action; on the other, 
as conditioning elements of further action.2 
There are certain common features--and common as-
sumptions--underlying these definitions. 3 First, culture 
is at least one universal characteristic of all men and 
all societies, however unique may be its manifestations. 
Second, culture is learned, it is social heritage, and, 
therefore, at least potentially subject to bei~g learned 
by all men. 4 Third, although culture as social heritage 
1. See Kroeber, Ant., 253-4. 
2. Kluckhohn, C.-;-C'lass lecture, November 19, 1951. See 
also Kluckhohn, C., Art o(l951)2. 
3. See Herskovits, MHW , 18, 625-641. See also Hoebel, 
MPW, 3 ff. 
4. See Benedict, PC, 12. See also Redfield, in Tax (ed.), 
AAT, 121: "If you took an ordinary human being and put 
him in some remote part of the world, no matter how unedu-
cated he was and how unprepared for the phenomena of cul-
ture and the wholesale implications of the philosophy of 
cultural relativism and all the rest of it, if he survived 
at all and was not put into the pot and stewed, he would 
get along with these people on the basis of certain assump-
tions he mak~to the effect that these people were, on the 
whole, like him." 
is stable and, in a sense, 11 given,n it is also dynamic, 
always "in t he making," continuously being changed by 
human agents, an ttopen" rather than a nclosed" system. 1 
The reco gnition of the fact of change creates something 
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of a problem for cultural monists and determinists. Fourth, 
as implied in the idea of learning, culture is artificial, 
inhibiting the randomness of behavior. It is not to be 
set completely over against nature and human nature, but 
is rather a "correlative, polar concept." 2 It not only 
restrains "natural man," but it also enables him, sets 
him free, as a regulative process instituted and con-
tinually modified "by man in his search for realization. 
This i mpl ies that · culture is not a ttnatural system" with 
laws of its own. Fifth, culture is selective, involving 
focus and impl y ing that its derivation from biological, 
environmental, psychological, and historical components 
of human existence does not determine a single answer, 
but provides a framework of possible answers. Sixth, 
culture is in a sense normative, in that it provides 
standards for making choices, in that patterns of ex-
pectation are necessary for social life, and in that 
1. ·See Bidney, TA ~ 138, 376. 
2. Bidney, TA, 140. See also 141-154. 
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following customary ways affirms solidarity. 1 Seventh, 
culture is t o some extent patterned or integrated. This 
means that culture is social rather than idiosyncratic, 
that much of its influence is unconscious, that it is a 
fabric rather than shreds and patches. Note that cultures 
can h ave de grees of integration.2 Bidney insists that 11 in-
tegration per ~ is not an absolute good" and proposes 
teleofunctional rather than functional integration or log-
ical consistency. · A normative concept, teleofunctional 
integration involves dyn~~ic balance and individual ·par-
ticipation in the achievement of goals. 3 
In relation to this study, perhaps the most impor-
tant comrr!on assumption i s that of culture as a differ-
entiat i ng factor between groups of people. Note, as a 
type case, Sapir's description of culture a:s the attitudes, 
views, etc. "that give a par t icular people its distinctive 
1. See Parsons and S~ils (eds.), TGTA, 16-18; and Kluck-
hohn, c., Art.(l951) • . See also Bidney, TA, 400-412. 
2. See Sapir, "The Unconscious Patterning of Behavior in 
Societ1," in ~:andelbaum (ed.), SWES, 544-559; Linton, Art. 
( 1938) ; Murdock, OPC, ix; Kluckhohn, C., MM , 35;. Bene-
dict l n Mead and Galas (eds.), PH, 80-94. 
3. Bidney , TA, 394-9. 
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place in the world. 111 Despite Bidney 1 s distinction be-
twe en ttculture" and 11 a culture;" these definitions assume 
culture as a correlative concept to a particular society2 
and prejudge the issue of cultural relativism. Kluckhobn 
and Kelly 1 s conception ( ". • • tends to be shared by all 
.2!. ~ciall;y: designated members of a group. 113 ) opens the 
way for the crucial question of variability within as w~ll 
as between groups. 
That culture is not a simple concept is further 
indicated by the necess i ty of differentiating between cul-
tural patt erns as ideal constructs in the minds of anthro-
pologists, abstractions from 1) the patterns of ideals and 
norms of persons and 2) the patterns of actual behavior 
of persons. 4 To indicate that culture is, . in one sense, 
a construct or an abstraction, does not i mply 11nothing 
but" or a mere fiction, for the concept is susceptible 
1~ Sapir, "Culture: Genuine and Spurious," in Mandelbaum 
(ed.), SWES , 311. Sapir criticizes the exclusive psychic 
emphasis of this suggestion but seems to accept the impli-
cation of group identification. However, he feels that 
genuine culture can never belong to more than a small, 
autonomous group. 328. See Kroeber, Ant., 9. 
2. On the relation .of society to cul t'i:lr'e' see III, 3, i. 
3. Kluckhohn and Kelly, Art.(l945); see III, 3, i. 
4. Fried, Art.(l953). See Bidney 1 s five levels of ab-
straction TA, 174-5. See also Opler, Art.{l948); Osgood, 
Art .(l951). 
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to continuing empirical reference to the behavior of per-
sons.1 To anticipate later discussion, the concept refers 
to a process, not to an entity or a thing , to the way peo-
ple pattern their behavior and transmit these patterns to 
their ch ildren and assume or explain their value.2 
Kluckhohn and Murray write that Ruth Benedict 
"makes the mos t fundamental point of the cultural anthro-
pologist when slae. insists that the anthropologist's t ask 
'· •• is to insist upon the interposition of a middle term 
between "nature" and human behavior, • n3 that is, the 
,, screenn of culture. 4 "No man ev er looks at the world 
with pristine eyes. 115 The fact of culture and the explan-
atory v alue of the concept are not here called into ques-
tion, but, as Bidney says, · there is danger that culture 
"become t h e new absolute and self explanatory reality~ 
the measure of man ••• no longer used to justify cultural 
progress but to justify cultural relativism. 116 Mrs. de 
Laguna agrees that it is the concept of culture "which 
\ 
1. See Bidney , TA, 374, 155, 128-130. 
2. See Frank , L. K., Art.(l948), 115-6. See Hoebel, 
MP'N, 436. 
3. Kluckhohn and Murray (eds.), PNSC, 414-5. 
4. Kluckhohn and Kelly, Art.(l945), 90. 
5. Benedict, PC, 2. See also Herskovits, MHW, 27. 
6. Bidney , TA, 423~ This study follows Bidney's in-
sistence that we must posit a'norm for ev al u ating the 
cultural proces s itself." 12. 
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provides the theoretical basis for our modern version of 
cultural relativism. nl 
5. The Concept of Cultural Relativism. 
Cultural relativism stems from the doctrine that 
each culture is an integrated whole and implies 11 that the 
values expressed in any culture are to be both understood 
and themselves valued only according to the way th~ people 
who carry that culture see things." 2 Herskovits, its 
leading exponent, describes it as a utough-minded" (em-
pirical) philosophy, requiring those who hold it "to alter 
responses that arise out of some of the strongest encul-
turative conditioning to which they have been exposed." 
He contrasts it to "tender-minded" (rationalistic) views 
. . 3 
and to ethnocentrism. 
Judgments are based on experience .. , and experience 
is interpreted by each individual in terms of his 
own enculturation. Evaluations are relative to the 
cultural background out of which they arise. 4 
1. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 144. She points to the 11 im-
plicit nominalism in modern anthropological thought," 
which holds that individual cultures are real while 
culture is an abstraction. 
2. Redfield, ~VT, 144. 
3. Herskovits, Art.(l951), 23. Credit is given William 
James for the categories. In contrast, Vivas describes the 
doctrine as nProtagorean" (MLEL, 27), and Bidney calls it 
ttromantic 11 £Art.(l953), 689 f~7· 
4. Herskovits, ~mw, 63; see 64-5. Redfield does not dis-
agree v1ith the basing of judgments on experience but ar-
gues that this does not imply all that Herskovits says 
regarding relativism. P\~, 145. 
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Boas wrote in 1911 these words that remain in later edi-
tions: 
It is somewhat difficult for us to recognize that 
the value which we attribute to our own civiliza-
tion is due to the fact that we participate in 
this civilization, and that it has been control-
ling all our actions since the time of our birth.l 
For Ruth Benedict cultural relativism implies acceptance 
of "coexisting and equally valid patterns of life" and 
is destined to become "another trusted bulwark of the 
good life." 
No man can thoroughly participate in any culture 
unless he has been brought up · and has lived 
according to its forms, but he can grant to other 
cultures the same significance to their partici-
pants which he recognizes in his own.2 
Kroeber takes a similar view, based on an .assumption 
of moral codes as ttnonrational, though often falsely 
rationalized" group habits or customs, usually emotion-
ally charged. For him relativism means that "every cul-
ture is more or less right in its ways when judged in terms 
of its own premises, and that no culture is probably more 
right than others in the abstract." 3 As Kluckhohn notes 
in a review oi' ~~His Works, "the premises, them-
selves, are apparently to be unquestioned. 11 4 
1. Boas, MPM , 225. 
2. Benedict, PC, 14, 33. 
3. Y~oeber, Ant., 265-6. 
4. Kluckhohn~., Rev.(l948). 
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Cultural relativism is ·to be distinguished from 
sociological relativism, v.rhich is concerned with the ori-
gin of social values as a function of class interests and 
social structure. Cultural relativism takes the values 
as given. 1 Mrs. de Laguna thinks it important to recog-
nize that cultural rel ativism ·· "is not simply a doctrine 
limited to holding t h at the existence of a mode of thought 
is causally determined by cultural conditions," as a, fer-
tility rite mi ght be expected only among an agricultural 
people. 
Cultural relativism is a doctrine concerning es-
sence as well as existence. Beliefs as meanings, 
and st andards as valuations, are determined by, 
and rel ative to, the cultures to which they belong.2 
In the following chapter cultur al relativism is 
considered against its philosophical and cultural back-
ground and in terms of its different meaning as method 
and as philosophy, looking toward a distinction between 
cultural relativism and relativity. Critical examination 
is made of t h e assumptions and implications of the con-
cept and of the involvements of the anthropologists who 
use cultural relativism as support for neutrality and 
tolerance. 
1. Bidney, Art.(l953), 691. 
2. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 145. 
CHAPTER THREE 
CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
1. Relativism in Philosophy. 
Relativism of truth and morals is no new doctrine. 
Mrs. de Laguna refers to cultural relativism as "the mod-
ern version of skepticism. 111 She indicates its ante-
c edents in the Greek Sophists: 
The relativism of human knowledge and of 
human standards has been held in some form since 
the beginnings of reflective thought. Each age 
since that of the Sophists has furnished its own 
version, and each fresh version has been attacked 
by the legitimate descendants of Socrates and 
Plato. The ground of attack has always been 
essentially the same: that the current version 
of relativism is committed to inherent contra-
dictions. It is indeed so easy to show that a 
complete relativism is impossible because it is · 
essentially self-refuting, that the really per-
plexing problem is why the doctrine of relativism 
continues to survive, or to arise like the phoenix 
from each succes,sive destruction.2 
Moderns may recognize this long background; -but they think 
that truly scientific proof of relativism has only recent-
ly been g iven. However, Kurt von Fritz holds that uthe 
fundamental belief underlying all these theories is that 
1. ~ de Laguna, Art.(l942), 142. 
2. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 141. von Fritz, Art.(l952), 
94-5, gives a similar review. 
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ethical relativism has been proved by 'scientific' ob-
servation."! Louise Saxe Eby thinks that the modern idea 
of morality as a matter of taste reflects not only the im-
pact of anthropology, but also the disillusionment of those 
who take the breakdown of specific codifications as indi-
c ating no moral codes are possible. 2 
Protagoras is usually cited as the first relativist. 
For h i m, there was no truth for man outside his feelings, 
and as sensations differ between individuals, so do truths. 
Since there is no criterion by which to measure truth, it 
becomes a matter of taste. Protagoras exaggerated differ-
ences, refusing to admit a universal human nature.3 Blan-
shard points out that the idea that .thinking is the puppet 
1. von Fritz, Art.(l952), 95. See also Kluckhohn, C., 
MEHV, 95-8. 
2. Eby, QML, 4 . See Morgan, A., SC, 257. 
3. See Weber and Perry, HP, 41-3. Roger Shinn, Art. 
(1953), calls attention to the pluralism of Xenophanes' 
observation that if oxen painted pictures of deities, 
they would look like oxen. Xenophanes saw Thracian red-
headed deities, African Negroid, and drew skeptical con-
clusions. 
of feeling began, not with Freud, but with Protagoras. 1 
Thomas Hobbes was a seventeenth century thinker 
who saw no ground in nature for moral norms. On such a 
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basis the only law Hobbes recognized was arbitrary human 
decree. His relativism left him with force as the only 
sanction for absolute sovereignty. 2 Hobbes is mentioned 
as representative not only because of the absolutism in 
practice that grew out of his relativism in theory, but 
also because of his reflection of the social and political 
situation of his day and of his desire to be "scientific. 11 3 
That these characteristics are not unrelated to modern rel-
ativism will be indicated in the next chapter. 
In contrast, it may be suggested that the doctrine 
of natural rights (and law) and the ideal of a common hu-
manity hav.e served through history as weapons of revolu-
tion and reform against arbitrary government and outmoded 
1. Blanshard, Art.(l947), 37. Blanshard also counters the 
suggestion of Allers, Art.(l950), 63, and Wild, PME, 70, 
that idealism is the source of relativism, and the linking 
of Nazism too simply with rationalism: "The thinkers of 
the great tradition have held that our thought, if it was 
to be reasonable, must bow to a logic the same for all of 
us, absolute in its requirements and independent of de-
sire." This, Blanshard argues, is not authoritarian, but 
that in the name of which authoritarian absolutism is 
challenged. Blanshard, Art.{l947), 38-9. 
2. Wild, PME, 125-7. 
3. Sabine, HPT, 455 ff. See Hill, CET, 10. 
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institutions.l 
2. Relativism in Anthropology. 
i. The Cultural Background of Cultural Relativism. 
Cultural relativism needs to be seen not only in 
the perspective of history of philosophy but also against 
its own cultural background, for one assumption of this 
study is that the concept of cultural relativism is itself 
culturally relative. Kluckhohn notes that the tradition 
of objectivity in anthropology may well be due to the fact 
that for early amateurs anthropology was a hobby and that 
they nstudied the things they did out of pure interest and 
not either to earn a living or to reform the world." He 
also raises the question of the kind of people who would 
be curious about the strange and bizarre, perhaps reflec~ 
ting a dissatisfaction with the familiar.2 Similarly, the 
inclusiveness of viewpoint and refusal to observe the "No 
Trespassing" signs of other disciplines may be ascribed to 
the fact that single ethnographers faced the task of record-
. \ 
ing all the information they could about a primitive cul-
ture before it was disturbed by western invasion. 3 Ruth 
1. See Bidney, TA, 411. 
2. Kluckhohn, C., MM, 4, 5. 
3. See Linton, S~VC, 4. 
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Benedict readily points to the influence of Darwin on the 
early evolutionary anthropologists. 1 
There were other relativizing influences. One of 
these was historical relativism, the idea that man has 
no nature but only a history (without continuity).2 Ernst 
Troeltsch, who thought.he had found a principle of uni-
versal rel·evance in personality as he studied western 
religion, became a relativist when he faced the imper-
sonal mysticism of the East.3 
Another type of relativism has been the religious. 
John C. Bennett explains that secular moral relativism that 
casts doubt concerning the existence of universal moral 
standards is often taken by Christian thinkers to be a 
good preparation for faith in revelation.4 Marvin W. 
Cook, in a discerning study of the relativism of Rein-
hold Niebuhr, defines religiously oriented ethical rela-
tivism as 
••• the view that, due to the limitations of human 
reason and the evidence of conflicting moral stan-
dards and frustrated moral ideals, man~~ is in-
capable, apart from social pressure or the inter-
vention of supernatural aid, of making universally 
normative valid distinctions concerning the nature 
1. Benedict, Art.(l931), 810. 
2. Shinn, Art.(l953). See Lavely, PPH, 87-9. 
3. See Troeltsch, Art.(l924). 
4. Bennett, J. C., CESP, 117. 
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of right and the good, and of formulating a system 
of general ethical principles that can function 
concretely as a constructive guide to men in their 
personal and collective conduct.l 
E. T. Ramsdell, to whom Cook acknowledges indebtedness, 
emphasizes that the issue for Christian thought is not 
wh eth er there are ultimate moral distinctions but whether 
man is capable of valid moral judgments. 2 
Sociology of knowledge began with Karl Marx' cri-
tique of capitalist thought as "ideological," reflecting 
class and group interests. It was completed by Karl Mann-
heim, whose Ideology and Utopia was written to demonstrate 
that all modes of thought are inevitably '•interested, u. 
that i~ determined by their social origins. Mannheim 
even extended this relationism to Marxist thought, which 
Marx had thought exempt. 3 Emile Durkheim was also con-
cerned with the origins rather than the truth of such a 
social fact as morality.4 On the basis of this view, the 
only reality man can know is historically determined and 
1. Cook, ERRN, 36. See Hill, GET, 106, for a discussion 
o£ Niebuhr's position as based on Mannheim's sociology of 
knowledge. See also Wild, PME, 175, concerning the atti-
tude of the Protestant reformers. 
2. Ramsdell, Art.(l943), 214. See Ramsdell on the influ~ 
ence of Westermarck. 
3. See Hill, GET, 45~58, especially 52-3. 
4. See ·Tsanoff, MIOC, 574 • 
.. 
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"there are as many worlds as there are disparate socio-
cultural contexts. 111 The debunking of too-abstract spec-
ulation needed to be done, but Mannheim's treatment was so 
devastating that the criteria of proof themselves becrune 
subjects of disputes.2 Harold Laski observes: nWhen you 
are aware of the limitation of your knowledge •• • , you 
refuse to identify your candle's fitful gleam with the 
light of the sum. 11 3 
Pragmatism has also been a relativizing influence 
in its protest aganst authoritarian standards and fixed 
values in favor of hypothetical ends and conditional rules. 
It has insisted on the plasticity of human nature as over 
against a theory of instincts. John Dewey's emphasis has 
been on consequences and on the instrumental character 
of truth. Judgments tend to be justified in terms of 
1. Bidney, Art.{l949), 352. 
2. Louis Wirth, in "Prefacen to Mannheim, IU, xiii. 
Erich Fromm, M.FH, 5, similarly approves of psychoanal-
ysis' debunking of certain norms, but pronounces it 
sterile when it failed to go beyond criti6ism. See 
Fromm, EFF, 248-9, for a discussion of "interest." 
3. Q.uoted in Boodin, SM, 421. Note Merton's idea in 
STSS, 386-394, that the sociology of knowledge was oft-
en an ad hoc theory. See also Bidney, Art.(l949), 352, 
for a criticism of the theory as self-refuting in that 
it i mplicitly assumes itself as an absolute. It is worth 
noting that Mannheim moved beyond this position himself 
in his later years. 
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'·' better," but the criteria of "betterness'·' are not al-
ways clear. It is almost relevant to apply Richard Nie-
buhr's story of the boys playing ball who, when asked 
about the rules, replied, 11The only rule is, 'Don't 
cheat l' ttl 
Another influence has been that of logical posi-
tivism, with its insistence that ethical statements have 
no meaning. 2 
The psychological emphasis o_n the genesis of moral-
ity in the emotions of approval and disapproval, as in 
Edward Westermarck, leaves moral conflicts unresolvable. 
The compartmentalization of personality into reason and 
emotion is unrealistic, and even non-rational factors can 
be investigated by reason.3 
William Gr~ham Sumner, Yale sociologist, considered 
the mores of a people as absolute values, themselves con-
taining whatev.er norm might be used in judging them, 4 
1. See Brightman, PR, 128; Mitchell, Art.(l944-5); Hill, 
GET, 155-175. 
2. See Hill, CET, 9-29, who connects the positivists 
with Hobbes. 
3. See Bender, PDML, 94; Brightman, Art.(l943), 4; Tsanoff, 
MIOG, 590; Hill, GET, 30-44, 59-82. Fromm, MFH, 36, argues 
that even Freud implies a nonrelativistic position in his 
theory of stages. 
4. Sumner, Folk., 77. 
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thus capable of making anything right or anything wrong 
and of mak ing comparisons between cultures impossible. 
Ralph H. Gabriel points to a curious paradox in Sumner's 
use of the methods of science. urn all this process his 
behavior implied acceptance on his part of absolute ethi-
cal standards, tt such as liberty, honesty, and courage .1 
Sumner is not the last scientist or relativist of whom 
this can be said, and it is not a side issue to discover 
the working hypotheses and practice of Sumner and of later 
anthropologists, as well as their full-blown theories 
about their practice. 
Gunner Myrdal criticizes the concept of mores as 
implying a ttdo-nothing 11 social theory and metaphysic and 
as related to the bias of social science against reform 
and induced social change. 2 Part of this status quo 
orientation has come from a desire to be scientific (i.e., 
natural scie.rice), with pure descriptive objectivity as the 
ideal. Objectivity would seem to be a positive value, 
toward which science is not objective, but committed.3 
Since Kant, it has been "a firm tenet of our intellectuaJ. 
1. Gabriel, GADT, 384-5. See Hill, GET, 36, for a simi-
lar comment on Freud's character. 
2. Myrdal, AD, 1031-4. _ 1 3. Tsanoff, Eth., 25; Muelder, art.(l951) , 102f., 106. 
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folklore that values are outside the realm of science,nl 
and in the nineteenth century came a tacit agreement be-
t ween science and religion that man and his values should 
be ex empt f r om scrutiny. All of this bias against bias 
has tended to reduce the sense of problem in social sci-
ence and to influence social scientists to think in terms 
of equilibrium rather than change, a situation conducive 
to relativism. In time of crisis, when a manwho h appened 
to be a scientist awoke to his responsibilities as a citi-
zen, he tried to hold his t wo roles as far apart as he 
could, an almost intolerable condition.2 But the results 
have been not only in an internal schizophrenia but also 
in the social problem of the separation of scientific 
know-how from moral responsibility. 3 
The cultural conditioning of cultural relativism 
is probably best shown in its emphasis on tolerance (ttlive 
and let l i ve," "some do and some don't"), which reflected 
t h e democratic and liberal, even romantic v.aluation of 
diversity, almost for its ovm sake, prior to 1939. In 
terms o~ the sociology o~ knowledge, the doctrine had its 
1. Kluckhohn, c., MEHV, 95. See Knight and Merriam, 
EOR, 140. 
2. See Siegel, Art.(l948), 210; Nadel,FSA, 25, 49. 54-5; 
Casserley, MMSS, l23ff; Miller, Art.(l951); Heumann, EVT; 
Herskovits, EA , 530. 
3. DeWolf, RRR , 159. 
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origin in the interest and climate of a period. But, as 
has been sugg ested, part of this desire for tolerance was a 
personal revolt against restrictive codes and a seeking of 
justification for deviant standards by reference to more 
"congenial" cultures. One writer ponders the fact that 
rig idity of social status seems to delight the anthropolo-
gist in Samoa and to disgust him in Boston and wonders if 
the best lens through which to study contrasts between 
dynamic and static cultures is the person who hankers, con-
sciously or not, to shed the burden of freedom imposed by 
our society. 1 Judgments of the Middle Ages as "wretched" 
or 11 idyllic" simil 'arly reflect our own attitudes toward 
the present, as a time of democratic fulfilment or as an 
age of social disorg anization. 2 It is interesting to note 
that most anthropologists do return from their wanderings ,3 
which may itself imply a value judgment. But, despite 
their return, many · anthropolog ists have fallen in love 
with t h e peopl e among whom they lived as they studied and 
have come to develop genuine sympathies and friendships. 
1. Furnas, AP, 481. Note Kroeber in Tax (ed.), AAT, 
151-2, on p eople with centrifugal tendencies becoming 
anth ropologists while those who prefer the familiar stay 
with sociology. See Shridharani, Art.(l950), 168. 
2. Romans, EVTC, 11. 
3. Wallis, Art.(l952), 143. 
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This has had its effect upon the idea of tolerance and non-
judgment of other cultures, as well as upon the assumption 
of a "pre-established harmony" which makes possible the 
peaceful coexistence of radically different ways of life~ 
The strange thing is that the same anthropologists 
who urged toleration rather than criticism of other cul-
tures reversed the role of the nineteenth century mission-
ary and returned to their own culture using objectivity 
as a weapon to reform its ethnocentrism (despite the bias 
against reform). Furnas comes to the defense of our 11 cul-
ture-studying culture": 
For generations the western world has bitterly 
blamed western man for the crime of not under-
standing the savage. It seems never to occur to 
anybody that, other things being equal, it would 
be equally fair to blame the savage for not under-
standing western man. 2 
It must not be overlooked that cultural relativism 
1. See Siegel, Art.(l948), 204; Benedict, PC, 257; Bidney, 
Art.(l953), 688; Tax (ed.), AAT, 366. 
2. Furnas, AP, 488. See also Green, A. W., Art.(l948), 
225. Furnas, AP, 479-480, compares the anthropologist's 
criticism of missionaries to how Sherlock Holmes would have 
£elt i£ thousands had milled over the site o£ a crime for 
days before he arrived. "But the trouble about man-pre-
serving is not that it may be immoral, rather that it leads 
to intellectual sins. It encourages theethnologist to re-
gard cultures as existing in vacuo, the same error under-
lying the doctrine of equar-validity of all cultural traits 
everywhere." 
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has been motivated, at least in part, by moral sensitivity 
and k indliness. However, it has h ad obvious implications 
of the relativism of all moral standards. It has become 
dangerous as a popular philosophy. Though this does not 
prove it untrue, its breakdown in time of crisis will be 
1 treated in III, 3, iii. 
ii. Cultural Relativism as Methodology and~ Philos-
~· 
The fact of cultural relativism is not in dispute, 
as has been indicated earlier. Criticism of its cultural 
background and of its popular results should not blind us 
to its importance as a basic postulate of anthropological 
field work. Different cultures do reveal different ways 
of behaving and of valuing, and these not random but pat-
terned to a large extent. People do make judgments on the 
basis of t h eir experience and interpret their experience 
in the light of their cultural background. To be under-
stood, a culture must first be examined in terms of its 
own structure and values. For Herskovits the method of 
relativism enjoins scienti~ic objectivity and precludes 
judging or seeking to change the ways of life being 
1. See Garnett, Art.(l943-4), 191; de Laguna, Art.(l942), 
161. 
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observed. It ·emphasizes understanding in terms of the cul-
ture itself "and refrains from making interpretations that 
arise from a preconceived (sic) frame of reference. 11 1 
So far so good: but recognizing only the categories 
of the culture being described leads to an untrammeled 
relativism in which each culture becomes "a self-contained 
monad which can ••• be compared with others only vaguely, 
'intuitively,' 'artistically.' rt2 The reader can at 
least have sympathy for, even if not real understanding 
of, the tragic plight of Ruth Benedict's Ramon, who some-
how "straddled -two cultures whose values and ways of 
thought were incommensurable. 11 3 Would not such an atti-
tude make it impossible really to "understand" a differ-
ent culture from one's own, which is supposed to be the 
purpose. of the method? Is there an inconsistency between 
Herskovits' insistence that "all men are so conditioned 
in their perceptions ••• and their judgments" by the sanc-
tions of their respective groups (page 28) and his seem-
ing exemption of anthropologists (page 23}, who nlive in 
a climate o~ opinion whose influence is so strong and yet 
1. Herskovits, Art. ( 1951), 24. Unless otherwise .. noted, 
references in this section are to this article, 24-30. 
2. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l953), 508. 
3. Benedict, PC, 20. In contrast, see 12. 
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so gentle that it is only by an effort of will that one 
becomes aware of it." 
Mrs. de Laguna knows of no anthropologist who has 
carried the i mplicit doctrine of cultural relativism to 
its logical conclusion or who is willing to accept the . 
conclusion when confronted by it. The logical conclusion, 
she says, is "that no concepts are universally applicable 
and no st a.ndards objectively valid. ul Some proponents of 
relativism, either unaware or indifferent, do not spell out 
the philosophical implications of the doctrine. At certain 
points in his writing Herskovits seems ready to draw the 
logical conclusion. He distinguishes between cultural rela-
tivism as methodology (see above), as philosophy, and as 
practice. Out of the data ngathered, ordered, and assessed" 
according to the method "came the philosophical position, 
and with the philosophical position came speculation as 
to its implications for conduct." It is open to question 
whether the ttought" of relativism is derived from the nisu 
of the data, or is identified with the relativism of the 
data. This leap is not a matter of fact but rather an in-
ference or assumption.2 
1. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 146. 
2. See Wallis, Art.(l952), 144; Siegel, Art.(l948), 204. 
l 
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As philosophy relativism concerns both the nature 
of cultural values and an epistemology that recognizes the 
force of enculturation, according to Herskovits. As such 
j_t involves departing from the ethnocentric practice of 
stressing divergences from absolute norms and brings into 
relief "the validity of every set of norms for the people 
whose lives are guiQ.ed by them," granting to every people 
"cultural autonomy. nl 
Kroeber also seems to admit that the principle of 
examining a culture in terms of its own values leads, from 
its base in method, "to a relativistic or pluralistic phil-
osophy--a belief in many values rather than a single value 
system. But why not, if the facts so demand? 11 2 In reply 
to Kluckhor~'s criticism, Herskovits wonders if he does 
not mean that the anthropologist should "seek to change 
those elements of the culture of which he disapproves," 
and goes on to ask: "But where are the cross-cultural 
guides?" Who determines what is "good" or "bad"?3 
Arthur E. Murphy distinguishes clearly between des-
cribing an existing relativism of cust oms and making this 
condition of anomie itself normative: 
1. Herskovits, MHW, 761 655. 2. Kroeber, Art.(l950) , 87. 
3. For Kluckhohn's and other criticisms, see next section. 
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The social situation this relativism re-
flects and rationalizes, is obvious enough. The 
moral impasse in which "I want" and "you shall" 
are t he last word in the determination of what is 
right and good is precisely that in which effective 
community of understanding has broken down; and the 
claims of individuals, classes, and nations confront 
each other in blank, unmediated competition. To 
recognize this breakdown as a fact is realistic com-
mon sense. To normalize it philosophically as the 
final truth about the meaning of our ideals ••• is 
something else. It is moral defeatism in the guise 
of scientific objectivity and analytical sophisti-
cation.l 
Blanshard thinks that the results would not be accepted 
complacently if the anthropologists really acted upon 
2 their philosophical doctrine. However, it is as a phil-
osophy, its assumptions and implications, that cultural 
relativism will now be criticized. 
3. Criticism of Cultural Relativism. 
i. The Assumutions of Cultural Relativism. 
The assumptions of anthropologists are not . often 
made explicit, although many anthropologists are coming to 
admit that a v alue-free science is an illusion. Rendering 
value- judgments : explicit is at least one step toward the 
ideal of objectivity, and Nadel sugg ests that teamwork 
1. Murphy, A. E., Art.(l950), 461. 
2. Blanshard, Art.(l947), 26. 
might help to cancel out biases.l Raymond Firth points 
to t wo k inds of assumptions that anthropologists make: 
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first, assumptions of fact, as to what is typical or most 
significant in a society; second, assumptions of the nat ure 
, 
of reality, which det ermine ideas of the aims of science 
and of social life.2 These two kinds of assumptions inter-
act t o produce such hidden valuations as "harmonious," 
11 logical, II It COnSUmmate Skill J II etc • in SUpposedly Ob j ec-
tive descriptions. John W. Bennett illustrates the in-
fluence of assumptions as he compares two studies of the 
Pueblo which emerge with different patterns because one 
concentr ates on "ends achieved" and the other on "means 
used. " 0 
In terms of this study the two basic assumptions 
underlying much, if not all, cultural relativism are: 1) 
that the concept of culture is ident i fied with a particu-
lar conception of society with political overtones, fur-
ther assuming too complete inregration of each cultUre 
and i gnor i ng variations within cultures; and 2) that each 
culture is in a sense a closed system, a thing in and of 
1 . Nadel. FSA, 51-3; Kluckh ohn, c., Art.(l949)2, 041-2; 
Siegel, Ar t .(l948); :Myrdal, AD, 1027-1064. 
2. Firth, Art.(l944-5), 51. 
0. See Bennett, J. W., Art.{l946). 
itself, thus implying a monistic cultural determinism. 
Romans' definition of a society as human beings who 
interact more with each other than with any others is 
used in various articles by Kluckhohn, who goes on to 
indicate culture as the distinctive way of life of such 
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a group of people. 1 The determinate group for study is 
not a ngiven," and each anthropologist has to decide what 
groups he will treat as cultural units. It is not every 
anthropologist who says explicitly, or implicitly, "that 
any particular way of life belongs to a greater phenomenon 
(the total culture of humanity) of which any one culture 
is one temporary phase.u 2 It would seem as if the concept 
of culture had been used to deny the divisiveness of race 
in biological terms only to accentuate differences between 
cultures, and so - societies, by attaching ••peculiar im-
portance to some one of the multiple associations in which 
all men participate." Richard McKeon insists, with refer-
ence to the opposition of the u.s. and the U.S.S.R., that 
the world is not simply divided into two parties but ttit 
is made up of men and women associated in a vast number 
1. Romans, EVTC, 403; Kluckhohn and Kelly, Art.(l945); 
Kluckhohn, c., MM, 24; etc. See definitions in II, 4. 
2. Kluckhohn, C., W~ ,269; see Murdock, Art.(l953), 477. 
See also Boas, AML, 13, 235. 
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of groups, including nations, classes, races, parties, 
trade unions, religions ••• ttl Kluckhohn and Murray de-
scribe the determinants of personality in these terms: 
t~Every man is in certain respects a) like all other men, 
b) like some other man, c) like no other man." In addi-
tion to universal and idiosyncratic determinants, they 
emphasize group memb-ership . and include seafaring men, 
desert folk, intellectuals, athletes, and persons in author-
ity. In such groups men are like some other men. 2 Note 
that such groups cut across nations, tribes, and classes. 
Lowie criticizes the conception of culture as a 
closed system, asking whether such a system be identified 
with "the chief's family ••• , his village, the district 
of Kiriwina, the Island of Boyowa, the Trobriand archi-
pelago, the North Massim province, New Guinea, or per-
chance Melanesia. " 3 The dominant fact of today 1 s world 
is no longer divergency but the acceleration of a process 
almost forcing unity.4 
1. McKeon, Art.(l950), 203-4. 
2. Kluckhohn and Murray .~ (eds. ), PNSC, 35-7. 
3. Lowie, HET, 235. 
4. See Bidney, in Tax (ed.), AAT, 338: "The most con-
spicuous human characteristic ••• is the fantastic ••• 
property exhibited by mankind ••• to become more and more 
irresistibly united into a single natural whole. 11 
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It is true that culture and society are correlative 
terms, that culture is in a real sense the way of life of 
a people and does define for a society its world, that hu-
man evolution is a group phenomenon and not individual-
istic.1 One almost natural division that has influenced 
this assumption of the anthropologists concerning which 
group to select as 11 society" has been the matter of lan-
guage. Sapir notes that n 'He t .alks like us' is equiva-
lent to saying 'He is one or' us.' n 2 And Toynbee further 
emphasizes the divisiveness of language: 
Though the institution of language exists 
for the purpose of serving as a means of communi-
cation between human beings, its social effect in 
the history of mankind hitherto has actually been, 
on the whgle, to divide the human race and not to 
unite it. 
This first assumption concerning culture is in 
large part due to the preoccupation of anthropologists 
with preliterate peoples, to the conception of the or-
ganic wholeness of these societies as illustrated in Red-
field's ideal-type, 11 The Folk Society, 11 and to t.t a general 
critical attitude ••• toward the heterogeneity of modern 
life."4 Redfield describes a culture as an organized 
1. Linton, Art.(l938) 1 ; SM, 86; Herskovits, MHW, 29; 
Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 347. 
2. Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 16 f. 
3. Toynbee, SH, 467. 
4. See Bennett, J. w., Art.(l946), 364. 
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set of conventional understandings and as that which char-
acterizes the folk society. "The society is to be de~ :· 
scribed, and distinguished from others, largely by pre-
senting this system," that is, culture. 1 The folk so-
ciety is small, homogeneous, conventionalized in behavior 
patterns, with a strong sense of group solidarity. Sapir·' s 
conception of "genuine culture" is a comparable type. 2 
Foster criticizes Redfield's concept and suggests that 
the folk society is not a whole society, an isolate, but 
a "half-society," existing in symbiotic relation to an 
urban society. Foster distinguishes between folk society 
and folk culture. 3 This suggests that Maciver's poncept 
of the "multi-group society'' may be more adequate; "not a 
static structure but a highly intricate network of par-
tial or complete understandings between the members of 
organizational units of every degree of size and complex-
ity • n4 
1. Redfield, Art.(l947), 353-4, emphasis added. For 
historical comparisons see Parsons, E. C., MTS; Pirenne, 
MC; Homans, EVTC; Yang, CV; Sims, RC. Note that £or Red-
field this is a type, a construct. 
2. See Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 308-331. See also Linton, 
SM, 283-5; Kroeber, Ant., 280 f£. 
3. Foster, Art.(l953;:-
4. Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 104. See Maciver, WG. See 
also Ruesch and Bateson, CSMP. 
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Perhaps then the most difficult aspect of the as-
sumption of the cultural. relativists is the further (or 
prior) assumption of the complete integration of a society 
as indicated in Redfield's type. The concept of integra-
tion as a single dominant drive in a culture has intro-
duced a normative element into descriptive work, re ally 
an artistic rather than a scientific attempt. Integration, 
again, is inferred, not observed. Herskovits writes: "No 
culture has a single pattern."l Opler says that Benedict's 
extreme integration fails to account for many unintegrated 
cultures and that her admission that the theory does not 
apply to our culture is puzzling in view of her eloquence 
urging that we see our culture as "one of many."2 Alex 
Inkeles, writing of personality and culture studies, em-
phasizes that complex societies include a variety of "cul-
tures."3 The anthropologically-inclined 11native" must 
surely have had doubts about the integration of a culture 
that sent him both ttdry" missionaries and rum-selling 
traders (to note only a single contrast). When it is 
remembered that culture is transmitted to young. initiates 
1. Herskovits, Art.{l945}, 158. See Devereux, Rev.(l940}, 
Art.(l944-5). 
2. Opler, Art.(l948). 
3. Inkeles, Art.(l953). 
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not by society as a whole, but by individuals and by f ami-
lies, it is easie~ to understand that cultures vary not 
only between societies but also within societies.l 
Th e assumption of the cultural relativist seems to 
i gnore these variations within the societies with which 
culture is correlated. The individual does not simply 
passively receive a unitary culture, but selects from it 
and uses it in his own way. Not all of a culture is 
shared. Each person "reflects" his culture "from his 
own point of view and with varying degrees of clearness 
and confusion. 11 2 Linton distinguishes between universal 
aspects of a culture as those shared by all members, such 
a s language and dress; s pecialties, aspects shared by cer-
tain categories of members; and alternatives, shared by 
certain individuals. 3 Florence Kluckhohn objects to over-
stressing, implicitly or .explicitly, ... "the unitary charac-
ter of value orientations, 11 emphasizing the variety of ··. 
roles pl ayed by an individual and variations between groups 
within a society. For her vari ation is a key to understand-
ing persona lity. 
1. See Linton,1SM, 474, 358, 365-6. See also Kluckhohn, c., Art.(l939). 
2. de Laguna, Art.(l949), 387. 
3. Linton, SM, 272-3. See also Linton, CBP, 127-8; Hersko-
vit s , MHW , 638. 
However important it is to know what is 
dominant in a society at .a given time, we shall 
not go far toward the understanding of the dyna-
mics of that society without paying careful heed 
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to the variant orientations. That there be indi-
viduals who live in- accordance with patterns which 
express variant rather than the dominantly stressed 
orientations is, it is maintained, essential to the 
maintenance of the society. Variant values ~~ 
therefore, not only permitted but actually ~­
guired.l 
Robert Merton points out structured sources of 
strains within societies which produce confusion of norms 
(anomie) and deviance. One such source of strain is t he 
divergence between culturally defined goals and the ap-
proved methods of achieving these goals. Merton dis-
tinguishes five types of adaptation: conformity, innova-
tion, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. 2 This men-
tion of innovation and rebellion suggests that t h e assump-
tion of relativism, by ignoring variation within societies, 
fails to take adequate account of the fact and sources of 
social change. It will also be noted that, by refusing 
even to postulate any reality beyond culture and/or so-
ciety, the assumption provides no basis upon which an 
existing society or culture can be criticized, leaving 
1. Kluckhohn, Florence, Art.(l953), 352; see also 345. 
Note her distinction between the accepted variant and the 
deviant whose behavior calls down group sanctions. 
2. Merton, Art.(l949). 
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change to chance.l Sapir points clearly to the need for 
recognition of variations: 
The very variations and uncertainties which the 
earlier anthropologists ignored seem to be the 
very aspects of human behavior that future stu-
dents of society will have to look to with a 
special concern, for it is only through an anal-
ysis of variation that the realit~ and meaning of 
a norm can be established at all. 
The second basic assumption of cultural relativism 
is closely related to the first, having to do with the 
nature of culture: that each culture is in a sense a 
closed system, a thing in and of itself, thus implying 
a monistic cultural determinism. Bidney traces two themes 
of development in anthropological theory of culture: one 
stemming from the naturalistic, 'positivistic tradition 
of the nineteenth century and holding that culture re-
presents an autonomous, superpsychic and superorganic 
level of reality with its own laws and inner development; 
the second stemming from eighteenth century rationalism, 
viewing culture as the product of human discovery and cre-
ativity and as subject to human regulation. 3 Cultural 
1. See Parsons, T., SSA, 448. 
2. Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 576. Sapir also notes that an-
thropology's inability to discover norms and consistencies 
nis not unrelated to a fatal fallacy with regard to the ob-
jective reality of social and cultural patterns defined 
impersonally." 
3. See Bidney, Art.(l949); Bagby, Art.(l953); Ford, Rev. 
(1950). 
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relativism takes its conception from the first theme and 
sees culture as its own cause. Kroeber outlined the con-
ception of nsuperorganic" culture in 1917, although he 
has since "'recanted." Leslie V'fuite is the most vigorous 
spokesman for the principle now, although others assume it 
from time to time. Whlte argues that the movement of an~ 
thropology toward psychology is 'tregression11 and '*reduc-
tionism, 11 for culturology relegates the individual to a 
role of "insignificance or even irrelevance.'' Culture is 
for him a "distinct order of reality," a closed. and 11 self-
l intelligentu system. 
The emphasis is on the power of custom over men, 
on the compulsion of "fashion," on the "drift" of lan-
guage. Ruth Benedict writes: ttE:ven given the freest scope 
by their institutions, men are never inventive enough to 
make more than .minute changes. 112 But the issue is wheth-
er there is a metaphysical reality to which the concept 
of culture refers. Bidney sees coming out of Durkheim 1 s 
work the question whether there are two kinds of meta-
physical reality, society and social facts. He finds 
sociology and anthropology based upon ''radically different 
l• See 'Vhite, Art.(l946); Bidney, Rev.(l950). vVhite is 
critical of Kroeber 1 s appeal to "human nature." 
2. Benedict, PC, 76. See Sumner, ~· 
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ontological premises," the first seeing society as real, 
the second social facts, or culture. It is not clear that 
Bidney always keeps in mind his own distinction between 
ttmethodological levels of abstraction" and rtmetaphysical 
or ontological levels of reality."1 Surely some sociolo-
gists and anthropologists have followed Durkheim, con-
sciously or unconsciously; but others have kept it ex-
plicit that they were dealing with abstract concepts as 
a matter of method. Sapir thinks that "precisely the sup-
posed 1 givenness 1 of culture is the most serious obstacle" 
to understanding its nature, for culture is not a "given." 
He goes on to suggest that from the standpoint 6f a child, 
culture is rather "something to be gradually and gropingly 
discovered." Systematically i gnoring the individual hurts 
the understanding of culture.2 
But culture is not just discovered, for man is the 
continual creator of culture, as well as its creature. And, 
in a very real sense, all cultures are "Experiments in Liv-
ing."3 Culture is not a substance but a process. Sapir 
insists the true locus of the process ttis not in a theo-
retical community of human beings known as society, for 
1. Bidney, TA, 87-9, 97, 106; see also 104, 112-3, 120. 
2. Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 411, 414. 
3. See MacBeath, EL, and Hallowell, Art.{l945)1. 
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the term 'society' is itself a cultural construct which 
is employed by individuals ••• to help them in the inter-
pretation of certain aspects ~f their behavior."l Culture 
and society are both constructs, abstractions from the be-
havior of persons, although these persons do develop a 
conception of "culture" and reify it--respond to it as a 
"collective representation." It is still persons from 
whose behavior the concept is abstracted and who do the 
abstracting. 2 Culture is carried in the minds of persons 
and expressed by persons; it is the storehouse of concepts, 
but conceptualization is a personal process; culture may 
be external to the individual at birth but its internal-
ization is a part of his becoming a person. 3 The anthro-
pologist who says, "culture determines,n is really using 
shorthand in describing his having observed parents and 
1. W.andelbaum (ed.), SWES, 515. See 517, 545, 575, 578, 
581, 593. W. E. Hocking, SIG, 56, writes of "Sociology 
and Humanism: 11 
Are we then to think of Society as an over-
individual self, having a conscious purpose and 
thought of its own, separate from those of its 
members? The difficulty with this notion is that 
such a being is nowhere findable nor addressable. 
If God is hard to locate, Society is not less so. 
2. Devereux, Art.(l944-5), 113. See also Meggers, Art. 
(1946), 181, and Tax (ed.), AAT, 123. Brightman, PV, 5, 
quotes C. Delisle Burns' adage that 11 abstraction is log-
ical forgetfulness, or the art of forgetting; and it is 
not misleading unless you forget that you ··have forgotten. 11 
3. See Linton, SM, 290, 292, 294, 310. 
other more experienced p ersons teaching younger persons 
1 
with less experience. 
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Bidney suggests a third alternative, beyond either 
"reducing" culture to psychology or making it a metaphysi-
cal entity: that is, granting it ttrelative autonomy. 112 
The same relative autonomy can be granted to society, as 
a methodological device. For purposes of study, cultures, 
as societies, can be treated as realities, as levels, pro-
vided one knows the risk. 3 Also, culture does have a 
supraindividual character in the sense that its continuity 
through time does not depend u pon the existence of partic-
ular individuals. 4 What is held here is not that "nothing 
but individuals" exist in reality, for the basic problem 
is the nature of individuality,_ or personality. Although 
this problem will be dealt with more fully in Chapter Five, 
the position of this study can be suggested here that there 
is no p erson apart from soclety and culture. The human 
1. Kluckhohn and Mowrer, Art.(l944), 8. Note that Kroeber, 
Ant., 254, writes in 1948 that culture is superindividual 
in that it is acquired by learning. 
2. Bidney, TA, 115. See also his distinction between cul-
tural values and social functions, 395. Meggers, Art.(l946. 
178, writes: 11The ethnologists, who come in contact with 
people, with culture, and with society, and who cannot make 
up their minds which to study, are responsible for the many-
faceted science that is anthropology today. 11 
3. See Linton, SM, 288, and Kroeber, NC, 4. See also Lin-
ton, Art.(l938)2, 427. 
4. Kluckhohn and Mowrer, Art.(l944), 15. 
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infant becomes a person only in continuing and meaningful 
relationship s with other persons-in-process and only with-
in the structured framework of mutual expectations and on-
ly by means of historically mediated and agreed u pon sym-
bols. This is the problem with which J. E. Boodin strug-
gles in The Social Mind, as he argues that human behavior 
cannot be understood or guided without awareness of the 
ngroup contex t 11 of individuals, with its history and · 
1deals. 2 Choices are of persons but there is a social 
field. 
The concept of p erson that is involved here is a 
polar concept,. shorthand for p erson-in-community, or, bet-
ter, a triadic concept i mplying person-in-community-made-
possible-by-culture. Kluckhohn and Murray sugg est almost 
this concept in writing that instead of culture and person-
ality, we need to see culture-in-personality and p erson-
ality-in-culture.3 Similarly, Mrs. de Laguna recognizes 
1. Boodin, SM, esp. 428-430. 
2. Kluckhohn and Murray (eds.), PNSC, xii. See also Muel-
der , Art.(l950), 477-481; Vivas, MLEL, 195; Linton, CBP, 
5; Murphy, G., Art.(l949), 13-14; Wallis, Art.(l950). 
3. de Laguna, Art.(l949), 379. Hallowell, Art.(l953), 
quotes Parsons and Shils, TGTA: "All concrete systems of 
action, at the same time, have a system of culture and are 
a set of personalities ••• and a social syste~ o~ sub-sys-
tem.11 (Italics omitt ed.) Hallowell goes on to trace the 
dependence of personality on "·socially mediated experience 
in interaction with other persons" and the 11 concomitant 
development of a h~man social order and a cultural heri-
tage." 
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that 11In playing a social role, the ·individual is at once 
realizing himself as a person and activating the function-
ing of the culture."l 
ii. The Implications of Cultural Relativism. 1 
There are at least four logical implications of the 
doctrine of cultural relativism to be contrasted with its 
explicit statements: 1) relativists argue against seeking 
to chang e cultures, but imply in this argument a criticism 
of the culture of those who seek change; 2) relativism is 
held to be "true," while it implies that there are no cri-
teria for ntruth;" 3) relativism is inferred from compara-
tive studies but implies that there is no basis for cross-
cultural comparisons; 4) these implications further imply 
that relativism leaves the ultimate appeal to force in 
conflicts of value between cultures. 
Herskovits' strictures in regard to an anthropolo-
gist seeking to uchange those elements of the culture of 
which he disapproves" (such as advocating monogamy) 2 have 
already been noted. Felix Keesing, reviewing in 1953 
1. Note Ruesch and Bateson, CSMP, 13: "Psychiatry and an-
thropology are still at the stage of being descriptive 
sciences; and because, in such sciences, the theoretical 
premises are left implicit, these sciences have diffi-
culty in accumulating a coherent body of clearly formu-
lated hypotheses.n 
2. Herskovits, Art.(l951), 26. 
Herskovits' Economic Anthropology, a revision of a 1940 
work, indicates that the author is still able to criti-
1 
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cize economists and anthropologists, even . though Hersko-
vits' definitive statements on relativism appeared between 
1940 and 1953. Even more strangely, it is in the precise 
works that spell out his relativist position that Hersko-
vits ch alleng es the ethnocentrism of his own culture. 
The implication, as Bidney points out, is that eth-
nocentr i sm, negatively valued, is to be transcended "in the 
name of cultural relativism, 11 positively valued. The hier-
archy of values according to which these positive and nega-
tive valuations are made is not specified. Nor is it ex-
plained how we can have cultural relativism without ethno-
centrism, since "cultura l conditioning necessarily leads 
the members of any given society to prefer their own value 
syst em above all others." In advocating a culture system 
which inculcates the relative validity of its own values 
and at the same time the recognition of the equal validity 
of other systems, Herskovits posits an ideal cultural rela-
tivism ''totally dif:ferent :from the real cultural relativism 
of h i storic cultures. 11 He disavows absolutes and yet seems 
1. Keesing, Rev.(l953), 101. 
to respect differences in cultures a~ good in absolute 
1 terms. 
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There are, apparently, two kinds of ethno-
centrism--a vicious and a benign kind. The vicious 
kind of ethnocentrism involves belief in objective 
absolute values and hence intolerance of other codes. 
The benign kind involves preference for one's own 
value system, as well as mutual respect for those 
of other societies. How it is possible to transcend 
ethnocentrism of the intolerant variety, if there 
is no objective standard of comparison,· is not ex-
Plained. Furthermore, it is not at all clear why 
one s hould prefer his own system of cultural values 
rather than some other. 
In a later work, Bidney suggests that the relativists, in 
place of the abhorred static ethnocentrism, substitute 
nserial ethnocentrism ••• the attitude of viewing each 
culture from its own perspective only." 2 
The relativism assumed to be universally valid and 
applicable must be applied to the civilization and science 
of the anthropologist, leaving the relativist in something 
of a dilemma. As a scientist, he is forced to claim ob-
jective validity for his own thought and is thus implicit-
ly committed to an objective truth, including the truth of 
the concept of culture and its implied relativism. But the 
notion of relativism applied to itself means that it is 
"significant and valid only in relation to the culture 
1. All references in this paragraph are from Bidney, Art. 
(1953), 690. 
2. Bidney, TA, 42?. 
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to which it belongs." But if it is itself merely relative 
and not universally applicable, nno objective science of 
anthropology is possible."l This is the dilemma in which 
Sumner was caught. Only one page separates these state-
ments: "In the folkways, whatever is is right,'' and ''There 
are folkways which are posi ttvely harmful. 112 From where 
comes the .iudgment? Brightman argues that cultural rela-
tivism equally condemns all cultures, thus committing sui-
cide by seeing itself as "no more than an oddity of recent 
Western culture." Pointing out that the doctrine is now 
invoked as reason for "respecting all cultures"' and "now 
as a ground for destroying enemy cultures," he concludes, 
nA- theory that does _ not apply to itself is a poor theory 1 n3 
Turning to the implications for truth, one of the 
effects of relativism would seem to be a suspicion "that 
even our own deepest beliefs and our most cherished con-
victions may be as much the expression of an unconscious 
provincialism as are the fantastic superstitions of the 
savage. " 4 In a time of extremely rapid change, the 
1. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 146-7. 
2. Sumner, Folk., 28, 26. See Golightly, Art.(l947), 
and Merton, Art.(l936), for a study of valuations that 
are not hidden. 
3. Brightman, PV, 11. 
4. de Laguna, Art.{l942), 143-4. 
88 
blurring of the traditional landmarks can lead to a condi-
tion of anomie, or breakdown of the norms, in which the 
very consensus that holds a society together is shaken. 1 
The real problem is whether there is any possibility of 
discovering valid criteria of truth at all or even whether 
there is any such thing as Truth to be discovered. This 
seems to be the ultimate dilemma of the relativistic phil-
osophy. On the one hand, relativism implies that all 
truth is relative; on the other hand, the research and 
writing of anthropologists presuppose a common truth avail-
able to all. Margaret Mead writes: "Only if one believes 
in awareness, believes that the truth will make men free, 
is one justified in attempting to find and disseminate ••• 
knowledge.u 2 Brightman pushes the necessity of a presup-
posed common truth: 
If ,no~; truth were knowable, regardless of cultural 
conditions, then no communication among cultures 
would be possible. Anthropologists have yet to 
discover a human society the members of which find 
everything and everyone from another culture com-
pletely unintelligible. Where there is any common 
ground at all, there is some common truth, for even 
agreement in error is possible only when some truth 
1. Muelder, Art.(l950), 477 f. 
2. Mead, MF, 435. See also, 446: "Put simply, the social 
scientist who believes in such a relationship between 
knowledge and freedom and the good life can work construc-
tiV-ely only in a society that understands this position." 
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about means of communicating ideas is known.l 
A third implication concerns anthropology as a 
compar ative science2 and whether cross-cultural studies in 
any significant sense are possible within the limits of 
cultural relativism. The publisher's foreword to the 1948 
edition of Patterns of Culture states that "cultures (our 
own included) cannot be compared on an ethical basis, but 
simply as coexisting and equally valid patterns of life." 
More recently Levi-Strauss makes cultures seem even more 
incommensurable: nwe can understand the values of any so-
ciety only in so far as it is similar to our own; if the 
society is dissimilar, the values cannot be perceived at 
all ••.• no information c an pass from one society to an-
other."3 Brightman puts the matter of relativism and 
1. Brightman, Art.(l947), 512. Note also Parsons', SSA, 
447-8, comments on Durkheim's relativism: 11Now his ep iste-
mology has brought the basis of human reason itself into 
the s ame relativistic circle, so as to make the previous 
relativism itself relative, since the relativism of social 
types is itself a product of a system of categories which 
are valid only for the particular social type. This is 
••• 'social solipsism• ••• in short, a reductio ad ab-
surdum." Parsons goes on to show the relationshipofthis 
idea to the inadequacy of Durhl~eim 1 s theory of social 
change. See also Arrow, SCIV, 84-5, for whom relativism 
is the "better alternative," despite its danger of glori-
fying the status quo. See also Northrop, Art.(l944), 
646, 653. 
2. See Mead, WJ.F , 25. 
3. In Tax (ed.), AAT, 326. 
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comparative studies in simple terms, criticizing relativism: 
••• there is no more reason for preferring a 
European anthropologist to a Polynesian shaman 
than there is for preferring handshaking to the 
rubbing of noses as a salutation among acquain-
tances.!. 
A final question to which the earlier discussion 
leads is whether relativism leaves the ultimate appeal 
to force. Casserley sees the d anger that "science, cut 
adrift from the underlying culture pattern of which it is 
properly s p eaking a phase and a manifestation, is turning 
into technics, the pliant handmaid of power. 11 2 Sumner put 
the danger mor e p l a inly: HNothing but mi ght has ever made 
right • 11 3 Relativism is itself the most dangerous absolute, 
because from it there is no escape. Relativism, seeing 
norms as matters of t aste, is related to modern distrust 
of r eason, as has been noted, "But since man cannot live 
without values and norms, this ••• makes him an easy prey 
for irrational value s y stems. 11 4 Bidney contends that the 
1. Brightman, Art.(1947), 511. See his Art.(l950), 437. 
2. Casserley, MMSS, 223-4. 
3. Sumner, Folk ., 65. Vivas, MLEL, 30, opposes Thras~ma­
chus not just because he is wrong in thinking that right 
is defined by mi ght, but because mi ght cannot tell us how 
to choose, cannot be a rule of conduct. Muelder, Art. 
{1947), 51, emphasizes that 11 the proposition, 'Might is 
Right,' is inherently irrational an d immoral." 
4. Fromm, MFH, 5. See Frank , W., Rev.{1951), who writes 
of Le·.vis :Mumford's analysis: uFrom a way of life denying 
the pr i mal validity of the subjective, he explains the se-
quels of t otalitarianism, regimentation, a-bombs, and 
genocide ." 
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mythological absolutes which accompany the relativistic 
denia l of universal and objective norms lead to perpetual 
crises and conflicts. He concludes that the only real 
alternative to such mythological absolutes "is a better, 
more r ational, and more objective ideal of conduct and 
belief, capable of overcoming the limitations of the for-
mer.111 Hocking writes of society words that apply to cul-
tur e as well, when a culture is seen as a closed system, 
beyond which there is neither comparison nor appeal. 11We 
can endure the defects of the finite deity we call Society, 11 
w·rites Hocking, as long as there is God to . fall back on, 
but the abolition of God makes us aware that Society is 
lna de qu a te. 
The de ath of God le aves Society in the place of 
the Absolute; and lik e many another potentate who 
falls sh ort of omniscience as well as omnipotence, 
we realize that his pretensions are tolerable only 
when h e is humble and recognizes a law above hi~2 
The author p o i nts out that society's demand for conformi t y 
11 is as it must be in a world that must regul ate itself by 
averages and probabilities. 11 
iii. T'he Involvement of Anthro uologists. 
Brightman distinguishes between necess ary implica-
tion, as a category of logic, and empirical involvement, 3 
1. Bidney, Art.(l953), 694. 
2. Hocking , SIG, 69. See also 70-1, 83. 
3 . Brightman, PV, 23 ~ refers to Percy Hughes and John Dewey. 
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a moral rather than a logical category. Attention has 
already been called to the assumptions and implications 
of the doctrine of relativism. ~TI~en these are s pelled 
out, the relativist may not accept them as logical in-
ferences, but he may also find himself involved as a per-
son in certain activities despite the implications and 
so involved in the consequences of these activities. In-
volvement is then an existential rather than a theoretical 
matter, though it has theoretical implications. The an-
thropologist may become involved in a practical situation 
which could not be seen as a strictly logical implication 
of his theory but which has meaning in relation to his 
theory. Merton has called attention to the fruitful inter-
play between theory and practice in social science.l 
Barnett £inds evidence of "a growing tendency among an-
thropologists ••• to subscribe wholeheartedly to the pre-
cept of complete objectivity in the abstract and to vio-
late it in practice."2 
Just as relativism and tolerance in anthropology 
reflected the liberal democratic atmosphere, so it seemed 
to require cultural crises to arouse anthropologists and 
other social scientists to their responsibilities rtas 
1. Merton, STSS, 83-111. 
2. Barnett, Art.(l948), 353. See Lynd, Art.(l951), on 
social science having abdicated its responsibility. 
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citizens and public persons, 111 in other words, to their 
involvement. Bi dney thinks that American anthropolog ists 
by and l arge "uncritically assumed the v a lue of cultura l 
differences and their mu tual compatibility." 
The idea of an ttethics of violence" (Sorel, 1 '325 
and 1941) and of perpetual crises brought about 
t h rough the conflict of social classes and national 
interests, which Marx and Sorel taught, did not en-
ter into t he ir peacefuJ scientific perspective at 
all. Had they thought ."l.m terms of the possible in-
compatibility and conflict of ideologies and of the 
doctrine of social revolution rather than of social 
evolution, they would not have labored under the 
naive optimism of cultural laissez faire. It has 
t aken the impact of the second World War to shake 
this romantic cultural optimism and to awaken an-
thropologists to the reality of cultural crises 
and to2the need for cultural integration on a v10rld scale. 
Muelder not e s the challenges of the Great Depression and 
of the United Nations in addition to that of World War II. 
He also notes the involvement in ''bias in refusing to 
deal '!l ith biases," and, beyond this, the involvement in 
necessary choices related to research. 3 Clyde Kluckhohn 
agrees that, as a citizen, the anthropologist "is moral l y 
obligated to look a.t the world," since democracy requires 
that the individual offer "to the thinking of the group 
1. Muelder, Art.(l951)1, 99. 
2. Bidney, Art.(l953), 688-9. 
3. Muelder, Art.(l951) 1 , 99, 106-7. See also 103-5. 
those insights that derive from his special experience 
1 
and training ." 
The involvement of the anthropologist conflicts 
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wi t h his insistence on toleration and understanding rather 
than judgment and choice. In 1949, Leighton could still 
write that the task is to understand, not blame , for the 
scientist ~does not take sides with sheep, wolves, or 
other animals in such a way as to blind his understanding 
of how they are interdependent." He compares the work of 
the social scientist to that of the naturalist and doctor, 
for whom forces are neutral, not good or bad, and whose 
2 like or dislike of wolves is irrelevant. This continues 
Ruth Benedict's dictum that we "grant to other cultures 
the same significance to their participantsn that we 
3 
recognize in our own and Mead's ndemocracy of culturestt 
which reruses to admit that one can be said to be better 
4 than another. Furnas quotes Keesing on the same ·theme: 
"There are no g6od or bad people, no good or bad deeds, 
except in terms of the morals defined within this or that 
cultural system. 115 Herskovits argues that a world society 
1~ Kluckhohn, C., MM, 264. 
2. Leighton, HRCW, 158-9. 
3. Benedict, PC, 33. 
4. Mead, M., Art.(l943), 193. 
5. Furnas, AP, 474. 
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can emerge hfrom the conflict of ethnocentrisms we call 
nationalism. • • only. • • on a basis of live and let live, 11 
referring to the "Statement on Human Right~.ul Bidney 
wonders if those who hold the principle of relativism 
would stand by it despite their involvement. 
The cultural relativist is so afraid of ethnocen-
trism and possible intolerance that he is prepared, 
in t heory at least, to tolerate any violation of his 
cultur al standards by members of another society, on 
the assumption that, no matter what the consequences 
may be for others, they would still be in accord with 
the principle of the relativity of values.2 
That involvement overweighed the principle is indi-
cated in Clyde Kluckhohn' s caveat: "The anthropological 
outlook demands toleration of other ways of life--so long 
as they do not threaten the hope for world order."3 Red-
field observ es that equal benevolence was easi er to prac-
tice on t he' primitives than on the Nazis and Fascists--
and even the Japanese. 4 World War II made additional de-
mands on anthropologists nbecause of the challenge of 
racism and the defense of democratic values and ideals. 
Scientists were called upon to commit themselves and their 
science," according to Muelder, regarding racial inferior-
ity, human dignity, the practicality of democracy, and the 
1. Herskovits, MHW , 653. See next section. 
2. Bidney, Art.(l953), 693. 1 3. Kluc¥~ohn , G.,~~ , 268, and Art.(l944) , 150. 
4. Redfield , PWT, 145. 
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1 
worthwhileness of freedom. Leighton, whose insistence 
that scientists do not take sides was quoted above, lists 
in the same volume the personnel of the Foreign Morale Anal-
ysis Division, working directly with the military--on one 
side. Included among at least six anthropologists are the 
names of Clyde Kluckhohn, Morris Opler, Ruth Benedict, and 
Commander Alexander H. Leighton. 2 
Upon the publication of Benedict's Patterns of Cul-
ture as a Pocket Book in 1947, Elgin Williams reviewed its 
significance for the ttcommon man.u Williams suggests that 
Gold Star mothers, survivors of Hiroshima, and the remain-
ing Jews in Europe may be t•poor customers" for Benedict's 
tolerance. He notes that she does not ask tolerance of 
war criminals, quoting: "If we justify war, it is because 
all peoples always justify the traits of which they find 
themselves possessed, not because war will bear an objec-
tive examination of its merits." Williams sees Benedict's 
recognition and condemnation of "asocial traits which are 
1. Muelder, Art.(l951)1 , 100. 
2. Leighton, HRWC, appendix. It should be noted that Her-
skovits, to the writer's knowledge, was not involved in 
"the war effort:t At le ast early in the war period, he 
served on t h e staff of Myrdal's study and prepared one 
book related to An American Dilemma. See Myrdal, AD, 
x, xi, xii. The significance of this involvement will 
be discussed in the next section. 
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destructive of human v alues" as tta tribute to her human-
itari anism, not to her anthropological theory." The polem-
ic against nasocial habits" is an nintrusion, tt for the very 
category of "asocial" is denied in the theory, Williams 
concludes. 1 
In reference to the theory and practice of function-
alists confronted by the growth of Fascism, Gregg and Wil-
liams write: "Logicall-y about all they can say is that demo-
cratic values are good and worth preserving (at the cost of 
fascist ·' values, good in fascist eyes) because they are 
theirs ••• But try as they may at complete relativism, 
most functionalists are uneasy and ill-content." 2 Malinow-
ski, a functionalist, oppo sed totalitarian states because 
they killed individual initiative, but such a conclusion:· 
is surely not b a sed on his theoretical scheme. Bidney 
thinks anthropology offers no better illustration of the 
conflict between theory and practice than Malinowski's 
willingness, under critical conditions, 11 to justify the 
very ideals of a democratic society for which his sci-
entific theory ot: cultural relativism failed to account.u 3 
1. Willian1s, Art.(l947), 85. The quotation from Benedict 
is PC, 29. 
2. Gre gg and Williams, Art.(l948), 605. 
3. Bidney, Art. (1953), 695 • 
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John Embree, who confesses to having lost his ob-
jectivity in the war crisis, protests against other an-
thropologists accepting ethnocentrism and the white man's 
burden by supporting u.s. Naval administration of Micro-
nesia.1 Douglas Haring, in reply, upholds what he calls 
the right of natives to become »civilized."2 
This suggests Muelder's third challenge to the an-
thropologist, to consider in regard to the United Nations 
"what culture patterns will work in a universal frame of 
reference." 3 Ruth Benedict sees "deep-lying cultural 
diversities" as not being of great practical importance 
in the period of Western political and industrial dominance. 
But, sh e adds, the cooperation of the United Nations de~ . 
mands knowledge and understanding. 4 Redfield asks what 
kind of help anthropologists in Point IV can give people 
without changing them. He continues, in reference to 
Herskovits' tolerance and ttneutrality for everybody," 
that the relativists' "success in living up to their doc-
trine may be questioned.n5 
The anthropologist is coming to realize that not 
1. Embree, Art. ( 1950 ).. 
2. Haring, Art.(l951)~ . 
3. Muelder, Ar.t..',(l951)1, 100-1. 
4. Benedict, Art.(l943}. 
5. Redfield, PWT, 147. "Thank goodness" can almost be 
read as a postscript. 
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just the atomic physicist but any scientist must f ace the 
consequences of his most detached studies as well ·_as his 
involvement in practical activities. Ulich quotes from 
''The · agician' s Apprentice:tt 
The spirits which I summoned, 
How can I quiet them?l 
Margaret Mead is especially concerned with new techniques 
enabling social scientists to ••manipulate" human beings. 
The social scientist faces new methodological obligations--
to be understood and to know for what purposes his knowl-
2 
edge will be used. 
tv. The Debate on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
In accord with his t h eory, Herskovits took the lead 
in dravling u p a "Statement on Human Rights" whi ,ch was sub-
mitted by the Executive Board of the American Anthropolog-
ical Association to the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights in 1 947. ~his Statement seriously questions whether 
the (at t h at time ) proposed Universal Declaration of Human 
1. Ulich, RPCT, 19. See Vickrey, Art.(l953), 148. 
2. Me ad, M., Art.(l950). Benne and Swanson, Art.(l950), 
7, indicate that the problems facing a social science con-
sultant include the choice of clients in terms of ideolog-
ical orientation, the kinds of work he will do, the sharing 
of work with the client, and limitations on use and publi-
c ation of findings. 
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Rights could apply to all men and not simply reflect the 
v alues p r ev alent in Western Europe and America. The prob~ 
lem is to formulate a statement that will take full account 
of the fact that the individual is not just an individual 
but a member of a social group. In other words, respect 
for the personality of the individual and for his right 
to full develo pment requires respect for the cultures of 
different groups. This i s the doctrine of toler ation and 
equal v a lidity already discussed in this study. The State-
ment is, as mi ght be expected, utterly o pposed to ethnocen-
trism and sees t h e consequences of t h e "call to action" 
of a "Universal Declaration" as dis a strous. Three propos-
itions, dict ated by the study of psycholo gy and culture, 
are presented as essential considerations for those at-
tempting to dr aw u p the Declaration: 
1. The individual realizes his personality 
through h is culture, hence respect for individual 
differences entails a resp ect for cultural dif-
f erences. There can be no individual freedom, that 
is, when the group with which the individual identi-
fi e s h i mself is not free. 
2. Respect for differences between cultures 
i s valida ted by the scientific fact that no tech-
nique of qualitatively evaluating cultures has been 
discovered. 
3. St andards and v a lues are rel a tive to the 
cultu re f r om wh ich t h ey deriv e so t h at any attempt 
to formul ate postul ates that grow out of the be-
lie fs or moral cod es of one culture must to that 
ex ten t detr act from the applicability of any 
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Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole} 
Although the assumptions and i mplications under-
lying this St atement have alre a dy been examined in t h is 
chapter , attention will be c alled to specific issues which 
aroused debate among anthropolog ists. Julian Steward 
t h inks there is no disagreement that, in terms of respect 
for cultures, primitive peoples "'on the receiving end of 
civilizing influences" should be tre a ted with more under-
st anding. He doubts, however, that in the first proposi-
tion anthropologists Kmean to approve the social caste 
system of India, the racial caste system of the United 
States, or many of the other varieties of social discrim-
ination in the world. 11 He questions whether they approve 
economi c i mperialism and exploitation of primitive peoples. 
But, on the other hand, Stew·ard is not sure "that we are 
prepar e d to t ake a stand a g ainst the values in our own cul-
ture which underly such imperialism. 11 2 
However, it is just such v a lues in our culture that 
Herskovits and others seem willing to criticize, despite 
their principles or understanding and no criticism. Her-
skovits and his fellow-workers on the Myrdal project would 
l. For the "st atement on Human Rights," see the American 
Anthropolog ist, 49 (1947), 539-543. 
2. Steward, Art.(l948). 
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seem, in terms of the first proposition, to respect the 
personality of the exploited Negro sharecropper in the 
Deep South and to appreciate the fact that both the share-
cropper and his exploiters realize their personality 
through their culture (or cultures). But nrespect for 
cultural differences" cannot overlook the conflicting 
cultural assumptions in the situation: those of the ex-
ploited, those of the exploiters, and the demands of the 
American Creed. Really to respect the personality of the 
sharecropper demands some critical attention to -. the con-
flicting assumptions and to the factors which prevent his 
realizing his personality to the full. That "respect for 
individual differences entails a respect for cultural dif-
ferencesn. breaks down when one set of values does violence 
to personalities is also illustrated in Herskovits' con-
demning Western missionaries and merchants who, acting on 
their cultural assumptions, disrupted the cultures of Afri-
ca and the South Seas. 1 
Much of the discussion of the State~ent has con-
cerned one paragraph that seems to leave the way open for 
criticism: 
1. Dr. Charles Lawrence has clarified the thinking behind 
the "Statement on Human Rights'' in a perfonal letter. On 
this topic, see also Muelder, Art. (1951) , 108. 
Ev en where political systems exist that 
d eny c i tizens the right of participation ia their 
g overnmen t, or seek to c on quer weak er peoples, 
underly ing cultur a l values may be called on to 
b rin g t h e p eoples of such st ates to a re alization 
of t h e cons e quences of the acts o f their govern-
ments, and thu s enforce a brak e upon discrimina-
tion and conquest. For t h e political s y stem of 
a p eo p l e is only a s mall p art of t he ir tot a l cul-
t u r e . 
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This is a " we a sel sentence," as Redfield suggests, pro-
vidi n g insight into just how diff icult it is to be objec-
tive and s ay nothing. 1 Discrimination and conquest would 
seem to be ttobjective, universal, negative v a lues" in 
Hersk ov its I hierarchy of values. 2 What are the "under-
lying cultural v aluesu in the light of the relativist 1 s 
st r ess on t h e interrela tedness and integration of cultural 
values? Steward sees this sentence as a loophole so Ger-
many would not have to be "tolerated," which turned into 
"th e f a t a l breach in t h e dyk e" of tolerance. 11 Either we 
tolerate ev erything , and keep hands off, or we fi ght in-
toler ance and c onquest--politic al and economic as well as 
military --in all their forms. Vfuere shall the line be 
dr awn? r.t 3 
~his i s t h e question that hurts, f or, once the 
anthro pologist becomes aware o f his involvement in choice 
1. Redfield, PWT, 150. 
2. Bidney, Art.( l 953), 694. 
3. Stewa~d, Art.(l948), 351. 
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and decision, he finds it difficult to know where to stop 
evaluating, to say nothing of knowing how to evaluate. 
The difficulty is indicated as Steward declares that the 
Statement itself is ua value judgment any way it is taken," 
but he does not admit that objection to the Statement is 
a value judgment. 'tif it does not advocate tolerance for 
all cultural values ••• , then it must imply disapproval 
of ~ cultural values, though it also says that we have 
no scientific basis for making any value judgments. 111 But 
the only thing that is 11provedtt by the fact that we have 
no scientific basis for making value judgments is that 
we have no such method. This dilemma poses the central 
problem of this study, whether there are cross-cultural 
norms which enable valid judgments betwe en cultural values. 
H. G. Barnett is more inclusive in his objection, 
holding that the Statement should be limited to the ap-
plic ation of the doctrine of culture laissez- faire. For 
example, ttThe United Nations are advised to allow free 
choice in cultural, hence individual, development unless 
a people choose to reject the ideal of individual free-
dom. '' But again the value judgment comes in by the back 
1. Steward, Art.(l948), 352. He notes that anthropolo-
gists "gladly 11 used professional techniques and knowledge 
in the war, but only as individuals, without scientific 
justification. 
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door, as it does in Barnett's 11 objective" criticism of a 
"necessarily arbitrary scheme of values, n· of a right being 
such 11only by definition," of "goodlf as "a matter of con-
vention or convenience only," of science studying only 
means, not ends. These value judgments are the more danger-
ous because unexamined. Note especially the implications 
as he says that an anthropologist would do well 11not to 
jeopardize his professional standing" by pretending quali-
fications in values. And so the confusion: a scientist 
who says should has no place in science ur g ing his fellow· 
scientists that they should not advise the United Nations 
on a Declaration of Human Rights. 1 
The United Nations did not follow the much debated 
advice of the Statement, and, as Redfield suggests, most 
anthropologists are probably rather relieved that they did 
not. 2 
4. Cultural Relativism and Cultural Relativity. 
There is danger that the crisis which awakens an-
thropologists to their involvement and to a rethinking of 
1. Barnett, Art.(l948). For a reply to Barnett and a state-
ment well aware that scientists must debate the implica~ 
tions of their work rather than 11 pretend purity," see Ben-
nett, J. W., Art.(l949). 
2. Redfield, PWT, 150. 
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relativism may too easily call forth absolutes. A number 
of falsely- grounded conflicting absolutes is itself a 
potent relativizing factor. Maximilian Beck notes con-
cernin g totalitarian ideologies that they are not re ally 
absolutes but, rather, relativistic, uand just because they 
deny the absolute validity of truth, they think that those 
in power can force others by violence to believe what they 
order them. nl Arthur E. Murphy describes absolutism as 
claiming 11 the final authority that belongs ••• to the con-
tinuing work of moral reason for the ideals ••• at some 
particular stage. 112 Reason, then, is a process not yield-
i n g once-for-always answers. 
But relativism's alternatives of fixed absolutes 
vs. denial of objective norms is a false restriction of 
choice. This study assumes a third alternative, an active 
and constructive relativity as opposed both to sophistic 
and skeptical relativism and to dogmatic absolutism. 3 
Bidney argues from an analogy with scientific truth, con-
tinually reformulated: 
The scientist does not argue that, because some 
1. Comment on Morris, Art.(l944), 629, ff. 
2. Murphy, A., Art.(l950), 462. See also Clark, Art. 
( 1953)' 26. 
3. Tsanoff, Eth., 44. See also de Laguna, Art.(l942), 141, 
1 58. 
former truth values are rejected as a result of 
new, objective evidence, there is therefore no 
objective criterion of truth, in the sense of 
verified knowledge. On the contrary, it is be-
cause of his faith in an objective order of 
nature amenable to gradual human discovery that 
he is prepared constantly to question his assump-
tions and generalizations and to alter them.l 
Hers kovits, seemingly in an attempt to forestall 
criticism of relativism, dif'ferentiates "absolutes" as 
fixed and unvarying ethnocentric concepts from "univer-
sals," which are least common denominators arrived at 
inductively from a survey of the varieties of cultural 
expression. He sees these universals as helping us see 
man in his unity as well as in his diversity, but this 
again is almost seemingly undiscriminating tolerance. 2 
And the divergence of practice f'rom theory is in 
evidence again as the relativist, ref'using any common 
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ground for appeal, becomes dogmatic and intolerant, tend-
ing to deny the truth of' any other view and to treat eth-
nocentric opponents "as deluded victims of their respec-
tive cultural institutions and historical traditions. 113 
Kluckhohn and others would insist that ucultural 
relativity 11 --note the change of ending--while subject to 
1. Bidney, Art.(l953), 692. 
2. Herskovfts, NillW, 76, 655. See also Kluckhohn, C., 
Art.(l951) • 
3. Bidney, TA, 180. 
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abuses and misinterpretations, 11has by no means destroyed 
standar d s or the useful tyranny of the normal. 11 According 
to Kluckhohn, n 'If the Bugabuga do it why can't we?'. • • 
is exactly what cultural relativity does not mean." On 
the contrary, it means that cultures must be seen as mean-
ingful wholes, and that customs must be evaluated in terms 
of their context. 1 It tnsists upon an adequate frame of 
reference, as Whitehead's philosophy of organism--looking 
beyond any isolated fact to other relevant facts to under-
stand the first fact. 2 
Obviously this kind of relativity differs from the 
extreme relativism criticized in this study. Kluckhohn 
tries to clarify the concept as a methodology that aids 
understanding but without precluding comparison and in-
telligent judgment: 
To understand "the meaning of a way of life to 
t h ose who live it" is a significant and indeed a 
noble undertaking. To understand, however, should 
not necessarily mean to accept, not even to remain 
content with dispassionate description. • .The 
rurillesty which the anthropologist gives to the ex-
u berant variety of cultural patterns may be only 
that which the psychiatrist gives to incestuous 
dreams. That is, the existence of a way of be-
having s h ows that it is significant, that it can-
not be legislated out of existence by moralizing, 
1. Kluckhohn, C., W~, 41; Muelder, Art.(l95l)l, 123. See 
also Casserley, MMSS, 115. 
2. Vfuitehead, PR, vi. 
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that it needs to be understood. Existence, however, 
should not be equated with inevitability, with ac-
ceptance, with "goodness 11 • • • Some values may well 
be regarded as within the realm of taste or choice 
or circumstance. But others would ieem to be ap-
propriate and necessary to all men. 
The anthropologist objects to too-easy comparison and to 
trying to impose one pattern on another in Procrustean 
style. There is a difference between disagreeing with a 
position but respecting it because its basic premises are 
understood, even though rejected, and rejecting a position 
without understanding it. 2 Relativity, thus conceived, 
does not imply the equal validity of all co-existing cul-
tures, nor, on the other hand, that one way is "right" and 
all others wrong. Values and norms are not, in these terms, 
completely relative to the cultures from which they deriv~3 
This kind of relativity stimulates a healthy skepticism 
about present ways of solving problems in any culture and 
encourages a willingness to learn from the answers other 
peoples have tried. 4 
1. Kluckhohn, Rev.(l948), 11-12. See also- Pope, Art. 
(1952), 145-7; and Tax (ed.), AAT, 375-6, 
2. Mead, M., MF, 447. See also ~uckhohn, c., MEHV, 102. 
3. See Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l951) ; McKeon, Art.(l950), 
205; Morris, Art.(l944), 623-4. 
4. Tsanoff, Eth., 12, tells of a traveller in Ethopia in 
1854-5, who with "civilized scorn" tossed aside the "super-
stition., of the natives that mosquito bites caused a dead-
ly fever as "coincidence," so that we waited decades for 
modern medical research. Tsanoff suggests "simple folk. 
may turn out to be on the right track in other subjects 
besides ••• flies and mosquitoes." 
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The suggestion that values and norms are not com-
pletely relative to culture implies that they must also 
relate to something else not culture-bound. The frame of 
reference for understanding values and norms in context 
must be expanded to what Casserley calls a nwider rela-
tivism," with moral concepts and behavior patterns related 
to, and judged in the light of, the structure of the ' so-
ciety and culture of which they are a part, to the univer-
sal conditions of social health, and tq man's total en-
vironment.l This will be the subject of Chapter Five. 
In the meantime it may be well to note that real 
tolerance depends upon a standard to which appeal can be 
made. Beck remarks, in reference to Milton, that nit was 
not relativism but, on the contrary, faith in the absolute 
validity of religion, morality, and knowledge which brought 
about the commitment of tolerance. n2 
In a pamphlet issued officially by Friends in 
England in 1917, these words occur: "We believe 
that Christianity requires the toleration of 
opinions not our own lest we should unwittingly 
1. See Casserley, MMSS, 190. For discussion of the theory 
of relativity as related to ethics, see P. Frank, Art. 
(1950), Reichenbach, Art.(l953), and L. Barnett, UDE. 
Note especially the postulation of a "space-time continu-
um" as a practical necessity in modern physics. 
2. Comment in Morris, Art.(l344), 628-9. See also 631, 
comment by Blanshard. 
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hinder the working of the spirit of God." This 
does not mean that the opinions of others are tol-
erated because one opinion can be as true as an-
other. Friends have never hesitated to condemn 
error when they saw it. But it does mean that 
God's spirit works best in an atmosphere of free-
dom and humble openness to new revelations of truth. 
It is noteworthy that some Friends were imprisoned 
for refusing to submit to the censor the pamphlet 
containing the passage just quoted. 
Margaret Mead sees three foci of problems raised by 
a mature cultural relativity: 1} how to respect the values 
of each culture and still judge them in terms of possible 
cross-cultural nultimates," 2) how to understand human be-
havior and still be willing to leave it unregimented; and 
3) how to help men act with conviction in the light of the 
realization that their own cultural imperatives are rela-
tive · and subject to revision. 2 
1. Quoted from H. H. Brinton, The Peace Testimony of ~ 
Society of Friends, by H. J. Cadbury, 1952 Annual Report 
of the American Friends Service Committee. 
2. Mead, M., Art.(l950), 91. See also Kroeber, NO, 6. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DISCOVERY OF THEMATIC VALUES 
1. The Cultural Situation: Concern with Values. 
The new set of problems suggested at the end of 
Chapter Three indicates a considerable shift in focus in 
t h e thinking of anthropologists, from a preoccupation with 
"f.acts" and claims to be a "natural" science and to a con-
cern with value problems which relate anthropology more 
closely t6 .philosophy and the humanities. 1 George Geiger 
could note in 1950 that "the institutl6nalized separation 
of descriptive inquiry from normative inquiry continues to 
2 be respectable, academic, and stultifying." But the cli-
mate was changing. Tsanoff thinks that beneath the empha-
sis on relativism itself was a "quest for certainty" more 
adequate than the discarded absolutes. 3 
The shift was partly due to the questions raised 
about science by its own philosophers concerning its own 
logic. Note, as one example, Whitehead's insistence in 
1925: nrr science is not to degenerate into a medley of 
1. See, for example, Bidney, Art.(l953), 682; Redfield, 
Art.(l950); Benne and Swanson, Art.(l950). 
2. Benne and Swanson, Art.(l950), 8. 
3. Tsanoff, MIOC, 599-600. 
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ad hoc hypotheses, it must become philosophical and must 
enter upon a thorough criticism of its own foundations. 111 
It was partly due to a renewed interest in such European 
social scientists as Max Weber, who did not shun questions 
of theory or of value. But it was also, as has been ·sug-
gested, a response to a crisis situation when social sci-
entists began to examine the usefulness of their science 
for men and the implications of some of their hidden valu-
at ions. 
Ruth Benedict, the arch exponent of relativism and 
tolerance, had been using such value-loaded terms as "frank-
-ly disruptive," "treacherous conflict," "palliation" and 
"amelioration," "realistic,n "fantastic rules," "subter..: · 
fuge," and "consistent and economical" in describing cul-
tures. Williams comments on Benedict's obvious negative 
valuation of violence and of Puritanism, her invoking of 
3 the doctrine of consequences. Barnett objects to the 
evaluative descriptions, "disastrous for mankind" and 
"demoralization, 11 in the "Statement on Human Rights. tt 4 
1. Whitehead, SMW, 25. 
2. See Benedict, PC, 77, 157, 236; Art.{l931), 812; Art. 
(1939), 224. 
3. Williams, Art.(l947), 86-8. 
4. Barnett, H., Art.{l948), 354. See also Furnas, AP, 
475; Herskovits, MHW, 6. 
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One of the most explicit indications of the new 
focus is found in Steward's urging anthropologists to 
search for regularities in addition to collecting facts, 
for "facts exist only ~s they are related to theories. ttl 
However, Swanton had argued twenty years earlier for be-
ginning with the "general and recurring,n and then working 
on the peculiar, and for more attention to theory. 2 The 
actual realization that values are a part of culture and 
subject to scientific investigation came in three main 
areas: the discovery of implicit culture, the concern 
with linguistics and pattern, and the study of culture and 
personality. 3 
2. Value Study in Anthropology. 
i. Value Study in Relation to Implicit and Explicit 
Culture. 
One of the first anthropologists to discuss ,.im-
plicit" culture was Clyde Kluckhohn. Kluckhohn's interest 
in psychoanalytic theory is both a condition and a result 
of his finding that there was more to the Navaho culture 
he studied than could be described to an outsider. As he 
1. Steward, Art.{l949), 25. 
2. See Swanton, Art.(l917). See also Kidder, Art.(l940}. 
3. For a different set of emphases, see Redfield, Art. 
(1953}, 737-8. 
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came to know individual Navahos better, he came to sense 
that there were certain background phenomena, common under-
standings, in terms of which the actual behavior of Navahos 
had more meaning. He was able to infer, not observe, "an 
independent system based upon linked premises and catego• . 
ries whose influence is greater, rather than less, be-
l 
cause they are seldom put into words. 11 Herskovits writes 
that the comparative study of culture, with first-hand 
contacts with many peoples, has taught "that all peoples 
think in terms of certain premises that are taken for grant-
ed. n2 
The distinction ·between explicit and implicit cul-
ture is not the same as that between objective and subjec-
tive. Explicit culture resembles the framework and girders 
of a building, the content, structure, and regularities of 
words and behavior as observed. Implicit culture is that 
which does not meet the eye, the architect's conception of 
the building, the "reasons" which both condition and justi-
fy the behavior. The two concepts are polar, for there are 
two aspects of culture, not two cultures. 
Kluckhohn describes the unstated assumptions of the 
1. Kluckhohn, c., MM, 35, 202. See Kluckhohn, c., Art. 
(1951) 2 , NW, Art.{l942); Art.{l943); Art.{l949). 
2. Herskovits, MHW, 73. 
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Navaho as so completely taken for granted that the Navaho 
accept their view of life as an ineradicable part of human 
nature and find it difficult to understand that other per-
sons could conceive of life differently. Their premises 
include: 1) "Life is very, very dangerous;" 2) "Nature is 
more powerful than man;" 3) "This life is what counts; 11 
etc.1 
Obviously, such thinking, implicit or not, is ethno-
centric. And from the evidence of implicit culture, some 
anthropologists draw relativistic conclusions. Herskovits 
says that however a people reason, "the logic is dictated 
by these assumptions. Granting th~ premises, the logic is 
inescapable. 112 The validity of such conclusions has already 
been examined. It should be noted now that: 1) the recog-
nition of implicit culture assumes that values are real 
and amenable to study and acknowledges that it is the val-
ues of a culture that determine its behavior patterns; and 
2) the variety that is so evident in actual customs seems 
to be a variety of instrumentation for dealing with a much 
smaller set or basic demands revealed in the value-premises 
of all people. Kroeber refers to this aspect of culture 
1. Kluckhohn and Leighton, TN, 159-238. 
2. Herskovits, MHW, 73. 
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as its "core," an "affect-laden idea system" which "at 
once reflects the habitual ways of action of members of a 
society, validates these ways to themselves, and to an ex-
tent controls and modifies the ways." It is made up of 
ltv alues, norms, and standards. nl It is in this realm of 
implicit culture that Myrdal finds the conflicting valua-
tions both between groups and within persons. The dis-
tinction between implicit and explicit culture enables 
Myrdal to treat the "Negro problem" as a moral issue and 
to write of the "Unity of Ideals and Diversity of Cul-
ture.''2 That there are conflicts of valuation is also 
made clear in Stilwell's observation that if a psychia-
trist could probe deep enough into our subconscious, he 
just might discover that we hesitate to wipe out cheating 
in our schools for fear it might render our children unfit 
to meet the challenge of the business world. 3 
It is of this same implicit culture that Redfield 
writes in The Primitive World and Its Transformations. The 
first great transformation is from the primitive world to 
civilization. Civilization brings about first the disin-
tegration of the local moral orders and then the rise of 
1. Kroeber, NC, 136-7. 
2. See Myrdal, AD, especially Introduction, Chapter I, 
Appendices I and II. 
3. Stilwell, Art.(l951). 
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more inclusive moral orders. Redfield's second transforma-
tion is the making more explicit of the implicit moral 
order (as distinguished from technical order)--"the rise 
of ideas as forces in history, influencing the moral order 
directly. 111 It is in the study of this moral order, of 
this implicit culture, that the unifying concepts of 
"themes" and "thematic values 11 emerge. 
ii. Linguistics and Pattern. 
A second area of study has also been converging on 
the concept of "thematic values." Sapir has been one of 
the leaders in anthropological linguistics, with his in-
terest in the fact of patterning in language and his great-
est contribution, according to Harris, in demonstrating the 
patterning of data in language.2 B. L. wVhorf has also em-
phasized 11 patternment 11 in language and configuration anal-
ysis as an alternative tool to the measurement of mathemat-
ical sciences. 3 Sapir carried over the idea of pattern 
from his linguistic analysis to his studies of personality 
and of culture. The actual recognition of patterning was 
probably delayed because of the positivistic bias in sci~ 
ence and the individualistic bias in popular thought. 
1. See Redfield, ~~~ especially xii. 
2. Harris, Rev.(l951). · 
3. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l951)2. 
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Kluckhohn points to the lack of equivalences in 
Navaho and English as an outward expression of inward dif-
ferences in the peoples' premises, basic categories, and 
views of the world. 1 The patterns and philosophy of a 
language thus provide a key to the implicit culture. A-
gain, the patterning is largely unconscious, so that Lloyd 
Varner suggests that an Australian aborigine, fully social-
ized and then trained in social science, would probably 
discover patterns in our language and culture that we 
miss.2 
One important concept in linguistics has been that 
of ttdrift," "the very slow but powerful changes in certain 
directions which seem to be implicit in the phonemic sys~ 
terns and morphologies of the languages themselves." 3 Her-
skovits applies the concept of cultural drift as "a pro-
cess of cumulative variation," an adaptation from Sapir's 
studies in linguistics. 4 This emphasis on culture as well 
as language having a current of its own of course lends it-
self to cultural relativism-.; .. 
The convergence of studies of implicit culture and 
1. Kluckhohn and Leighton, TN. 
2. See Kluckhohn, Art.(l943). 
3. Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 23. 
4. Herskovits, MHW, 582-1. 
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of linguistic.s into the recognition of pattern has two 
sets of implications. Opler traces, as one example, the 
development of Ruth Benedict's thought from a study of 
"psychological types" in 1928, through an analysis of cul-
tural configurations in terms of dominant drives (in 1932), 
to a more extreme emphasis upon integration around dominant 
drives in 1934. Opler notes that what began as a descrip-
tive category, pattern and integrat!on, developed into a 
"normative and selective element," failing to account for 
imperfectly integrated societies. 1 This development has 
branched into the numerous studies of "national character," 
as, for ex~nple, Benedict's Chrysanthemum and the Sword. 
Most criticisms of these studies have centered about their 
schematic and oversimplified presentation, their missing 
of the variations within each national culture. 2 From 
this stream of development can be traced certain implica-
tions of cultural relativ-ism. It is related, for example, 
to Boas' culture area concept. 3 
The other stream, equally committed to the discovery 
1. Opler, Art.(l948). See also Bidney, TA, 389. 
2. See Bennett and Nagai, Art. ( 1953); Gorer, Art. ( 1953); 
Kardiner, Art.(l949); Klineberg, TAIU; Komarovsky and 
Sargent, Art.(l949); Linton, Art.(l949); Mandelbaum, Art. 
(1953); Mead, M., Art.(l953). 
3. See Bidney, TA, 371; Herskovits, MHW, 632. 
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of pattern but without the implications of relativism, 
probably stems from Clark Wissler's conception of the "Uni-
versal Culture Pattern."1 Although the scheme seems some-
what more of a catalogue than do modern variations, Wiss-
ler does emphasize that all historic cultures, ours and 
primitive cultures alike, are "built upon one general pat-
tern," and that 11 It is this fundamental similarity which 
we express by the term pattern, or skeleton of culture." 
He also points to the "wonderful flexibilityn of the pat-
tern. The relation of this conception to the possibility 
of universal norms is suggested by Kluckhohn 1 s quotation · 
from Whitehead: "Human life is driven forward by its dim 
apprehension of notions too general for its existing lan-
2 guage." Whorf uses the analogy of language to point to 
something of the same order beyond attempted orderings: 
The tremendous importance of language cannot ••• 
be taken to mea,n necessarily that nothing is back 
of it ••• My own studies suggest, to me, that lan-
guage, for all of its kingly role, is in some sense 
a superficial embroidery upon deeper processes of 
consciousness which are necessary before any com-
munication, signaling, or symbolism whatsoever can 
occur ••• I mean ttsuperficial" in the sense that 
all processes of chemistry, for example, can be 
said to be superficial upon the deeper layer of 
physical existence ••• The different tongues are 
1. Wissler, MC, especially 73-98. 
2. Kluckhohn, Art.{l949), 358. See Ratner, Art.(l939}. 
This conception will be further developed in Chapter V. 
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the real phenomena and may generalize down not to 
any such universal as "langua~e, at but to something 
better--called 11 sublinguistic 1 or "superlinguistic" 
--and not altogether unlikt' even if much unlike, 
what wenow call "mental.,, 
iii. Culture and Personality. 
Under liThe Assumptions of Cultural Relativism," 
the interactive and polar conceptions of culture-in-per-
sonality and personality-in-culture were discussed. But 
this interrelationship was not always so obvious. It took 
time for twentieth century anthropology to come to terms 
with psychology and to realize that culture might be under-
stood better in many ways if ~een from the vantage point 
of an individual. Only gradually have anthropologists 
come to ·study people as individuals. 2 Or, perhaps, an-
thropologists have been studying people all along but 
have not always been able to get individuals in focus. 
Race, geography, climate, culture area--these were the 
important matters, Sapir notes, and "The whole temper of 
3 
anthropology was impersonal to a degree • ., 
Sapir, who, along with Ruth Benedict and Margaret 
Mead, developed this area of study, indicates how the 
person emerged as a concept as anthropologists studied 
1. Whorf, CPM, 21. . 
2. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l945); Hallowell, Art.(l945)2. 
3. Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 569. 
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cultures .1 In familiar circumstances the center of at ten-
tion is the individual and we eas~ly distinguish John and 
Joe. But in unfamiliar circumstances, facing a strange 
culture, we tend to lump individuals together in "presum-
ably all Chinese. • • " Opler recalls that the first con-
tacts with primitive peoples were not by men who wanted to 
learn but by those who came to conquer, trade, or teach. 
Soldiers and missionaries, with all of their interests in 
"fanciful stories, exotic customs, and esoteric rites of 
the savage," had fixed opinions regarding his mental in-
feriority and childishness and were ready to see an "inf'lex-
ible samenessn in all members of a group. Thus ignorance 
and prejudice obscured individuality until familiarity 
and psychological insights brought the person into focus. 
Also, Opler thinks, common behavior is easier to observe 
than idiosyncratic. 2 Bidney suggests that the change in 
perspective in anthropology, to a consideration of the 
3 person, i s a result of an altered view of culture. It 
would seem, on the contrary, that anthropologists had ' to 
alter their view of culture because they kept running into 
individuals like Dorsey 1 s "Two Crows," who repeatedly 
1. See Sapir, Art.(l934). 
2. Opler, Art.(l938). 
3. Bidney, TA, 327. 
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denied easy generalizations about Omaha culture. 1 
Goldenweiser emphasizes the impact of psychology 
and psychiatry in the new emphasis on the individual in 
anthropology,2 but Kluckhohn thinks only the latter has 
been influential. Before 1920, anthropology's focus was 
on the standard and average, almost anti-psychological; 
psychiatric influences have been partly responsible for 
attention to deviants, life histories, culture and person-
ality studies, etc.3 However, both Rivers and Seligman in 
England were aware of psychology in 1890-1900, and Marett 
wrote in 1911 on "The Individuality of the Primitive." 4 
Kroeber was probably the only American anthropologist who 
had any use for Freud's Totem~ Taboo, indicating the 
early hostility to psychiatry. 
There have been criticisms of the culture and person-
ality emphasis, including its preoccupation with child-
rearing techniques (although this is an easy way to get 
at culture} and Inkeles' charge of neglect of the inter-
relations of personality and social structure.5 Neverthe-
less, this area has opened the way for the study of the 
1. See Mandelbaum ( ed.), SWES, 569 ff. 
2. Goldenweiser, Art.(l941), 163. 
3. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l944)2. Note Sapir's articles in 
Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 509 ff., 569 ff. 
4. In Mead and Galas (eds.), PH, 32-33. 
5. Inkeles, Art.(l953). 
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1 dynamics of culture change. More important, this ability 
to bring into focus the persons rather than the abstract 
cultures is what really gives the tolerance and respect 
urged by the relativists. Finally, this emphasis upon 
culture-in-personality has provided a basis for the dis-
covery of universals. "The application of the personality 
point of view tends to ~inimize the bizarre or exotic in 
alien cultures and to reveal to us more and more clearly 
the broad human base on which all. culture has developed. 112 
lv. Concern with Philosophical Questions. 
The di scovery of values in the study of implicit 
culture, the awareness of pattern in language and then in 
personality and culture, and the emergence of the person 
in the study of culture--all these both stimulated and re-
vealed the concern of anthropologists with philosophical 
questions. Again, it was not only that anthropologists' 
theories implied philosophy but that anthropologists found 
themselves involved in asking questions that had philosoph-
ical reference. They came to realize that scientific 'ob-
jectivity did not mean either ignoring philosophical mat-
3 
ters or withdrawing to neutral trivialities. One 
1. Opler, Art.(l938), 219; Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 509. 
2. Sapir, Art.(l934), 413. 
3. See Geiger in Benne and Swanson, Art.(l950), 11 ff.; 
Kluckhohn, c., Art.(l939)2, Art.(l951)1; Muelder, Art.(l9Sl)l. 
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researcher found that social scientists were coming to dis-
criminate between: 1} values in science, as an integral 
part of scientific method; 2} values for science, deter-
mining problems of research; and 3) values 2f science, 
arising out of the knowledge discovered by science. Neu-
trality, according to this investigator, does not mean 
moral indifference but refusal to pronounce on ultimate 
1 
values. He also followed Max Weber in trying to separate 
the roles of scientist and citizen in dealing ~th values. 
Evans-Pr~tchard makes this same attempt: 
The 
and 
Within the anthropological field the anthropolo-
gist is, like any other scientist. • • bound to 
exclude moral values because they are methodologi-
cally irrelevant. In practical affairs, where the~ 
are relevant, he is equally bound to include them. 
persistence of this effort to keep separate normative 
descriptive inquiry indicates something of the con-
cern of science with the problem of values. The inade-
quacy of such a division of role has already been dis-
cussed. 
Regardless of Boas' own intent, the effect of his 
influence has been anti-philosophical and even such a · 
voice as that of Leslie White is challenging this bias. 
1. See Smith, SSV. 
2. Quoted in Herskovits, MHW, 650-1. 
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Redfield senses a growing tendency among anthropologists 
to be concerned with universal moral principles and 
underscores what has already been noted in this study, 
that "The anthropologist can hardly convince us--or him-
self--that as far as he is concerned a disorganized cul-
ture that fails to provide a desire to live is as valid 
as any other. nl 
One of the first attempts to come to grips with 
philosophical issues was Sapir's "Culture, Genuine and 
Spurious,"2 published in 1924. His characterization of 
genuine cultures was in terms of harmony, balance, and 
spiritual meaning, not efficiency. In such cultures the 
individual is not a 11 mere cog," but finds satisfaction 
for himself. Twenty-five years later c ane Bidney' s call 
for a 11meta-anthropology,"3 which would deal · not only 
with logic and philosophy but with the more ultimate 
issues of metaphysics and ontology. 
3. Thematic Values and Instrumental Values. 
The concern with philosophical questions and the 
1. Redfield, ~~, 142, 150, 90; also Kluckhohn, c., MM, 
285. 
2. Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 308-331, especially 314-5. 
3. Bidney, Art.(l949}. See Anshen (ed.), OEC, 5, for a 
similar concern with ontology. See also Kirk's (CVF) ad-
vocacy of "metascience" as a "science of science." 
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renewed attention to theory has involved a search for regu-
larities, or at least a more explicit statement of the reg-
ularities assumed in anthropological practice. Steward 
thinks that such typological categories as clan, caste, 
class, etc. give tttacit recognition" to common features 
of cultures, despite local peculiarities of expression. 
He bases his trial formulation of regularities on a distinc-
tion between basic institutions and unique variables. 
If the more important institutions of culture 
can be isolated from their unique setting so 
as to be typed, classified, and related to re-
curring antecedents or functional correlates, 
it follows that it is possible to consider the 
institutions in question as the basic or constant 
ones, whereas the features that len~ uniqueness 
are the secondary or variable ones. 
This distinction corresponds fairly closely to that 
of Linton between thematic values and instrumental values. 
Thematic values recognizable in every culture are based 
upon the similar 11needs of individuals and imperatives of 
social existence." These thematic values are instrumented 
in each culture by behavior patterns, with a limited range 
of variability, which ttare inevitably shaped by practical 
considerations of materials and skills available and by 
the conditioning of the individuals who compose the 
1. Steward, Art.(l949), 6. See also Kluckhohn, c., MM, 
266. 
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society."1 The concept of cultural relativity is valid 
in relation to instrumental values. Linton illustrates 
the difference by referring to the Pope's refusal tore-
ceive the late Mahatma Gandhi in a loincloth. Both men, 
says Linton, "would have agreed on the thematic value of 
modesty as common to both their cultures; but they dis-
agreed on the instrumental values of loincloths vs. 
trousers." 
It should be noted that this distinction is not 
quite the same as that drawn by Brightman between instru-
mental and intrinsic values as "points of view from which 
values may be regarded rather than absolutely distinct 
classes of value; but the fundamental meaning of value 
is to be found in its intrinsic aspect."2 Thematic values 
are not so much norms as they are, roughly, "things that 
have to get done." And yet, they are not unrelated to 
norms. Linton cautions against the notion that "any in-
stitution or pattern of behavior which occurs with great 
frequency in cultures is necessarily 'right';" but, he 
adds, "it is sat'e to assume that such a culture element 
must be intimately related to one or more of the universal 
1. Linton, Art.(l953), 308-9. 
2. Brightman, NV, 70. 
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thematic values. 111 
Linton acknowledges his indebpedness to Morris Opler 
for the preliminary concept of themes, which Opler de-
scribes as "dynamic forces, 11 categories related to uni-
versal human needs, with differences in content and organ-
ization. He finds the key to a culture in the "nature, ex-
pression, and interrelationship" of the themes. A theme is 
a 11 postulate or position, declared or implied, and usually 
controlling behavior or stimulating activity, which is 
tacitly approved or openly promoted in a society. 112 A 
theme is an abstraction, free of specific events and so 
available for comparison. Themes can be evaluated in 
terms of number of expressions, intensity of sanctions, 
and limiting factors (including other themes). O~ler's 
examples of themes include: "Men are more powerful than 
women;" "The universe is pervaded by diffuse supernatural 
power, 11 etc. It should be noted that Opler applies the 
themes within a single culture, to aid in understanding 
it, and not cross-culturally. 3 
1. Linton, Art.(l953), 309. This point will be discussed 
in Chapter V. 
2. Opler, Art.(l945), 198ff. See Opler, Art.(l948), and 
Art. ( 1949). 
3. Opler, Art.(l946)1. Note the similarity to Kluckhohn's 
premises of Navaho implicit culture, cited earlier. 
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Albert K. Cohen criticizes Opler's concept as too 
much concerned with inductive description, not readily 
comparable in Opler's treatment. However, Cohen suggests 
that themes, along with patterns and configurations, assume 
that all cultures have widely shared values or goals which 
govern the selection of means. He argues for the extension 
of the concept to reach 11 a body of interdependent, mutually 
limiting propositions."l In a later article Cohen proposes 
comparing societies in terms of themes, adding that these 
need to be related to the psychological, biological, and 
social needs of man--and to the needs of the social sys-
2 tem. 
Certainly for Linton the concept of thematic values 
makes possible cross-cultural comparisons. Opler 1 s con-
clusion to his secona article on themes implies this and 
. points to one of the focal points of this study: "It ·is 
at the level of motivation and purpose that the similar-
ities and differences between the behavior and conceptions 
of men and groups of men need to be explored."3 Rigorous 
search ~or cross-cultural regularities does push us beyond 
instrumental values to purposes, to thematic values, and 
1. Cohen, A., Art.(1946). 
2. Cohen, A., Art.(ll48). See Gladwyn, Art.(l947). 
3. Opler, Art.(l946) , 164. Emphasis added. 
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perhaps to norms. 
Note distinctions drawn by a number of writers that 
seem to converge upon Linton's concept of thematic values. 
Muelder calls attention to the satisfaction or experience 
of competitive or "spot" values within a larger context 
of ideal or "field" values, which control both the goals 
and the means of reaching them. 1 Golightly proposes as a 
distinction of "wider generality" than that between instru-
mental and intrinsic values that between normative state-
mertts of right and wrong and comparisons of norms them-
selves.2 Nicolai Hartmann puts a middle term between the 
"ideal Ought-to-Be" as unconditional being and the "posi-
tive Ought-to-Don of present obligation. This middle 'term 
is the ttpositive Ought.-to-Be, 11 which arises out of the 
tension between the ideal and the real and presupposes 
that the "ideal Ought-to-Be" is not yet rea1. 3 Kurt von 
Fritz sees "behind a 'relative' principle of conduct, which 
in one country may be the opposite of what it is in ariother 
country ••• a somewhat less arbitrary principle of conduct 
which appl~es in both cases. 114 Casserley writes c£ the 
1. Muelder, Art.(l950), 480. Credit is given W. E. Hocking 
for the terminology. 
2. Golightly, Art.(l947), 508-9. 
3. Hartmann, Ethics, I, 247-251. 
4. von Fritz, Art.(l952), 97-8. 
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anthropologists 1 '' quest through the relativities of social 
life for those absolute necessities ••• which the rela-
tivities assimilate, disguise and conceal, but neverthe-
less embody and express. 111 Gordon W. Allport opposes the 
idea that numerous ethnic differences mean that "the mores 
make anything right." "Actually," he writes, uall human 
groups hav e developed activities that are 'functionally 
equivalent.' Vfhereas details may differ, the members of 
every society agree in many of their purposes." 2 
It may be that this distinction is assumed by Ruth 
Benedict as she reports an Indian proverb, "They all dipped 
3 in the water, but their cups were different." Herskovits 
is willing to admit the existence of "universals," or 
least common denominators reached inductively, as opposed 
to fixed and unvarying "absolutes." He agrees that "cer-
tain cultural uniformities do arise out of the similarities 
in the situations with which all human beings must cope," 
but argues against postulating inherent drives or sub-
suming all culture under Wissler's universal pattern. 
He is unable to accept fully any hypothesis explaining 
universal aspects of culture, but he does see the wide 
1. Casserley, MMSS, 6. 
2. Allport, NP, 115. 
3. Benedict, PC, 19. 
134 
variation as '•multiple solutions stemming from an under-
1 lying universal base." In another place Herskovits writes 
of the infinite variety of cultures as "intricate varia-
tions on a number of basic themes," related to the de-
ma.nds of the physical organism, the group's survival and 
order of living, adjustment to the universe, aesthetic 
demands, and communication. 2 
This study will proceed to indicate some of the 
thematic values anthropologists have discovered as "in-
variant points of reference," foci around which the pat-
terns of all cultures seem to crystallize. 3 These thematic 
values may provide "universal categories" in 'terms of which 
comparison of cultures is possible and from which may be 
inferred universal norms. 
4. Some Themes Discovered in Cross-Cultural Studies. 
The listing of themes in this section is intended 
as suggestive rather than exhaustive, as indicating some-
thing of the range and types of thematic values. Two areas, 
ethnocentrism and abnormality, will be treated in some 
detail as type cases closely related to cultural relativism. 
1. Herskovits, MHW, 76, 2'34, 237-8. 
2. Herskovits, Art.(l945), 144. Emphasis added. 
3. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l953), · 520-l. See Boas, A~ffi, 203~ 
and Art.(l932), 613; Malinowski, FFM, vii. 
135 
It should be noted again that instrumentation of themes 
differs, so that a slap on the back might express good 
will in one culture and be an in~ult in another, but both 
1 
cultures would have ways to express good will. 
Any list of themes should be against the background 
of Wissler's "universal pattern," as the prototype of this 
kind of effort, and of Murdock's "common denominators," as 
a later development of Wissler's scheme. Wissler's scheme 
classified culture items in terms of speech, material · 
traits (food, shelter, travel, dress, uten~ils, occupa-
tiona), art, mythology and scientific knowledge, relig-
ious practices, family and social systems, property,govern-
ment, and war. 2 This is really a listing of institution~ 
and its adequacy as a categorical scheme will be questioned 
in Chapter Five. Something of the same criticism is justi-
fied of Murdock's "partial list" of items occurring in 
every culture: 
Age-grading, athletic sports, bodily adornment, cal-
endar, cleanliness training, community organization, 
cooking, cooperative -labor, cosmology, courtship, 
dancing, decorative art, divination, division of 
labor, dream interpretation, education, eschatology, 
ethics, ethnobotany, etiquette, faith healing, fam-
ily, feasting, fire niaking, ~ folklore, food taboos, 
runeral rites, games, gestures, gift giving, 
1. See Linton, Art.{l947), 340. 
2. Wissler, MC, 73-98. 
136 
government, greetings, hair styles, hospitality, 
housing, hygiene, incest taboos, inheritance rules, 
joking, kin-groups, kinship nomenclature, language, 
law, luck superstitions, magic, marriage, mealtimes, 
medicine, modesty concerning natural functions, 
mourning, music, mythology, numerals, obstetrics, 
penal sanctions, personal names, population policy, 
postnatal care, pregnancy usages, property rights, 
propitiation of supernatural beings, puberty cus-
toms, religious ritual, residence rules, sexual 
restrictions, soul concepts, status differentia-
tions, surgery, tool-making, trade, visiting, 
weaning, and weather control.l 
It should be noted that all themes are abstractions 
from experience, the experience of persons. Greene sees 
the "ultimate matrix of all inquiry" as the "self exper-
iencing its world." 2 Hadfield suggests that "it seems 
necessary to suppose that every world view starts from 
the man who is the viewer and includes the idea of a self." 
He goes on to uaccept as human universals" the "I" and 
" Me" constituents of this self, as developed in G. H. Mead.3 
This experience of self-awareness would seem to be an es-
sential part of socialization, inherent in the human situ-
ation. Those who go to the extreme of self-repudiation 
al ways assume a self to repudiate and, as Bateson notes, 
achieve a "generous self-acceptance by including their 
repudiation within brackets. 114 
1. Murdock , Art.(l945), 124 ff. 
2. Greene, Art.(l953), 368-9. 
3. Redfield, P~'VT, 91 f. See Mead, G. H., MSS. 
4. Bateson, Art.(l943), 246. See Hallowell, Art.(l953). 
And the universality of the "self experiencing 
its world" calls for recognition of another universal, 
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culture. Steward recalls that Ruth Benedict used to say, 
with a smile, when asked about parallel developments, '~es, 
all mankind has culture, hasn't it?n1 
The theme that lies behind this is probably communi-
cation, for experience, to be human, requires sharing, at 
least pot entially. So every culture has a language with 
which the people categorize experience, select from, in-
terpret and give meaning to experience. The development 
of language is probably logically prerequisite to that of 
culture, but both were probably developed together as man 
became man. Languages are functionally equivalent, and 
so, comparable. Language is at once a socializing and an 
individualizing force. It not only enables sharing of 
ideas but also the establishment of rapport.2 
Another theme is that of morality, distinctions of 
right and wrong. Society is impossible on the basis of 
simply random behavior, and every culture limits the free-
dom o~ its members, makes behavior predictable, makes 
cooperation possible, by rules that regulate conduct and 
1. Tax (ed.) AAT, 123. 
2. See Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 7-17; Hallowell, Art.(l953), 
612; Kluckhohn and Leighton, TN, ch. s. 
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define expectations. IO.uckhohn writes: "As wide an in-
duction as anthropology can offer is that every society 
des per ately needs morality in the sense of common stan ... ·· 
dards. nl In no human group have anthropologists found 
approval of indiscriminate lying, cheating, or stealing. 
All groups seem to have ethical systems and a standard for 
truth. 
A closely related theme concerns the "reasons" for 
these rules, for whatever exceptions are permitted, and 
for natural events. For every group seems to have devel-
oped more or less adequate s chemes of explanation for their 
behavior and for self-understanding. Men do not simply 
act in approved ways because of arbit rary sanctions, but 
because of stories about the origins of the rules which 
at the s ame time : enjoin obedience. These stories may be, 
and often are , myths, forming a system about which the 
society is integrated. These "reasons" are typically 
traditional, but note again Redfield's second transforma-
tion, that of the moral order from unconscious and 
traditional into being explicit, "thought about, 11 and 
1 l.K1uckhohn, C., MM, 282. See also his Art.(l951) ; 
Kluc khohn and Leighton, TN, ch. 9; Linton, Art.(l952), 
658; MacBeath, EL, 327; Brightman, Art.(l947); Mead, MF, 
151; Bidney, TA, 11-14; Parsons and Shils (eds.), TGTA, 
25-6. 
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so subject to change. 1 In each culture there is some 
freedom, and again the except ions have "reasons. 11 All 
cultures seem to distinguish between 11 reasons 11 involving 
"empirical lore" and those involving religion. A. E. Mur-
phy proposes as an evaluative conception, "community of 
understanding," which he says "can properly be said to 
exist in any society to the extent that shared ideals 
operat e as reasons in the determination of policy and reso-
lution of conflict. 112 
These shared ideals point to another universal 
theme, that of religion. All societies have religious 
codes , rituals and beliefs to provide some degree of social 
solidarity and expressive symbolism, and to give meaning , 
or i entation, and a sense of security in an of'times tragic 
world. Sanctions for behavior are often religious, though 
societies may vary in emphasis upon shame as a 11 socialtt 
phenomenon and guilt as a 11 religious" _phenomenon. The 
close relation of these two factors is seen when religion 
is viewed as a unifying force; although Levi-Strauss ques-
tions whether we can ever know whether r eligion unifies, 
since there is no society without religion to enable 
1. Redfield, PWT. See also Kluckhohn, Art.(1942), and NW. 
2. Murphy, A., Art.(l950), 455 f. See also Kluckhohn, c., 
MEHV, 110. 
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comparisons. Malinowski and others often relate religion 
exclusively to stresses, strains, and tragedy, failing to 
consider that all the major events of the life-cycle, 
birth, coming of age, marriage, etc., are as equally focal 
points for religion as are death and despair. Religion is 
closely related to the rhythm of activities, of work and 
rest, and to the transitions from childhood into adult 
status. Death is a focus of universal concern, and no 
people deal with it as simply a physical matter, disposal 
of the corpse. Whether by institutionalized hysterics or 
by quiet ritual, every society patterns expressions of 
grief and meets the experience of bereavement. Malinow-
ski illustrates the sophisticated temper as he recognizes 
religious truths as "indispensable pragmatic figments:" 
Take away from the natives the belief in the reality 
of their sacred lore, destroy their sense of the 
spiritual world as it exists and acts upon them, 
and you will undermine their whole moral outlook.l 
In the light of modern anomie, speculation is perhaps 
justified as to whether there are· more natives than Mal-
inowski thought. 
1. Malinowski, FFM, 26, 60. See Muelder, Art.(l951)1 , 
120; Levi-Strauss, Rev.(l953); Kluckhohn and Leighton, TN, 
ch. 7; Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 346-7; Kluckhohn and Mur-
ray, PNSC, 25; Mead, M., MF, 163 f.; Benedict, Art.(l939), 
and Art.(l932}. 
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Religion as an integrating factor implies as a theme 
the necessity of some form, however simple, of social or-
ganization in every group. Social stratification is an 
everchanging phenomenon, but Maciver argues that it is 
"in some sense as inherent in society as society is in-
herent in man."1 Culture change would seem to be another 
universal. Leadership would seem to be a . function in 
every group. Every society has some division of labor 
for specialization and cooperation, at least according 
to sex, with adult males usually given prerogatives. No 
society, writes Margaret Mead, says there is no difference 
between men and women except in their procreative functions. 
The basic learnings of child-rearing are in essence the 
same as our s , with the necessity of learning what it is 
to be male or female. 2 The division of labor i~ part 'of 
a scheme for :getting necessary work done, for every society 
has some kind of economic life, recognizing some kind of 
personal property, and retaining the right of eminent 
domain with respect to some resources. 3 
1. Maciver, Art.(l947), 103. See Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 
332; Leighton, HRCW, 163; Benedict, PC, 24; Murdock, SS, 
7; Datihof, Art.(l953); Heimann, Art.{l953); Herskovits, 
MHW , 71. 
2. Mead, M., MF, 5, 9, 143 f. 
3. Linton, Art.(l952), 655 f. See Boas, AML, 427. 
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Probably the most obvious focus of all cultures is 
on the family. Murdock writes of the nuclear family (one 
set of parents and their children) as na universal social 
grouping." It is either the sole prevailing form or is 
the basic unit of which more complex and extended forms 
are composed. The social usefulness and universality of 
the family are not explained just in its collective func.-
tions (sex, economic cooperation and division of labor, 
reproduction, and education of children), but in the satis-
factions derived from its relationships. Sex is not the 
only focus of the family, although it does solidify the 
relationship of parents and it cannot be left without · 
restraint. But, on the other hand, if the regulat_ion is 
too strict, the society suffers through personality mal-
adjustments and insufficient population. The family as the 
primary unit in l andholding and the focus of status is not 
capable of explanation on .an instinctive or hereditary 
basis. Although incest taboos are seemingly infinitely 
variable and arbitrary, "they invariably apply to every 
cross-sex relationship within the nuclear family save 
that between married spouses. 11 These taboos make the 
nuclear fa.mily discontinuous, confine it to two generations, 
and provide that every normal adult belong to two families. 
I ncest taboos prevent some disruptive jealousies, diffuse 
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culture, and enlarge areas of cooperation and solidarity. 1 
Monogamy is the only form of marriage nrecognized 
and permitted in all social systems," according to Linton, 
although it is preferred in relatively few societies. All 
societies have rules of descent, or kinship, as an irreduc-
ible principle of selection for mutual assistance, regula-
tion of marriage, etc. All societies have - some form of 
childtraining, or of beating "the ch ild 1 s ears in at some 
point," as Kluckhohn say.s. Muelder indicates the evalua~ 
tive element involved in thematic values: rtAdequate family 
life is a functional necessity for a healthy culture. 112 
In every society the family is supposed to look 
after its members' interests and "to present a united front 
to outsiders. 113 The family is thus the first in-group. 
But people in all cultures seem to feel a need for par-
ticipation in a larger in-group than the family, for 
1. I·Jiurdock, SS, 1-16, 263, 294-9. See also Opler, Rev. 
(1950); Mandelbaum (ed.), SWES, 336 f.; Benedict, PC, 
29; Linton, SM, 125, 153, and Art.(l952), 651-4. Aris-
totle 1 s reply to Plato 1 s proposal to abolish the family 
is relevant:· that if children do not learn to love their 
families, they will be unable to be attached to any one 
else or any other group. See Anshen (ed.), FFD, 9. 
2. Muelder, Art.(l95l)l, 115; "healthy" means "viable.tt 
See also Linton, SM, 187; Murdock, SS, 14-16; Kluckhohn, 
c., MM , 277, and Art.(l953), 520. 
3. Linton, Art.(l952), 654. 
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"Nowhere on earth do people live regularly in isolated 
families. nl The child always is regarded as a member of 
the same groups as his parents. The in-group, with its 
face-to-face relations, its common interests and loyalties, 
is the main culture-bearing group and the "primary seat 
of social control," providing each individual with the 
emotional responses necessary for socially acceptable 
behavior. 2 
It is from the in-group that members look out to 
observe differences from outsiders, to form judgments about 
other ways, and to distinguish between "we" and "they. 11 
Most in-groups have one set of mores for dealing with mem-
bers and another applying to outsiders. 3 The emotional 
attachment to in-group ways is natural and necessary, for 
complete "detachment" would lead to disorganization.4 But 
this is obviously ethnocentrism, which Herskovits says is 
universal and important as "a gentle insistence on the 
good qualities of one's own group, without any drive to 
extend this attitude into the field of action," as in 
1. Murdock, SS, 79; Linton, SM, 216, 217-225. 
2. Linton, CBP, 8; Murdock, SS, 82; Allport, NP, 29-30. 
3. Herskovits, MIDV, 61; Benedict, PC, 6; Redfield, PWT, 
92; Linton, SM, 225; Benedict, Art.(l943), 101. See page 
28, this study. 
4. Kluckhohn, c., MM, 39. 
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Euroamerican expansion. 1 There seems to be no question 
but that ethnocentrism in some sense is a universal theme; 
but there is considerable question of whether it is too 
d.eep-seated to overcome in the interests of harmony. Some 
hold that this social attribute which man has most in com-
mon, his commitment to a culture group, is the source of 
the deepest misunderstandings and conflicts. 2 Muelder ob-
serves that "Prejudice of some kind is almost the invaria-
ble accompaniment of positive group loyalty when it comes 
in conflict with v1hat is different. 113 
Differences do tend to arouse anxiety. However, 
Murdock argues from the inevitable fru~trations involved 
in social life to free-floating aggressive tendencies; 
which cannot be fully vented within the in-group and are 
then displaced toward outsiders as hostility. He concludes 
that "Intergroup antagonism is thus the inevitable con-
comitant and qounterpart of in-group solidarity."4 All-
port notes that there are many in-groups to which a single 
person may belong, and labels as ~ theory of prejudice 
the ngroup-norm" theory. He views it as uunnecessarily 
collectivistic" to set every in-group as "over-against" 
1. Herskovits, MHW, 68-9. 
2. Locke, Art.(l944), 611. 
3. Muelder, Art.(l950}, 479. 
4. Murdock, SS, 83-4. See Romans, EVTC, 328. 
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some out-group. Th e threat o£ disease and poverty can 
also cement in-group loyalty, as in James 1 "Moral Equ iva-
lent o£ War." Allport places primary emphasis on the de-
sire £or security rather than hostility to outs iders in 
explaining in-group loyalty. He points to the usaving 
psychological principle ••• concentric loyalties need not 
clash," to the world £ederalist who is devot ed to family, 
school, and nation, and to the 11 hope£u l possibility" t hat 
larger loyalties can be developed. 1 In another volume 
Murdock stresses the effect of £ocussing on dif£erences 
in strengthening ethnocentrism and describes t h e in-group 
as a rrpeace group," maintaining law and order. 2 And Boas,, 
while denying the evolution of moral ideas, sees progress 
in ethical conduct in the "ever-increasing ••• extension 
o£ the size of the group among whose members altruistic 
obligations ar e binding. n3 
The concept o£ normality is not altog.ether a sep-
ar ate theme. The distinction o£ normal and abnormal be-
havior and persons is one made by all cultures, but it is 
1. Allport, NP, 39-46. See 
critique of Murdock's view. 
2. Murdock , Art.(l931). 
3. Boas, MPM, 187-8, 205-6; 
Art.(1944)1, 164. 
Opler, Rev.(l950), for another 
See also Adams, R., Art.(1951). 
AML, 219: See Kluckhohn, c., 
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at least in part against the background of the theme of a 
moral code and social expectations. Kardiner insists that 
we must not confuse psychological constellations which 
are constant in whatever culture and the social signifi-
cance attached to these constellations, as well as to 
other aspects of deviance. It is the latter, evaluative 
category with which this section deals. Of course, if, 
as relativism holds, any moral code is relative only to 
its culture, then abnormality is culturally defined and 
is, similarly, relative. As evidence for relativism in 
normality-abnormality, Benedict points to behavior con-
sidered normal by our culture but abnormal by others, and 
kinds of abnormality rarely occurring in our culture, as 
the nwihtigo psychosis" (craving for human flesh), running 
1 
tt amok," etc. 
Even if moral codes are not completely relative, 
as this study holds, there would seem to be evidence for 
relativism in the classing of psychological constellations 
as abnormal or normal. Thus, the nberdache," or trans-
vestite, is considered abnormal in some cultures but is 
given a useful role in Plains Indian culture. This rela-
tivity, as distinguished from relativism, means that 
1. See Wegrocki, Art.(l948), 553; Benedict, Art.(l934) • . 
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behavior is defined as abnormal in its cultural setting. 
Herskovits describes certain neurotic or psychotic mani-
festations (in terms of psychological constellations) as 
1 
culturally patterned and learned in other cultures, as, 
for instance, the shaman whose instability is institution-
' 
alized. Culture influences the form as well as the in-
cidence of the abnormalities. 2 EVen protest and rebellion 
may be more patterned than the rebel suspects, and forms 
of mental illness may be culturally provided alternatives 
to deviance and crime. 3 
Each culture selects some human potentialities for 
special elaboration, leaving others to be restrained or 
4 
suppressed. This means that individuals with the char-
acteristics not chosen for development are likely either 
to be classed abnormal or to turn to abnormal behavior. 
Even the elaborated types can be pathological, according 
to Fromm, who outlines a conception of culturally pat-
terned defect. In such a case, the individual judged 
normal in his culture is abnormal ·in his failure to 
1. Herskovits, MHW, 67. See Hoebel, MPW, 458. 
2. Hallowell, Art.(l934). 
3. Opler, Art.(l943); Parsons, T., Art.(l953). 
4. Bidney, TA, 146. 
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realize full human potentialities. 1 Thus, in ~ elanesia, 
according to Benedict, suspicion and paranoia are at the 
cornerstone of the social structure, with the man of a 
sunny, kindly disposition viewed as "crazy."2 This type 
of patterned defect has consequences which social scien-
tists are coming to describe in terms of "social cost," a 
concept which will be developed in the next chapter. In 
this s ame context, the "Wi htigo psychosis" mentioned above 
is seen to be related to rigid taboos on cannibalism and 
aggravated by suspicions if an individual once shows 11 symp-
toms."3 The interrelation of themes is indicated here. 
Wegrock i seems to i mply in his criticism of con-
cepts of abnormality that behavior can only be called 
abnormal where choice is involved. Certain mechanisms 
are abnormal, not in themselves, but in their "function 
in the total economy of the personality. 114 Thus the in-
dividual whose ttdefect 11 is culturally patterned is not 
abnormal when judged in terms of his culture's norms but 
only when compared with a postulated norm of personality. 
In this sense, the culture is judged, not the person. 
Kroeber, in a 1951 postscript to his ttPsychosis and Social 
1. Fromm, Art.{l948), 412-3. 
2. Benedict, Art.(l934), 66. 
3. See Cooper, Art.(l934); Hallowell, Art.(l934). 
4. Wegrocki, Art.{l948), 555. 
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Sanction,n suggests that the rewarding of neurotic or · 
psychotic manifestations may be an index of cultural back-
1 
wardness. On the other hand, Kroeber argues with justi-
fication that the culture which socially channels sexual 
inversion so that the individual finds some social satis-
factions without endangering society may provide a better 
solution than that of simple persecution. 2 Again, the as-
sumption of a norm of personality realization should be 
noted. 
Much confusion has arisen from the confusion of 
normality with conformity. Bogardus points to the neces-
sity of "relative withdrawal, 11 holding that individuals 
can live in a group only if they can dissent at some 
points. 3 F. J. Hacker, writing of psychiatry's need for 
adequate criteria of normality, describes its first cri-
teria in terms of internal happ iness and inner freedom 
and external mental efficiency and conformity. 4 Later, 
1. Kroeber, NC, 300. See also Kroeber, Art.(l950)2, 
766 f. 
2. Kroeber, Art.(l95o)2, 770-l. See Benedict, Art.(l934), 
66, for a similar judgment. Kroeber, Art.(l947), also _ 
notes significantly, that all personality studies do not 
have to be of deviance, that there are "successful" ad-
justments. 
3. Bogardus, CS, 265. See Mandelbaum {ed.), SWES, 309, 
514. 
4. Hacker, Art.(l945}, 49-52. 
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psychiatrists r ealized too-great conformity may be a 
weakness. This realization involved psychiatrists in 
criticism of. culture, in defining "adjustment" to a "sick" 
culture as "pathological. 11 Again, Merton's typology is 
instructive. He notes as adaptations to anomie, in addi-
tion to conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, 
1 
rebellion. Each of these except innovation might be clas-
sified as abnormal. 
Benedict's early article may not have been complete-
ly committed to relativism, for it suggests normality be 
considered in terms of "social adequacytt rather than fixed 
symptoms. 2 Hacker records that psychiatry has moved in 
the direction of treating personality as a whole, with 
frank admission of evaluation, and of integration of person-
ality as the vague but flexible yardstick of normality: 
plasticity and best use of capacities, full enjoyment of 
love and work, ability to withstand trauma, resilience and 
endurance. 3 This is an impl:tcit if not explicit self-
realization position, frankly normative, with personality 
assumed as the center of reference. 
It must still be recognized that culture influences 
1. Merton, Art.(l949), 236 ff. 
2. Benedict, Art.(l934), 76; Wegrocki, Art.(l948), 558. 
3. Hacker, Art.(l945), 54-62. See Bidney, TA, 147. 
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the achievement of normality in terms of the conflicts it 
presents to its members, in terms of socially patterned 
defects. 1 Green emphasizes that cultural "roles, goals, 
and self-conceptions" may be internally inconsistent and 
contradictory either at the same time or at different times 
in life. Cultural pressure to attain a self-defeating goal 
leads to anxiety neuroses and prevents real self-acceptance. 
Green concludes that cultures can be compared and judged 
in terms of these inherent inconsistencies in roles, goals, 
and self-conceptions.2 This is a judgment of culture as 
well as of individuals for socially patterned defect. In 
terms of the same problem abnormality can be defined as the 
choice of escape reactions in a situation of conflict 
rather than facing the problem. 3 This judges individual 
abnormality, presupposing a normative conception of per-
sonality beyond cultural conformity. Kluckhohn suggests 
two further criteria of abnormality related to Benedict's 
social a dequacy and to the themes of morality and reasons: 
"All cultures define as abnormal individuals who are per-
manently inaccessible to communication or who consistently 
fail to maintain some degree of control over their impulse 
life." Social life, . he continues, requires both 
1. Wegrocki, Art.(l948), 558. 
2. Green, Art.(l948). 
3. Wegrocki, Art.(l948), 560. 
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communication and order.l 
It is not the aim of this study to make a defini-
tive reconciliation of concepts of abnormality. It has 
tried to show that such a reconciliation is in principle 
possible, that anthropology is moving toward such a defin-
ition, and that abnormality is potentially a universa! 
concept, not just relative to cultural definition but 
also to a presupposed norm of personality. 
1. Kluckhohn, C., MEHV, 104. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THEMATIC VALUES AND UNIVERSAL NORMS 
1. Some Possible Categories of Thematic Values. 
Opler describes themes as positive valuations, 
approved and promoted in a society. Linton, outlintng 
his conception of thematic values, holds that the values 
may be positive or negative. These differences suggest 
the difficulty of finding categories for thematic va£ues 
to enable cross-cultural comparison. Clyde Kluckhohn 
points to two interrelated problems: panhumarl regular-
ities which limit cultural variation, and substantive 
uniformities which may indicate universal categories. 
Are there fairly definite limits within which 
cultural variation is constrained by panhuman regu-
larities in biology, psychology, and the processes of 
social interaction? Do these limits and also the 
accompanying trends toward similarities in form and 
content make for categories of culture which are 
universal in the sense of being both invariant 
points of reference for description and comparison 
and, perhaps, substantive uniformities or near-
uniformities?l 
If the anthropologist insists that each culture must be 
understood only in terms of its own categories of exper-
ience, the implication is obvious that categories are 
nothing more than culturally determined "mental constructs!' 
1. Kluckhohn, c., Art.(l953), 507. See Fromm, MFH, 50-
117, for a similar attempt at classification of person-
ality. 
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The relativistic conclusion follows almost automatically, 
provoking the questions of whether any comparison is possi-
ble on this basis and of how the anthropologist from one 
culture can really understand the categories of another 
culture. Equally as obvious are the ethnocentric (in the 
"bad" sense) implications of the anthropologist trying to 
force all cultural material into the categories of his 
own culture. If the categories are not only mental con-
structs but also have a grounding in human experience it-
self, there is, of course, the third possibility that the 
categories of the anthropologist's culture and of that 
which he studies are both approximations of deeper cate-
gories, enabling revision by appeal to a common referent. 
The question of categories is a persistent one for 
philosophy as well as for anthropology: whether categories 
are a priori principles of mental activity to be imposed 
on experience or are in some sense given in experience to 
be apprehended by mental activity. This study will follow 
Borden Parker Bowne's understanding of categories as 
immanent principles: 
They are not principles which the mind uses to 
know with, but they determine the form of knowing. 
They are not empty forms of the pigeon-hole type 
into which the mind sorts its experience; but they 
are the organic principles by which experiemce 1s 
built up. 
* * * 
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They constitute the framework o~ intelligence, 
and when experience is built into them they give 
the form of experience. As immanent principles, 
they underlie experience. As abstract ideas, they 
are reached by abstraction from that expelience 
which, as principles, they make possible. 
Any object in our experience becomes real for us only 
with the "organizing activity on the part of the mind 
according to principles immanent in the understanding." 
Categories are, in a sense, given in experience; the 
ordering activity of intelligence finds intelligibility 
in the data. 
A category, . then, is a structural principle of 
a coherent system, an abstraction from the rational 
whole of experience. Culture would seem to be a phenom-
enal category, though perhaps more. Categories of know-
ledge are first, in some degree, empirical generaliza-
tions on a phenomenal level, discovered by analysis in 
the process of abstraction. However, culture cannot be 
adequately understood in terms of categories of phenomena. 
Rather, one must infer from practices and institutions 
the underlying aim or purpose. Purpose is here distin-
guished, as volitional causality, from the more mechanical 
1. Bowne, TTK, 61, 112. See also 112-6; Brightman, 
IP, 95-8. 
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causality of function. 
A still further inference is required from the human 
purpose to the deeper teleology to which it responds. It 
is helpful to distinguish between logical categories, as 
inexorable, and ethical categories. The values and norms 
of the latter have some independent being, but as claims 
rather than as necessary existence, claims which can be 
' 
transgressed, but with consequences. Categories would seem 
to have metaphysical, logical, or ethical levels of being. 
Hartmann holds that the ethical, or 11 ideal ought-to-be, 11 
ls conditional, a tendency toward realization, becoming the 
npositive ought-to-be" where opposed by actuality. But the 
ethical requires more than resistance; it requires a real 
self-existent as a point of origin in the stream of being, 
a person, who is both an ontological and axiological 
entity.l Beginning with the phenomenal categories, which 
are logical, we infer both the ontological and axiological. 
The question for this study is the sense in which 
anthrop~logists use such concepts as categories and the 
implications or this use. Clyde Kluckhohn says that this 
is the greatest unsolved problem of anthropology, how to 
organize field data in such a way that comparisons are 
1. Hartmann, Eth., I, 242-269. 
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possible. The anthropologist can compare crossbows, mar-
riage rites, etc., but he has as yet no way to compare 
patterns and values without distortion. Kluckhohn does 
suggest as one possibility the organization of data about 
certain "invariant points of reference, 11 focal points of 
human social life. 1 Linton observes: 
If we could determine which elements are vital in 
all cultures and give all culture configurations 
their form and orientations, these elements would 
offer a really valid reference for developing a 
system of classification.2 
Not all anthropologists are interested in classification. 
Herskovits, for one, objects to classification as an end 
in itself, which stems from our traditional stress on form 
"to !the comparative neglect of process." Again, Herskovits' 
protest seems to be against rigidity and not against the 
attempted classification. See, for example, the sentence 
he italicizes: "Cultural forms are the expression of unique 
sequences of historical events, but they are the result of 
1. Class lecture, November 14, 1951. 
2. Linton, SM, 391. See 382-400. Linton describes Austra-
lian groups that assign statuses on the basis of blood re-
lationships that extend beyond the tribe. A stranger has 
his genealogy examined until some point of contact is found 
with a genealogy of the group so that he can be assigned a 
place. If there is no common point of relationship, "they 
usually kill the stranger because they do not know what 
else to do with him." (124) It may not be too far-fetched 
to suggest that this is precisely what happens in the 
bre~~down between cultures. 
underlying processes that represent constants in human 
experience."1 
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Brightman distinguishes between a class, as "the 
collection of entities defined by any concept, 11 and a cate-
gory as "a fundamental principle, implied or presupposed 
by all experience. " 2 Many anthropologists seem, rather 
uncritically, to use classes instead of categories in 
describing cultures. As Florence Kluckhohn s~ys, they 
"rely too much upon mere empirical generalizations. 113 
But, classes or categories, they obviously do not refer 
to uniformities of content, for it is the content that is 
the main index to relativity. 4 What then, are the "invar-
iant points of reference? 11 
i. Needs. 
For some anthropologists, the constant factor is 
the needs of the human organism. Malinowski stresses 
needs as the biological foundation of culture. The per-
manent vit al sequences incorporated in all cultures, from 
impulse to act to satisfaction, rest upon such bodily 
needs as hunger, sex appetite, fright, somnolence, etc. 
1. Herskovits, ~ffiW, 595, 619; see also 602. 
2. Brightman, IP, 322-3, 95 ff. 
3. Kluckhohn, F., Art.(l953), 344. 
4. See Kluckhohn, c., 1dM , 15; Wissler, MC, 78. 
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This concept of need is opposed to motive. However, phys-
iology prov ides only a minimum definition of satisfactions, 
which are shaped by tradition. Malinowski's analysis moves 
from a functional to an institutional be.sis, for satisfac-
tion is never "purely physiological or private, 11 but al-
ways institutionalized. Culture is not made up of specific 
res ponses to specific needs, but is the 11 integral satisfac-
tion of a series of needs." From his analysis of institu-
tions, Malinowski derives the "instrumental imperatives" 
of economic organization, social control, education, and 
politic al organization, and the "integrative imperatives"· 
1 
of knowledge, religion and magic. He sees the scientific 
task of anthropology as the comparative study of institu-
tions of law, property, cooperation, marriage, state and 
religion. Relig ion, Malinowski emphasizes, fulfills a 
de f inite function in each society. 2 
Linton's earlier studies seem to agree with Mal-
inowski in t hat nthere are no universal patt erns, only a :. 
series of universal needs which each society has met in 
1. Malinowski, STC, 75-7, 85-9, 101-112. See also Steward, 
Art.(l949); Herskovits, }ffiW, 229; and Aitken, Rev.(l951). 
There are some similarities between Malinowski's 11 impera-
tives 11 and Aberle's ''functional prerequisites." See iii. 
2. Malinows k i, FFM, vii, 57-9. 
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its own way." He mentions 1) biological needs of food, 
shelter, protection, reproduction; 2) social needs of 
preserving solidarity, training individuals, and coordinat-
ing activities through leadership; and 3) psychic needs for 
1 
emotional response, security, and nev1 experience. Kroeber 
also 'agrees that there are biological, psychological, and 
social cons:tants, but insists that these are nsubcultural. 11 
Similarly Forde argues that Kluckhohn's universals are 
determinants rather than categories. Kluckhohn 1 s reply is 
that there must be universal categories corresponding to 
the determinants. 2 Kluckhohn insists that the universals 
are "culturalu in the sense that "they are incorporated 
and socially transmitted" and that they are "not merely 
empty frames." He sees in these biological, psychological, 
and sociosituational constants the basis for comparison 
of cultu res apart from ethnocentrism. 3 
This whole conception of needs as the basic category 
would seem, despite qualifications, to be biological in 
emphasis, if not reductionistic • . Malinowski closes one 
o~ his last books with this emphasis in two axioms: 1) 
every culture must satisfy a biological system of needs, 
1. Linton, SM, 394-5; CBP, 7-9. 
2. See Tax (ed.), AAT, 119, 122-3. 
3. Kluckhohn, c., Art.(l953), 516-7. 
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2) every cultural achievement refers directly or indirect-
ly to satisfaction of bodily needs. 1 Clyde Kluckhohn also 
stresses that "Human biology sets limits, supplies poten-
tialities and drives, provides clues which cultures neglect 
or elaborate. "2 
These "needs" may serve well to note limiting fac-
tors to cultural choices, to indicate problems which must 
be solved--or neglected. But the emphasis, from Wissler 
to Malinowski, is really on man's biological equipment. 
Even adding psychology, this tends to assume an individual 
basis for culture to the neglect of the social process. 3 
A more i mportant criticism of needs as the basic 
category is found in the implications of culture's selec-
tion from a~ong needs, neglecting some and elaborating 
others. Certainly .the criterion for denying one need, or 
the expression of one impulse, in deference to another need 
or i mpulse, is not given in the needs themselves. Or, is 
there a "'pecking order," a hierarchy of needs? And, if 
so, in terms of what criterion--sheer strength of the 
impulse? But it is precisely the strongest impulses that 
1. Malinows ki, STC, 171. 
2. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l953), 513. 
3. Bidney, TA, 66-7. That Bidney does not escape the view 
he criticizes is shown on 113. See Murdock, Art.(l945), 
137-9. 
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are often selected for most rigorous· control. Florence 
Kluckhohn notes that there is in no society 11 a one-to-
one relationship between the desired and the desirable," 
that there is not even in s pontaneous activity pure impulse 
gratification.1 Dorothy Lee criticizes the concept of 
needs in its assumption that action occurs in response 
to a "lack. 11 She points out that anthropologists who 
deplore the idea of culture as a list of traits, and so 
unintegrated, seem willing to define culture as the answer 
to a list of needs. She sees the list of needs as put 
under greatest strain in time of war. For example, a list 
of needs would fail to explain the behavior of peoples who 
chose to give ~p food and security rather than to join the 
Axis. But she does not argue there are no nee ds, but, . 
rather, that they are derivative rather than basic. She 
knows, for example, of ttno culture where human physical 
survival has been shown, rather than unquestioningly as-
sumed by social scientists, to be the ultimate goal.n 
Value, not needs, lies at the basis of human behavior. 2 
Kinship, for example, is not reducible to an organic basis 
or to a simplistic functional explanation, for kinship 
1. Kluckhohn, F., Art.(l953), 350. 
2. Lee, Art.(l953), 335-7. On kinship see Fortes, ~VKT, 
15 ff. 
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relations are basically moral relations. And every cul-
ture has some kinship principle. 
Herskovits provides an over-simple illustration of 
the concept of function, equating nthe fact of existencett 
of forms with the pragmatic performance of function, or 
else the societies would not survive. But one form may 
satisfy several needs or functions in a society and a 
similar form satisfy a different set of needs in another. 
And one need may be served by more than one form.l Also, 
as Linton suggests, much of culture is "embroidery," with 
some usefulness, but no direct relation to any "basic needs," 
reflecting interest rather than utility. Needs may initi-
ate some cultural response, but a circular pattern is set 
up so that the response shapes the need in subsequent ini-
tiation. 2 
The conception of ttneeds" as basic leaves anthro-
pology with no explanation of cultural change, nor of the 
diversities of culture. There must be some factor beyond 
needs to enable Sapir to distinguish between genuine and 
spurious cultures and to explain why some peoples adopt 
other ways in preference to their own functional forms 
1. Herskovits, MHW, 61; Bidney, TA, 150; Tax (ed.), AAT, 
120; Murdock, Art.{l945), 129, 134. 
2. Linton, SM, 441, 414; see also 266. 
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in event of culture contact. On what basis does a culture 
suppress the need for self-expression in the interest of 
security.1 
However, one instructive idea should not be over-
looked--the principle of limited possibilities, whether 
the limiting factors are biological, or situational, or 
due to other cultura l expressions. Culture cannot develqp 
in "just any old. way," whether this implies that in no 
culture do the men bear the children to the less obvious 
limiting effects of k inship systems upon economic pat-
terns.2 
ii. Problems. 
For Florence Kluckhohn, the basic c ategory is that 
of problems ., common to all mankind, which demand solutions. 
These problems di.ffer from needs in that they are only in-
directly physical, but ere rather philosophical and abstnct. 
As the editors note in their introduction to her article, 
"The premises and assumptions which we make about our-
selves, about our fellowmen, indeed about the nature of 
man in genEral serve to guide our actions in dealing with 
1. See Zingg , Art.(l942 ); Linton, SM, 131. 
2. See Kluckhohn, C. , !'IU!i , 43; Linton, SM, 133. 
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ourselves, our fellow men, and men in general."l Florence 
Kluckhohn makes her assumptions explicit. The first is 
that "There is a limited number of basic human problems for 
which all peoples ••• must find some solution." These con-
stant problems trarise inevitably _out of the human situa-
tion.n The five problems concern: 1) the lnnate predis-
position of man, as evil, good-and-evil, or good; 2) · the 
relation of man to nature, as subjugated to nature, living 
harmoniously within it, or over-against nature; 3) the time 
dimension, as past, present, or future; 4) the personality 
type valued, as being, being-in-becoming, or doing; 5) the 
relatlon of man to other men, as lineal, collateral, or 
individualistic. Mr.s. Kluckhohn's second assumption is 
that the possible solutions to these problems are inde-
pendently variable, but that the variability is within 
limits. For example, a culture may select one of the 
three orientations under each problem for special empha-
sis, but "all dimensions ••• not only are but must be 
present at all times in the pattern structure of every 
society." This presupposition accounts for variation 
within cultures as "not only permitted but actually re-
quired."~ 
1. References in this section are to Kluckhohn, F., Art. 
( 1953). 
2. See also :N,uellar-Deham, Art. { 1944-5). 
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These c ategories are certainly not just "drives" 
or needs in a biological sense. In fact they may remain 
too much i n the realm of implicit culture to provide an 
adequate set of categories, as they stand. Mrs. Kluck-
hohn's problems are most suggestive and her presupposi-
tions are clearly indicated. She does not indicate, how-
ever, tha t t h ere may be "reasons" for the choice of one 
dimension for emphasis,or that the realization of person-
ality is assumed in all three dimensions of the fourth 
problem. Furthermore, there is the element of purpose 
which she misses and which will be discussed later as the 
basic category. There is an implicit assumption of a 
"ground 11 which requires these problems to be solved and 
which serv e s to limit possible solutions. This metaphys-
ical question is never fully faced. 
iii. Functional Prerequisites. 
For David F. Aberle and his associates, the cate-
gories must t ake explicit account of the social process, 
of the questi ons posed by the "human situation" and the 
necessary conditions of social life. 1 Parsons and Shils, 
for ex ample, emphasize, instead of needs, 11 need-disposi t :kms, 11 
1. Aberle, Art.(l950); Herslmvits, IV'iliW, 234; Linton, SM, 
265- 6 , and Art.(l953), 306-7; Tax (ed.), AAT, 328; Kluck-
hohn, C., MEHV, 102, 105. See Ellwood, HSP, 59, on 
Aristotle. 
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as including mot-ivational and evaluative elements as well 
as a psycho-biological reference. 1 Aberle outlines a set 
of nine functional prerequisites, "the t h ings that must 
get done in any society if it is to continue as a going 
concern. '' Th e emphasis is on the maintenance of a sys-
tern or structure of action, not necess arily the members. 
Four conditions are seen as terminating the existence of 
a society: 1) biological extinction or dispersion of mem-
bers; 2) cessation of individual motivation; 3) war of all 
against all--pursuit of "ends by means selected only on 
the basis of instrumental efficiency;" 4) absorption into 
another society. 2 
The functional prerequisites listed by Aberle mean 
that any society must provide for: 
1) Adequate relationship to the environment, and 
sexual recruitment of new members; 
2) Role differentiation and assignment, with care 
of ch ildren and allocation of resources; 
3) Communication through shared, learned symbols; 
4) Shared cognitive orientations, to enable manipu-
lation of the environment, to make social situations 
I . Parsons and Shils (eds.), TGTA, 9-10. 
2. Aberle, Art.(l950), 100-4. See 101 for a definition 
of nsociety.n 
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predictable, and to account for aspects of the situation 
which are not subject to prediction and control; 
5) A shared set of goals, including alternatives; 
6) Normative regulation of means of achieving goals; 
7) Regulation of affective expression; 
8) Socialization, the initiation of new members; 
1 9) Effective control of disruptive behavior. 
This is an instructive list, but it does have as-
sumptions other than those stated. It is explicitly as-
sumed that for society to continue uas a going concern," 
to survive, is good; the assumption is implicit that this 
is good for the members. The first prerequisite assumes 
self-preservation as good. Something of man's nature as 
a goal-seeking being is presup~osed in numbers 2, 5, and 
6. That man is not just a creature of needs, but that im-
pulses are and should be regulated in terms of ends is as-
sumed in numbers 5, 7 and 9. These, in turn, presuppose 
such moral laws as Brightman's logical law of the con-
sistent will, his law of ideal control {that empirical 
values should serve ideal values), and perhaps even the 
1. Aberle, Art.(l950), 105-110. No-te that Linton, CBP, 
24, includes parts of this list, especially numbers 5, 6, 
8, and 9; and Cohen, A., Art.(l948), includes 1, 2, 4, 5, 
and 6. 
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law of the most inclusive end (implying some synthesis of 
values.)1 Prerequisites 3 and 4 assume that men can know, 
and that they can share knowledge, that experience, in 
other words, is both interdep endent and private. Number 
4 even seems to presuppose some metaphysical · ground for 
cognitive orientation. 
The implicit structure of moral law runs through 
the prerequ i sites. Yet, because it is only implicit, part 
of the structure is missing. There is no clear statement 
of "for whom?" except for society. There is no ideal of 
personality or ideal of community against which to judge 
the working of other laws in an integrated system. There 
is an implied law of social devotion, of subordination of 
personal to social gains, which, however necessary, is 
dangerous without the control of an ideal of community.2 
These lacks make it possible for the system of func-
tional prerequisites to assume survival as an end in it-
self, or as Nadel puts it, as nan ultimate, given purpose.1r3 
This is a quite different conception of survival as a 
criterion from Margaret Mead's comment on the problem of 
1. See Brightman, ML, 89-90, and following chapters. 
2. L. Harold DeWolf has added three communitarian laws 
and a metaphysical law to Brightman's moral laws as noted 
above. 
3. Nadel, FSA, 374-5. 
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an adequ a te family structure: 11 No p eopl·e who fail to meet 
it survive, as whole human beings. nl .Survival and equilib-
rium, along with function, are inadequate criteria. Man 
c an make many wrong choices and still survive. Ruth Bene-
dict p o i nts to man's "fairly wide marg in of safety" and 
suggests that "he will not be forced to the wall even with 
a p itiful handicap . 11 2 The concept of survival assumes life 
on a minimal level of needs, without recognition of the 
more human values. Fromm thinks that "The choice between 
life and death is more apparent than real; man's real 
choice is between a good life and a bad life." Fromm also 
points out that a society ttmay be org anized in such a way 
that the norms necessary for its survival conflict with 
the universal norms necessary for the fullest development 
of its members." Thu~ he distinguishes between socially 
immanent norms, necessary for the functioning and survival 
of a s pecific kind of society and of the people living in 
it , and 1miversal norms, the aim of which is the growth 
and unfolding of man. 3 Fromm's explicit postulation of 
personal s e lf-realization provides his focus on the 
1. Me a d, M., MF, 6. Emphasis 
2. Benedict, Art.(l931), 813. 
Fromm , 1WH, 486; and Chapple, 
Brightman's comment, 85. 
3. Fromm , MFH, 18, 242, 240. 
602. 
added. 
See Kardiner, Art.(l949); 
Art.(l950), 83, especially 
See Hallowell, Art.(l953), 
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inadequate concept of survival. Theremust be functional 
prerequisites for a society, but these can be fulfilled 
without adequate attention to the human being who is at 
the center of the human situation. Bidney writes: 
Man , it appears, is not content with mere self-
preservation in the biological sense, since the 
self he is most concerned to preserve is his cul-
tural self, the one expressed in his moral, relig-
ious, artistic, and scientific ideals and practices~ 
2. The Problem of Norms in Thematic Values. 
i. So~e Inadequate Concepts. 
One assumption of this study is that universal norms 
can be derived from the empirical data of thematic values. 
It has been emphasized that the mere fact of universality 
does not imply "right" in a moral sense. To equate the 
"is" of exp erience with the "ought" of morality uncritical-
ly is to do violence to the persistent moral sense of man. 
W. R. Sorley suggests that there is no meaning to duty if 
the "ought" were already in existence, that 11 the very 
nature of moral law may seem to re quire the possibility 
of its not being realized in existence. 11 2 One version 
of this uncritical use of the 11 is 11 is the appeal to con-
sensus as the criterion of truth. Alain Locke, for 
1. Bidney, TA, 438. 
2. Sorley, MVIG, 189. See Linton, Art.(l953), 309. See 
the discuss ion of Hartmann, .. pages 132, 157, this study. 
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example, argues for cultural relativism's truth on the 
basis of established scientific facts and of an 11 increas-
ing consensus of scientific opinion."1 One recalls that 
at one time the propositon that the earth was flat enjoyed 
a remark able, if not universal, consensus. Consensus of-
fers no principle for change or progress in truth; if 
p eople, even scien.tists, a gree on error, there can be no 
challeng e, unless a higher criterion is admitted. 2 
Various conceptions of science have also been pro-
p osed either as devices for assuring truth or as criteria 
of truth in one way or another. There is some reason for 
this, for the very possibility of such a thing as social 
science re s ts on the assumption that man and his conduct 
are not exempt from but are a legitimate ground for sci-
entific investigation. 3 But this is quite a different 
proposition from the proposal to measure progress (and 
so comp are cultures) in terms of science and technology. 
So Boas suggests that "It is not easy to define progress 
in any phase of social life other than in knowledge and 
control of nature. "4 Herskovits agrees that it is dif-
ficult to est ablish that one culture is b etter than 
1. Locke, Art.(l944)1 614-5. Emphasis added. 
2. See Brightman, IP, 49-51. 
3. Casserley, MMSS, 3. 
4. Boas, AML, 214; see his MPM, 203. 
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another, "with the possible exception of technological 
aspects of life."1 Kroeber 1 s criteria for judging prog-
ress are of the same order: 1) total quantity of culture, 
2) ability to distinguish subjective from objective 
phenomena, 3) diminishing influence in social affairs of 
physiological considerations, and 4) growth of science 
and technology, or "reality culture. 11 2 
Leslie White's conception of science and its role 
in evaluating cultures is still different. For White 
"all science is natural; if it is not natural it is not 
science." Technology and tools compose the basis of cul-
ture; all else is superstructure. Energy is the key to 
culture and the fundamental mode of being. White sets ·· . 
forth the law of cultural evolution: nculture develops 
when the amount of energy harnessed by man per capit a is 
increased; or as the efficiency of the technological means 
• • • is increased; or, as both factors are simultaneously 
increased." "Better" means more effective and efficient 
3 
and can be measured in mathematical terms. He point8 
out specific ally that "The culture energies of the Arunta, 
the Chinese (Han dynasty), and the u.s.A. (1945) are not 
1. Herskovits, MHW, 70. 
2. Kroeber, NC, 318; Ant. 304. 
3. White, L., Art.(l943), 335, 338-9, 355. 
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to be understood in terms of 'psychic activity' or physiol-
ogy, but in terms of boomerangs, agriculture, and turbines.n 
One strange factor in White's science is his emphasis on 
deductive method, saying induction is a waste of time when 
deduction can get the answers.l 
F. s. C. Northrop has a still different conception 
of science, wi th further implications for cross-cultural 
comparisons. For him, it is not natural science, but the 
philosophy of natural science presupposed by the members 
of a culture which determines, in the main, the cultural 
ideology. Northrop's emphasis is naturalistic, pointing 
to "the inner order of nature revealed by natural science." 
He argues that the nought 11 in terms of which society's in-
ner order is to be changed is the "is of the inner order of 
natural man and nature as determined by the philosophically 
analyzed and articulated, empirically verified, knowledge 
of nature. 11 Beyond society and culture there remains only 
nature.2 
Since this scientific verification is of a ch ar-
acter such that it gives the s ame verdict for one 
person as it gives for another, such ~ philosophy 
of science used as the philosophical theory which 
defines the idea of the good for culture provides 
1. White, L., Art.(l946), 89, 83. 
2. Northrop, Art.(l953), 675-6; Art.(l952); Bidney, Art. 
(1949), 338; TA, 415. 
a cultural ideology which because of the scien-
tific roots of its verification must be said to 
be valid for everybody.l 
It is thus that Northrop judges the "ought" of 
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morality in terms of the "is 11 of science and, according 
to Bidney, confuses two meanings of science in the process. 
One meaning of science is factual, historical, relativistic, 
pertaining to all types of culture. Northrop's other 
meaning is normative, "a · theory of truth about nature 
which alone is capable of winning universal assent and 
transcending the limitations of contemporary cultural 
traditions. 112 Bidney agrees with the normative function 
of natural science but would include social science, the 
humanities and religion. This would seem to change dras-
tically the whole conception of science. 
Raphael Patai, reviewing Northrop's latest. book, 
The Taming of the Nations, wonders how his "admission in 
principle of the internal validity of the 'living law 1 of 
each nation can be reconciled, especially in the case of 
dictatorships, with the international concern with human 
rights and civil ·liberties o~ certain groups or individuals 
living within their geographical areas." Patai goes on to 
1. Northrop, Art.(l947), 73-4. 
2. Bidney, Art.(l949), 343-4, TA, 170-3. 
comment that, despite Northrop's eagerness to bridge 
cultural gulfs, t h ere is implicit in his argument "ac-
ceptance and reliance on the anthropological theory of 
cultural relativism. ttl 
Much of N0rthrop's difficulty lies in his too-
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narrow conception of natural science, based in turn on 
too ~arrow an understanding of nature. There is no ques-
tion in this study but that the separation between science 
and the study of values must be overcome. But this is 
not accomplished by making values and norms subject to 
judgment by a natural science as conceived during the 
separation. Northrop tries to connect his method with 
that of the Stoics, from whom stems the tradition of 
natural law. But the Stoics meant much more by nature 
than Northrop does, including, as does Bidney, social 
science, the humanities, and religion.2 Brightman sees 
the "nature" of natural science as "a limited realm ·based 
on selected . evidence." It is less than the real world, 
which "must include nature ••• all of the personal world, 
and all that is necessary to explain and understand it. 113 
The nature studied by natural science does not take 
1. Patai, Rev.(l953). 
2. See Bidney, TA, 416 ff., on "normative science of cul-
ture.n 
3. Brightman, NV, 58. 
adequate account of the natural scientist and of his 
interest in and purpose for studying nature: 
':fhe possibility of science presupposes not only 
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that nature is a distinct and specific order of 
reality about which it is possible to be objectively 
scientific, but also that man is a kind of being 
who is capable of being objectively scientific about 
nature.l 
Redfield emphasizes that the anthropologist needs to pro-
ject his own human qualities into the situation he seeks 
to understand, for his "own nature is an instrument of his 
work. 112 Brightman insists that "the very impersonality of 
science is a personal achievement." 
Impersonality in science means two things: (1) that 
the scientist ignores his personal desires and be-
liefs in the interest of truth; and (2) that the 
scientist is never satisfied with his own personal 
results until they have been tested by other compe-
tent scientists. In short, impersonality is loyalty 
to the personal ideal of truth and appeal to the 
experience of other loyal persons.3 
What has been said of the nature with which natural 
science deals is as true of its method. The method of 
science is not dogmatic or preconceived, but adapted to the 
material with which it works. 4 In short, science as now 
conceived cannot provide the norms we seek, nor can it 
1. Cass~rley, MMSS, 141; see also 154. 
2. Redfield, Art.(l953), 733. 
3. Brightman, NV, 57. 
4. See Casserley, MMSS, 204; Cohen, M., Art.(l933}. 
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compare cultures in terms of values. If it is to help us 
discover norms, it will have to be a different science, 
dealing with a more inclusive reality in terms of a more 
flexible method. Such a science would, for example, have 
to deal with Linton's judgment that the greatest differ-
ences between our thematic values (in the area of economics) 
and those of primitive societies derive less from tech-
nology "than from the lessening of intimate social rela-
tions and enduring association which has accompaniedtt tech-
nical developments.l 
IVIrs. de Laguna thinks that, insofar as science is 
able to transcend a culture's limitations, it is because 
of "its capacity for progressive modification through self-
criticism."2 Bidney calls this the "spirit of science, at 
once rational, progressive, and self-corrective," and, to 
that extent •normative. 3 Science recognizes its own in-
completeness ubecause it holds to an ideal of complete-
ness." The scientist explores an unknown world because 
1. Linton, Art.(l953), 333. See Casserley, MMSS, 96; and 
Fromm, MPF, 249. 
2. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 149-151. 
3. Bidney, TA, 430 ff. It should also be noted that sci~ 
ence presupposes among other things that knowledge is a 
moral good and that purposes can be carried forward, and 
that it requires a certain environment of freedom. See 
Brightman, Art.(l938); Miller, Art.(l951); Gabriel, CADT, 
387; Goode and Hatt, MSR, 20 ff.; Kluckhohn, G., Art. (1951)1. . 
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he assumes it is also habitable, "and that means of com-
munication may always be found to connect it with the 
kn own and settled." Science moves forward b.ecause of ' its 
"unassailable faith in the universal order."l Such a con-
ception of science moves well beyond any identification 
of the "::ts" and the "ought" to a criticism of the "is" in 
terms of an inferred and postulated universal order of 
"ought." 
ii. The Concept of Cost. 
One concept of social science that may have implied 
more criticism and evaluation than anthropologists intended 
in using it is that of ncost." The concept is usually 
used a s "social cost," although, as will be noted, the cost 
is often exacted of the members of a society. Attention 
has been called to the hidden valuations of anthropologists, 
as in the uncritical use of "realistic,n "fantastic," and 
"twisted and distorted, 11 in describing cultural solutions .• 
Ruth Benedict writes that some societies may find the risk 
too great and the Erice too high for theirselect1on of val -
ues for elaboration: 
It is possible to scrutinize different institutions 
and cast up their cost in terms of social c apit al, 
in terms of t h e less desirable behaviour traits 
1. de Laguna , Art.(l942), 154-8. 
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they stimulate, and in terms of human suffering and 
frustration. If any society wishes to pay that cost 
for its chosen and congenial traits, certain values 
will develop within this pattern, however 1bad 1 it 
may be. But the risk is great, and the social order 
may not be able to pay the price.1 
In later writings Benedict notes that some societies' tech-
niques are more llsuccessful 11 in reducing "conflict" and 
ttstrain; u that cultures may be more or less integrated, 
"but there is a limit beyond which lack of integration 
produces catastrophic psychic conflict in individuals and 
chaos in society. 11 2 Nadel thinks that this evaluation 
rests on standards free from a complete relativism, which 
standards Benedict brings in 11by the backdoor. tt3 
Kluckhohn describes Navaho social efficiency as re-
quiring repression of hostility, and so fantasies of witch-
craft, with social disruption as the cost.4 Margaret Mead 
sees psychosomatic medicine as providing new tools for 
"evaluating cost which different social systems exact" 
from their members in terms of stresses of competition, 
unrealizable social ' status, and unresolved conflicts. 
If . we do not make concessions to certain physiological 
1. Benedict, PC, 229. See also 251. 
2. Benedict, Art.(l943), 102, and hrt.(l939), 228, 230. 
3. Nadel, Art.(l937), 272. See also Williams, Art.(l947), 
90. 
4. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l942), and NW. 
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limiting factors, she says, we pay the price in health, 
individual happiness, and world peace. 1 The critical 
question in the evaluation of economic progress, ac~ord­
ing to Boulding, is the evaluation we place on the "social 
cost" of various rates of progress.2 . Karen Horney in-
dicates the source of much of the neurosis in our society 
in contradictions within our culture, as between competi-
tion and love, stimulation of needs and frustrations in 
satisfying them, freedom and its limitations.3 
The concepts of dysfunction and compensation are 
closely related to that of cost. Cultures create as well 
as solve problems, as in the instance of Navaho witchcraft. 4 
Linton points out that while competition for achieved sta-
tus entails some loss to society, the ascription of status 
sacrifices excellence of performance to certainty that jobs 
will be done. 5 Kardiner writes of the "blocked" person-
alities of Alorese women, whose feminine goals ''become 
1. Mead, M., Art.(l950), 90-3; and W~, 16. See Kluckhohn, 
c., Art.(l944)2, 599. 
2. Boulding, Art.(l953), 81; see also 55, 65. 
3. Horney, Art.(l949), 250-1. See also on peoples' toler-
ance of stress, Leighton, HRCW, 76-9. On '1 socially pat-
terned defect" as distinguished from neurosis, see Fromm, 
MFH, · 221-2. 
4. Kluckhohn and Kelly, Art.(l945), 81; Beaglehole, Art. 
( 1938). 
5. Linton, SM, 129. 
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internally disqualified by major conflicts organized around 
them." The woman who accepts the feminine goal is "ex-
ploited and worked to exhaustion." Conflicts are "built 
in" where the pattern of growth develops submissiveness -
and the economy demands initiative and aggression. 1 
Such a concept as cost is as applicable to complex 
society as to Alor. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., writing of 
loyalty programs and security risks, s~ys: "The price for 
perfect protection of governmental activities may be too 
high to pay." Preoccupation with secrecy, protecting scien-
tific work, may stifle science itself. 2 G. K. Chesterton 
is reported as observing that when he got married, he 
liked one woman so well he wanted more. Then he dis-
covered that the condition {the price!) of having any 
woman was having only one woman. 
The concept of cost implies the existence of univer-
sal norms. These norms are not fulfilled in any society. 
But to the extent that a society fails to fulfill the 
norms, it must bear the cost, live with the consequences. 
If it can, it must compensate, more or less adequanely. 
It is in this sense that Sapir seems to have developed his 
1. Kardiner, PFS, 224-5, 416-8. 
2. Barth, LFM, xix, 185 ff. 
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normative conception of "spurious," as opposed to "genu-
ine, 11 cultures. A culture can be spurious in inadequately 
providing for the development of members' personalities. 
Robert M. Zingg sees drunkenness as compensation for the 
s purious elements in Tarahumara culture, "so strong a 
spurious compensation for so many other spurious elements 
••• that the fundamental ••• institutions are integrated 
about it." The spurious compensation defeats the accom-
plishment of genuine values, leading to a vicious circle 
in wh ich "drabness encourages the escape through drunken-
ness; the drunkenness encourages the drabness.ul Nadel 
spells out the meaning of "cost" in specific terms: 
If we find that a people devotes all its energies, 
even successfully, to war and conquest at the cost 
of numerous lives and the stability of families; or 
that an economic system efficiently based on ruth-
less competition is maintained at the cost of wide-
spread poverty and social iniquities, we are tempted 
to speak ••• of 'failure' and, if not of 'irrational' 
a ims, at least of aims achieved iniquitously. Indeed 
••• our choice of words will often betray us; for 
when we s peak (as we often do) of ends achieved 1 at 
a cost' we already express judgments of this kind.2 
Nadel goes on to ask if the scientist must prune 
his voc abulary in case the persons involved have no sense 
of the cost (see Fromm's "'socially patterned defect"). 
His conclusion is that he must consider not only the 
1. Zingg, Art.(l942), 84, 90-1. 
2. Nadel, FSA, 272. 
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appropriateness of the means but also the worthwhileness 
of the aims. 
At some stage in his analysis the social enquirer 
inevitably turns into a philosopher and must posit 
absolute aims or purposes, and some self-reliant 
worthwhileness of actions, since without these as-
sumptions his subject matter simply makes no sense.l 
The anthropologist must assume and must study, not just 
mechanical causality, and not just logical consistency 
and integration of a culture, but also the purposes that 
shape a ·culture. Social and cultural institutions are ·not 
so much functional as purposeful. The concept of cost im-
plies that not only means but also ends can be criticized 
and improved, and thus it opens the door to metaphysics. 2 
iii. The Postulate of a Universal Ground. 
The concept of cost implies an "order of conse-
quences," as has been suggested. There seems to be a cer-
tain nrequiredness" in the solution of cultural problems 
which points to the possibility of a cosmic order or 
universal ground.3 This universal ground is a postulate, 
just as is the postulation by natural science of a meta-
physical reality behind the phenomenal reality of sense, 
1. Nadel, FSA, 272-3. See Fried, Art.(l953), 287 f. 
2. See Nadel, FSA, 206-7, Art.(l937), 272-3; Muelder, Art. 
(1951)1, 109. 
3. See Bennett, J. c., COW, 18; Kohler, PVWF, chapters 
2, 3. 
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a postulate approximated but never completely known or 
verified.1 Social scientists are not agreed on such a 
postulate. Florian Znaniecki illustrates some of the con-
fused thinking. Early in a recent book he argues that 
"The name 1 cultural sciences' will be meaningful only. if 
we postulate the existence of a universal category of 
cultural order including all specific orders which stu-
dents of culture have discovered or will discover." Yet 
in the same volume he sees the cultural sciences avoiding 
dogma only by maintaining the same "agnosticism with regard 
to the nature of man which modern science maintains with 
regard to the essence of the univera&." Science can no more 
know "what man as a whole really is than what the universe 
as a whole really is."2 
The point is not that there is consensus on the 
postulate of a universal ground among social scientists, 
, 
but such a postulate is necessarily presupposed in their 
work, as scientists. For Bidney the assumption is of "an 
objective, ontological order," independent of man but sub-
ject to man's discovery. 3 Vivas assumes, in like manner, 
that "Values are real and antecedent to our discovery of 
1. See Bidney, TA, 19-20. 
2. Znaniecki, CS, 9-10, 113. See also Maciver, SC, 157. 
3. Bidney, Art.(l949), 352. 
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them. nl This does ]lOt mean that there is a "realm" of 
"things" called "norms," for, as Greene says, "we can to-
day conceive of reality in other than substantive quasi-
material terms." 2 It is for values as it is for sense 
data--"A curious order runs through our perceptions, as 
if indeed there might be an underlayer of objective real-
ity. n3 It is as Sorley says of moral laws, "not that they 
exist but that they are valid, but their validity cannot 
be separated from their implication in reality."4 
But the postulation of' such a universal ground must 
not be taken as by-passing the problem of how we know such 
reality. 5 Such a postulate does not imply that our know-
ledge is ever perfect or complete in a static s.ense. It 
is rather that our knowledge is capable of completion, in 
principle. 6 Blanshard writes of intelligence finding an 
1. Vivas, MLEL, viii; for "value", read unorm," in the 
terms of this study. 
2. Greene, Art.(l953), 374. 
3. Barnett, L., UDE, 23. 
4. Sorley, MVIG, 188. Hegel's third sense of objectivity 
was "universality for all rational minds as such." See 
Reyburn, ETH, 164. 
5. Greene, Art.{l953 ), 366-379, 382, 391. 
6. On the completeability of language, see Harris, Rev • . · 
{1951). See also Kluckhohn, C., MM, 35, quoting White-
head: "Human life is driven forward by its dim appre-
hension of notions too general for its existing language. 11 
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nanswering intelligibility," a "target" which helps us 
progressively discover which of our definitions are close 
to the mark and which wide of it. 1 Adams believes that 
the postulate of a universal ground is essential if men 
are to have the nerve for their supreme venture "of encom-
passing the whole of humanity within a single moral order 
binding upon the interests and caprices of each constitu-
ent group, and capable of enlisting the loyalty of men 
everywhere. u2 
iv. The Postulate of Human Nature. 
Early anthropologists assumed the "psychic unity" 
of mankind. But cultural relativism has, for some, made 
the concept of human nature a function of each particular 
. 3 
culture. Thus Kardiner sees his concept of 11basic person-
ality" as a relativistic factor doing away with a uniform 
and constant human nature. 4 Roheim' s comment is that "The 
most basic of all basic personalities is the one connected 
with the fact that we are all human. " 5 Of course, no anthro-
pologist (nor anyone else) ever meets human nature as such? 
1. Blanshard, Art.{l947), 41-7; see 28-33, ff. 
2. Adams, G., Art.(l947), 201; see 195. See also Bidney, 
TA, 163-8, 181, 418-421. 
3. Hallowell, Art.(l950), 159, and Rev.(l950), 99. 
4. Kardiner, PFS, 415-6. 
5. Quoted in Hallowell, Art.{l950), 171-2. See Bidney, 
TA, 6. . 
6. See Brightman's comment in Garnett, Art.{l944), 594. 
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but as enculturated. 
Zingg's comrnents on spurious values in Tarahumara 
culture and the compensatory importance of drunkenness 
have been noted. In drinking, he suggests, the people 
escape the limitations of their conditioning "and really 
act human." Their ''humanness" is seen as ttalmost identical 
with that of all other drunken humans in the same state of 
intoxication." 
Drunkenness seems to paralyze those critical cen-
ters that carry the impressions of social condi-
tioning, which generally function so prominently 
to distinguish the behavior of individuals in one 
culture from those of another. Alcohol indeed makes 
the whole world kin; and drunken Indians, college 
students, or any others giggle, titter, whisper, 
laugh, and shout in identical ways. A common human 
type appears to emerge from the uninhibited person-
ality, suggesting that a study of drunken behavior 
would throw revealing light on what human nature 
is when stripped from so much of its social con-
ditioning.! 
This study will not follow Zingg's suggestion of 
finding human nature in what remains after paralysis of 
the cortical centers. The postulate of human nature as-
sumed in this study is not reductionist but rather stres-
ses potentialities and possibilities. Linton notes as 
the most outstanding characteristic of man his teachabil-
ity.2 Certainly the assumption here is not of a 
1. Zingg, Art.(l942), 90. See page 184, this study. 
2. Linton, SM, 132. 
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nminutely homogeneous" human nature, or of a standard 
phenomenon, fixed and unchanging. 1 It is set over 
against the idea of man as a blank sheet of paper, a 
completely malleable puppet of culture. There is a given-
ness to human nature, but it is a teleological given, an 
inherent capacity to actualize certain potentialities.2 
The change in Clyde Kluckhohn 1 s point of view is 
worth noting. In 1944, he writes that the greatest les-
son o£ anthropology is that of the "boundless plasticity 
of what we too glibly call '•human nature'. tt3 In 1952 his 
conception had changed to that of a ''human nature which 
all cultures mold and channel but nev.er entirely remake!14 
In 1953, he, along with Henry Murray, explicitly states 
that there are boundaries and limits to the variability 
of personality, as of culture. 5 
One implication of a common human nature is Mar~ 
garet Mead's assertion that the newborn child of any 
1. See Kluckhohn, C., MM, 38; Furnas, AP, 483-4. 
2. Fromm, MFH, 20-3. See Toynbee, SH, 179, 182, for 
examples of the "disregard of human nature." See also 
Dewey, HNC, 1, 2; and Florence Kluckhohn's "problems," 
page 165 of this study. 1 3. Kluckhohn, C., Art.(l944) , 146. 
4. Kluckhohn, C., MEHV, 106. 
5. Kluckhohn and others (eds.), PNSC (rev.), 342. See 
also in 1948; "Personality has a substratum that is com-
mon to all human beings everywhere." Kluckhohn and Mur-
ray, PNSC, 108. 
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people is capable "of learning the language and ways of 
behaving of any other people. ttl But the conception is 
not a least common denominator of observed similarities, 
but a postulate, more concerned with human capacities 
than with needs. Personality is what each individual 
version of human nature becomes through his experience 
in society and his sharing of culture. 2 
3. The Possibility of Universal Norms and of Comparison 
of Cultures. 
i. The Category of Purpose. 
Cohen and Nagel, writing of classification and 
categories, conclude: uThe most important thing is to 
pick out that trait in the objects studied which will 
be the most significant clue to their nature."3 The in-
adequacy of needs, problems, and functional prerequis-
ites as categories enabling comparison of thematic val- . 
ues and cultures has pointed to the category of purpose. 4 
1. Mead and Galas (eds.), PH, xvii. 
2. Bidney, TA, 336; see 81, 112-3. See also Maritain, 
RMNL, 60-1; Mandelbaum {ed.), SWES, 580. 
3. Cohen and Nagel, LSM, 224. Murdock, OCM, xix-xx, 
lists seven major facets of elements of culture accord-
ing to which they are classified in the Human Relations 
Area Files: pattern, circumstances for appropriateness, 
relation to a subject (status, group), object of activi-
ties, means, purpose, result. 
4. See page 185. 
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This category suggests that the most significant aspect 
of human activities and institutions is that they are 
purposeful rather than merely functional. The notion 
of causality is assumed in any suggestion that human 
affairs are, or must be, predictable and social order 
possible. The concept of purpose requires a distinction 
between mechanica·l causality and volitional causality, 
not a denial of causality. Volit1onal causality has to 
do with the teleological use of causal sequences, with 
the achievement of ends. 1 That this further assumes per-
sons who set the purposes has been noted and will be 
dealt with in the next section. 
The position presented here is that the way to 
understand the unity underlying the diversity of cul-
tural patterns is to see what each people is trying to 
do in the patterns and institutions. This is not simply 
the question of motivation. Purpose, as distinguished 
from motiv ation in this study, is conscious orientation 
toward a future end or goal. It can be and often is a 
factor in motivation. Motivation can be unconscious as 
well as conscious; it refers to the conditions of origin 
of an act as well as to its goal. It may involve fear 
1. Bowne, TTK, 108 f. 
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or desire as well as purpose. It is the process of 
arousing or initiating behavior, of channeling an activ-
ity into a given course. 1 Kluckhohn writes: "White chil-
dren are motivated by grades; but children from some In-
dian tribes will work less ~ard under a system that sin-
gles the individual out from among his fellows. 112 The 
motivation is an instrumental value which must be under-
stood and judged in the light of the thematic value--
the purpose--of education, whether in mission school or 
in hogan. Education of some sort is, of course, a func-
tional prerequisite for any society; initiates must be 
trained. But education can have a larger purpose than 
this function. This implies possibilities in human 
material as well as required on-going of a social system. 
It is this insight into purpose that Boas urges 
in relation to a custom of the Chuckchee of Siberia. 
These people believe that an individual will live in the 
future life in the same conditioh in which he dies, so 
that old men want to die before they become decrepit. 
Only by seeing the purpose can we understand, compare, 
and perhaps judge the behavior of sons who kill their 
1. Young, Art.(l346), 384-5. 
2. Kluckhohn, C., MM, 39. 
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fathers on request. 1 Redfield tells of a band of the 
Siriono of Brazil who walked out of a camp leaving a 
woman, sick unto death, alone behind them. It is only 
as we see the total set of purposes of these people, 
with their harsh and precarious life in a tropical forest, 
that such behavior makes any sense at all. As Redfield 
says, "We understand how it is that the Siriono husband 
leaves his wife to die alone in the jungle, and we do 
not condemn him as we condemn the suburban husband who 
leaves his wife to die in a snowdrift. 112 We understand, 
and the condemnation is different, but still we judge, 
as will be discussed later. 
These illustrations concern the limiting factors, 
as of geography, which must be taken into account in 
understanding the purpose of an institution or pattern. 
But the emphasis of the category of purpose is on pos-
sibilities rather than needs. Margaret Mead has dealt 
more explicitly With this emphasis than have most anthro-
pologists. She notes that anthropology has contributed 
mainly a statement of limits ttbelow which man cannot 
fall and be man." The new task relates to man's aspira-
tions and potentialities. Are the differences between 
1. Boas, AML, 186. 
2. Redfield, ~VT, 19, 163. 
195 
men and women a biological "must," or a nmust" of social 
convenience for the rearing of children, or is there a 
third possibility? Miss Mead asks, "Are not sex dif-
ferences exceedingly valuable, one of the resources of 
our human nature that every society has used but no so-
ciety has as yet begun to use to the full?" This is one 
illustration o~ the larger perspective she has in mind: 
As human beings we are not only interested in not 
doing wrong and evil and destructive things, but 
have also always cared terribly about our possi-
bilities for doing goo~ and right, constructive 
and beautiful, things. 
The category of purpose turns the attention from origins 
and survival to teleological needs of creativity, of ex-
cellence, of a more inclusive "we" experience.2 Mrs. 
de Laguna points out that some cultures that 11make limited 
demands on native mechanical ingenuity or on artistic or 
intellectual creativity ••• furnish small scope for the· · 
exercise of the higher moral virtues.'' She suggests that 
many individuals go through life "with their native re-
sources for living and acting untapped. 113 We can compare 
cultures not only in the rrustration involved when needs 
are aroused and left unsatisfied but also in the failure 
1. Mead, M., in Tax (ed.), AAT, 351, and 1W, 9, 18. See 
Bidney, TA, 417, 357. 
2. See Bender, PDML, 214-7. 
3. de Laguna, Art.(l949), 389. 
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to take account of potential needs and aims. It is worth 
noting that Herskovits refers often to universals as 
"different ways of accomplishing the same ends that every 
people seem to have felt essential. nl 
But the purposes of a people are not dealt with 
one by one as isolated fragments, either in the realiza-
tion of these purposes or in their comparison between 
cultures. The purposes are interrelated so that a peo-
ple may choose to satisfy one at the expense of another--
and pay the price. Integration of purposes is one of the 
purposes of a culture; and, though integration is never 
complete, the culture must always be seen as a whole, 
more or less adequately integrated. MacBeath urges 
that moral judgments relate not so much to isolated 
activities as to . the total way of life of a people.2 
John Wild emphasizes the relational aspect of morality: 
Goodness is not a single atomic unit which can 
be characterized or analyzed. Neither is it a 
complex of such units. It is rather a relational 
structure of existence which can be relationally 
analyzed.3 
This relational aspect of purpose requires that the 
1. Herskovits, wlliW, 63.3; see 3, 11, 233, 643. 
2. MacBeath, EL, 33 ff. See Murphy, G., Art.(l949), 2U. 
3. Wild, PME, 90. 
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multi-purpose institution of the family be noted again, 
in fulfilling purposes related to sexual expression, 
division of labor, reproduction, education, security, 
and affection.1 It requires that the practices of the 
Chuckchee and Siriono be seen as part of a total way of 
life, including the environment with which the way of 
life deals. It acknowledges that witchcraft among the 
Navaho is not uncaused, that it has a "purpose," but also 
that it has consequences in terms of the total way of 
life. It understands that female infanticide may have 
the purpose of limiting the population among a people 
whose attitudes toward sexual activity of children are 
"permissive; •2 although it may insist on judging the p)lr-
pose of the permissive attitudes and on questioning the 
"effectiveness" of the method of limitation. 
Dorothy Lee compares the complex of values of a 
culture with the complex of notes of a symphony. Satis-
faction comes from the orchestration, from the totar. 3 
And yet certain notes may interfere with the total satis-
raction; orchestration may be imperfect; the theme of the 
symphony may not provide an adequate center of 
1. See Murdock, SS, 10; Linton, SM, 153-7, 259. 
2. Kardiner, Art.(l949), 66; Linton, SM, 182. 
3. Lee, Art.(l953), 338. 
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integration. 
That some cultures select some purposes or poten-
tialities for special elaboration to the neglect of oth-
ers has alre~dy been noted. 1 A culture may emphasize 
freedom at the expense of justice, or vice versa,2 but 
always there is some balance between these thematic val-
ues. Some thematic values, it seems, have to be instru-
mented. 
A people may conceivably adopt boasting, democracy, 
or war, or reject these ways of acting, as its 
'dominant trend' demands. But certain modes of 
action are not merely available for acceptance or 
rejection; they occur always, as do productive 
techniques, or the control of resources, or relig-
ious observances of some kind. Here, then, the 
culture no longer selects its themes, but varies 
their treatment.3 
The fact of selection between thematic values and pur-
poses for emphasis and varying treatment implies a hier-
archy of purposes, some principle according to which the 
selection is made or justified. 
Even exceptions from a rule or principle, rather 
than negating the idea of purpose, themselves point to 
a higher principle in terms of which the exception is 
1. See Benedict, Art.(l934), 73; PC, 219; Danhof, Art. 
{1953), 115; Dewey, HNC, 89-105, 149-168. 
2. See Maciver, Art.(l953); and Knight, Art.(l953). 
3. Nadel, FSA, 389. See Linton, Art.(l950), 647. 
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justified.1 Linton writes, "Although practically all 
societies recognize divorce, there is no society which 
approves it in principle." 2 The exception is allowed 
or justified by appeal to the purpose which the family 
is trying, unsuccessfully in this case, to instrument. 
Fried calls attention to the fact that circumstances may 
make it necessary to ignore the standards of Tarahumara 
division of labor or of child care, 3 in light of the pur-
poses these standards seek to serve. Hanks suggests that 
if institutional ways are attacked, it is usually not 
"at the point of their main intent; this is rarely ques-
tioned." Evasion is more often attempted by trying to · 
show the principle does not apply. 4 
It is suggested that cultures are comparable as 
the category of purpose is applied to the thematic val~ 
ues. The cultures can be compared in terms of the in-
strumentation of thematic values, of the integration of 
purposes into a total way of life, and of the purposes 
themselves. Each culture compares purposes as it· selects 
among thematic values for elaboration and as it makes 
1. See von Fritz, Art.(l952), 99-101. 
2. Linton, SM, 176. 
3. Fried, Art.(l953), 289-291. 
4. Hanks, Art.(l949), 118. See Homans, EVTC, 358; and 
Beaglehole, Art.(1938). 
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exceptions to principles. In all this a higher principle 
is implied, making possible the selection and the excep-
tions. But purpose is a category, not a norm, and a 
norm must be presupposed to provide the higher principle. 
Von Fritz uses the analogy of uhealth" as "a not definite-
ly formulable but ob jectiv.e superior criterion in medi-
cine."l This study presupposes personality as the norm. 
ii. The Norm of Personality. 
The emphasis thus far woul~ seem to imply that the 
norm of personality involves a hypothet-ical imperative. 
If, anthropologists seem to say, man wants to be a per-
son, then, certain purposes are required and must be - in-
strumented. But the universal ground or order of con-
sequences presupposed in this study seems to make the 
imperative categorical. Man may be able to examine in 
his thinking the hypothetical imperative. But th~ ' "if" 
of his thinking presupposes, among other things, his 
reliance on the personal characteristtcs of reason, of 
autonomy, of consistency of values, his consideration 
of consequences, and his exercise of freedom. In think-
. II ing about the 11 if, man acts as if he were a person. 
1. von Fritz, Art.(l952), 106. See Hallowell in Tax 
( ed.), AAT, 334, for a suggestion of "mental health" as 
a similar concept. 
201 
Existentially, man, as a person, cannot elect not to be 
moral. Life seems to say to him through the order of con-
sequences, "Be a person!"1 
The norm of personality was presupposed at the be-
ginning of this study. Its validation has been attested 
in the evidence of anthropologists' implying such a norm, 
and, in their studies, revealing that personality is as-
sumed even where a culture poses "denial" as a solution. 
What does such a norm mean? It means that "Persons are 
subjects of purposes, not just objects of the purposes of 
other people. 112 All values, Brightman says, are forms of 
the experience of persons. "Truth, beauty, good, worship--
these are nothing if a person does not apprehend, realize, 
enjoy and develop them. 11 Self-experience is the basis of 
all our knowledge: 
If we do not grant that mind can refer beyond itself 
to something other than the experience of the moment, 
we cannot give any coherent account of the experience 
itself. But if we forget that that reference is 
rooted in the evidence of the present conscious mind, 
we have no basis for knowledge or for belief in any-
thing.3 
It is the person who is the conscious experient, or 
1. MacBeath, EL, 455, adds ". • • and re.cognize and treat 
others as persons." 
2. MacBeath, EL, 451. 
3. Brightman, NV, 51, 62. 
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center of experience, who perceives, thinks, remembers, 
purposes, and values. Not only does the person experi-
ence value; he also evaluates, judges values experienced 
in the light of ideal values, universalizes some ideal 
values as true for all persons, and criticizes ideal val-
ues in terms of a hierarchy of norms. There are many 
norms and values: justice, love, truth, etc. But the 
norm of truth, to take one example, is not impersonal 
but omnipersonal, for all persons just as verification 
is £I persons. 1 As a particular center of experience 
that universalizes, the person posits an ideal of person-
ality as the norm of other norms, the principle of criti-
cism in terms of which other norms are judged. It is the 
person as concrete unity of immediate experience and self-
transcendence that makes the norm of personality a univer-
sal one and that binds all men together. The appeal to 
ideal values and thus to a rational norm for the ideal 
person makes possible the appeal to the universal norm 
of personality, valid for all men. 
Greene emphasizes that the only values we know 
are "embodied values" of the "self-experiencing-its-
world. "2 This suggests that personality is not a static 
1. Brightman, PV, 7, 18, 25. 
2. Greene, Art.(l953), 369-371. 
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but a dynamic norm, best understood in realization of new 
potentialities as new experience presents itself. It has 
also been suggested that personality is not opposed to 
society but is rather a triadic concept always involving 
society and culture in its realization. This is a com-
' 
munitarian conception of personality-in-community-made-
possible-by-culture. Troeltsch has pointed to the meta-
physical grounding of co~~unity in the nature of person-
ality.l Eduard Heimann writes: 
Both rationalist individualism and ration-
alist collectivism miss the dialectical unity of 
person and community by making either the strong 
individual supreme and making society a derived 
value, a means for ends ~f individual welfare, or 
making the collective absolute and treating the 
individual as a means which may be used or de-
stroyed as expediency suggests.2 · 
Only persons are ultimately real. But the question 
of chronology of origin is fruitless. The emphasis here 
is on the simultaneous development of personality, society, 
and culture. Muelder writes that the p erson emerges from 
the self only within the framework of social-cultural 
exnerience. 
There is a genuine gestalt which may be called a 
social mind. It has a level of existence not 
1. See Muelder, Art.(l951) 2 , 49-50. See also Casserley, 
MMSS, 213-4; Brightman, NV, 64. 
2. Heimann, Art.(l953), 140. 
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above or below personal minds, but on the same 
level. The consciousness which it embodies may 
be termed objective spirit, but it is not dis-
tinct from minds~ It exists in minds. The 
content of social mind is too rich, because of 
its embracing all component minds, for our indi-
vidual consciousnesses to contain this content. 
No individual ~ind has an immediate intuition of 
t h is total content, nor is there an objective 
self-consciousness which is aware of this con-
tent. Irtdividual minds genuinely participate 
in it; they are avvare of each other through it; 
through it group decisions and volitions are 
achieved; and as a mental gestalt it may act 
with selectivity and creativity. On a normative 
level it constitutes whatever we know as fellow-
ship or community. But on every1level it is the matrix of all personal decision. 
One difficulty with cultural relativism is that it 
has disregarded the significance of the person. 2 Cultural 
patterns are relative not only to the culture but also to 
the order of consequences, of which personality is the 
highest norm. Nadel argues that the criteria assumed by 
anthropologists have been far from being fortuitous or 
subjective, but have been entailed in the very framework 
of anthropology. The criteria involve the stability and 
integration of society and culture and the "normality" of 
personality. Nadel goes on to admit that the two criteria 
may offer conflicting evidence, that society may achieve 
stability at the expense of the person. 3 But the final 
1. Muelder, Art.(l943), 201-2. 
2. Ford, Art.(l939), 135. 
3. In Tax ( ed. ) , AA.T, 335-6; see Furnas, AP, 6. 
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norm cannot be two norms which conflict. The norm of per-
sonality must be the ultimate judge of society and of cul-
ture even though, or perhaps ,-because, personality requires 
society and culture for realization. 
But personality is not the criterion. A criterion, 
as used in this study, differs from a norm in being primar-
ily a logical test rather than an ethical standard and ap-
plies to the process of judgment and evaluation rather than 
to the focal value. Even the truth of the value of person-
ality must be tested in terms of coherence with other truth, 
in a continuing circular process. The basic postulates of 
this study are that coherence is the criterion_ by which we 
discover the truth about personality and that personality 
is the norm of other norms. 
iii. The Criterion of Coherence. 
This study has been rational and empirical in method, 
with coherence presupposed as the criterion of truth. Is 
such a criterion assumed by the anthropologists? Certainly 
few are even as explicit as Kluckhohn: "In cultural sys-
terns the systemic element is coherence: the components 
of a cultural system must, up to a point, be either logi-
1 
cally consistent or meaningfully congruous. n But the 
1. Kluckhohn, c., Art.(l951)1, 399; see also 412. 
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appeal to such a criterion is implicit whenever an anthro-
pologist asks us to take account of new facts and to 
reason with him as to their meaning. We are asked to 
consider Dobua.ns, Da.homeans, Siriono,· Chuckchee, and others, 
and, in the light of the diversity of values and patterns, 
to revise our ethnocentric ideas and values. We are 
asked, in the name of cultural relativism, to make all 
the facts of anthropology rtstick together," cohere, so 
that we can draw the relativistic conclusion that these 
1 facts do not cohere. Bidney, in a discussion of culture 
and personality, criticizes the pragmatic test of a defin-
ition as one criterion but inadequate for a. complete under-
standing of a. phenomenon. "In addition, there is the logi-
cal test of coherency and adequacy for all perspectives. "2 
Brightman writes: 
If 'practical' and 'work' are not defined exactly, 
the use of them as criteria only adds to the confu-
sion of thought and belief. But if they are defined 
exactly and used thoroughly, they turn into a man-
date to examine all the evidence, especially all of 
the consequences of action, in the light of the 
mind's total experience. In other words, when 
taken thoroughl!, the pragmatist's criterion turns 
into coherence. 
1. See Vivas, MLEL, 34 ff., for a devastating analysis of 
Herskovits' self-contradiction in this regard. 
2. In Sargent and Smith (eds.), CP, 52. 
3. Brightman, PR, 128. 
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Coherence is not validated by appeal to any other 
criterion but only by its use as we attempt to understand 
our experience. Coherence means 11 inclusive systematic 
consistency, 11 a consideration of all the facts of experi-
ence, with propositions about these facts related to the 
facts and to each other in an orderly and significant way. 1 
The process of all verification begins in the complete 
apprehension of personal experience, proceeds in its 
thorough analysis and the experimental testing of hypo-
theses, and moves toward a synoptic and systematic ac-
count.2 Again, we verify the criterion of coherence as 
we use it in interpreting experience. It is a universal 
criterion, applicable in principle to all experience, and 
a progressive one, enabling continuing self-criticism and 
reformulation of hypotheses in the light of new data and 
new insight. 
4. The Function of Universal Norms: Resolution of 
Conflicts. 
In almost every consideration of the possibility of 
1. Brightman, IP, 68-9; see also PR, 128-9. Brightman 
notes that it may be a very coherent hypothesis that some 
truths are always true, such as . the validity of coherence 
and the need to consult experience. 
2. See Muelder and Sears, DAP, 515. 
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universal norms, there has been an implicit or explicit 
concern with their function. Thus the attention paid 
to differing values has called for some mediation between 
values, even if only a vague "tolerance. 11 Often the recog-
nition of ethnocentrism has involved the suggestion that 
it be combatted with cross-cultural understanding, that 
the socially necessary in-group consciousness should not 
interfere with cooperation and understanding between 
groups.l There has been no interest in ranking cultures 
on an evolutionary scale but rather in discovering some 
norm to which appeal could be made in resolving conflicts. 2 
1. See Adams, R., Art.(l951), 600; Anshen (ed.), OEC~ 
20-1. Note the emphasis in the Report of the President's 
Commission on Higher Education {HEAD, 14): 
Admittedly there is a danger in seeking to incul-
cate in youth a passionate loyalty to one way of life. 
Rededication to democracy will necessarily involve the 
emotions as well as the intellect. Yet the allegiance 
we want dare not be unreasoning and intolerant, fana-
tic and self-righteous. If it is, it will only aggra-
vate excessive nationalism that is at the root of cur-
rent failures in international cooperation. The task 
of college faculties is to inspire in our young people 
a consuming enthusiasm for the democratic way of life 
and at the same time develop in them an active appre-
ciation of _different cultures and other peoples. 
2. Miller, Art.(l951), 148, says: "The proper function of 
the social sciences is to study social situations involving 
a conflict in norms and to state the results of these 
studies so that they can be used by the people to resolve 
these conflicts." 
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It has been noted that the norm is usually implicit 
in the attention given to persons. Margaret Mead reports 
how Ruth Benedict gave freely of her time to help young 
psychologists analyze research programs, with one frequent 
question: "Do you want to find out something about the 
test, or about the people?nl Sapir's concept of genuine 
culture has been noted. The genuine culture is not only 
11 inherently harmonious; 11 it is also one in which the indi-
vidual is not a mere cog, an efficient servant of a col-
lective purpose. 
The telephone girl who lends her capacities, dur-
ing the greater part of the living day, to the 
manipulation of a technical routine that has an 
eventually high efficiency value but that answers 
to no spiritual needs of her own is an appalling 
sacrifice to civilization. As a solution of the 
problem of culture she is .a failure--the ~ore 
dismal the greater her .natural endowment. 
It is in such terms that Vivas judge s that "the Dobuan 
may have succeeded as Dobuan but he has failed, in part 
at least, as a human being. n3 
One of the thematic values to which attention has 
been called is that all cultures not only have moral · codes 
but also have "reasons 11 for these codes. Vivas suggests 
that the Dobuans be asked by the relativist why they reject 
1. Mead, M., Art.(l949), 460. 
2. Mandelbaum . .(ed. ), SWES, 315-7. 
3. Vivas, MLEL, 39. 
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alien ways and prefer their own. 
Is it merely a matter of their preference, which 
is the result of social conditioning? If this is 
their answer and by it is intended that the process 
of conditioning is not one susceptible of rational 
criticism, they utterly stultify themselves. For, by 
descending from the plane of reason, they abandon 
the means by which to criticize those members of 
their own culture on whom Dobu training did not 
for any reason whatever take. Criticism is a ra-
tional activity which goes beyond the brute assertion 
of arbitrary preference ••• If a culture is con-
tent to accept values on causal nonrational determina-
tions, it cannot expect the individual to do other-
wise. And that turns all choice of value into mere 
arbitrariness. The same will also be true in re-
spect to the values espoused by a man at one period 
of his life as against another and in respect to one 
value within his consciousness1and another with which the ·former may be in conflict. 
If, however, the Dobuans offer reasons why they ought to 
prefer the pattern of Dobu, then the patterns are open to 
rational criticism. The appeal to reasons and to norms in 
the resolution of conflicts of valuation is in principle 
the same whether the conflict be within the experience of 
a single person, or between members of a single culture, or 
between the moral sense of a group and that of a deviant 
member, or between a minority proposing (or opposing) so-
cial change and those who argue for the status quo. It is 
by this same appeal to reasons (and so, coherence) and to 
the norm of personality that conflicts of valuation can, 
1. Vivas, MLEL, 39-40. See also 215-7. 
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in principle, be resolved between cultures or between mem-
bers of different cultures.1 
Mrs. de Laguna argues that it is just this appeal 
to reasons and to universal norms that is a necessary con-
dition of the anthropologist's work. For the anthropolo-
gist is unavoidably caught in a conflict of moral standards 
and must become a critic of his own code of conduct as 
well as of the code of those whom he studies. He must 
follow a pattern while living among a people and so must 
distinguish between those parts of his code which are in-
strumental and those which are thematic. 2 It is not just 
the ways of the people that must be evaluated by the 
field-worker; he must evaluate his own ways. This is not 
a matter of implication but of involvement. 
Furthermore, the anthropologist implies that he 
has "an instrument for reaching truth that he regards as 
1. Vivas, MLEL, 36. A. E. Murphy, Art.(l950), 463, says: 
~An ideology is what an ideal becomes when it loses its 
mediating function as a reason and operates instead as a 
weapon in a struggle of morally irreconcilable antagonists:' 
On this Brightman comments that "The underlying assump-
tion here is that when the appeal is made to reasons, a 
reconciliation is always in principle possible. 11 Note also 
Muelder, RER, 206, that in the Western legal tradition, 
"The belief in Reason made possible the reconciliation of 
conflicting customs, statutes, cases and doctrines. 11 
2. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 164-5. 
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inherently better--not just relative to the judgment im-
pressed on him by his enculturated experience."l The 
ability of the anthropologist to transcend his own cul-
ture, at least in part, means that communication is pos-
sible, which is itself as imperative for resolution of con-
flicts as for learning from one another. 2 The work of the 
anthropologist assumes a certain amount of objectivity, 
of detachment. Obviously, complete objectivity is "im-
possible this side of sanity. 11 3 Mrs. de Laguna suggests 
. that, if the anthropologist "could perform the psycholog-
ical feat of severing the ties and loosing the obligations 
which bind him to his culture, he would lose his mind and 
destroy his very soul. " 4 Even the anthropologist never 
completely becomes a spectator; his transcendence is al-
ways piecemeal, holding a pattern up for conscious scrutiny. 
This is what Louis Mink calls the ttin-and-out 11 theory of 
the self, 5 its ability to rise in part above its cultural 
home. The conscious attention to formerly unconscious 
1. Redfield, PWT, 158; see also 162. See MacBeath, EL, 442. 
2. See Benedict, PC, 10; Herskovits, MHW, 6, 78, and Art. 
(1951), 23; Mead, Art.(l952); Klineberg, TAIU, 16. 
3. Furna~, AP, 478. 
4. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 162. 
5. Mink, Art.(l953). See also Adams, G., Art.(l947), 
197-8; Boas, AML, 204; Redfield, P#T, 159. 
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valuations is the basis of Redfield's moral transformation. 
Lincoln Barnett writes of the physicist and of man: 
uLeast of all does he understand his noblest and most 
mysterious faculty: the ability to transcend himself and 
perceive himself in the act of perception."l 
Reinhold Niebuhr writes of the meaning of this 
transcendence: 
The progressive development of ever wider 
communities in the history of mankind is accounted 
for by the fact that every individual has the ability 
to achieve some detachment from the communities to 
which he is bound by nature (the family) and by 
nature and history (ethnic and other communities), 
and th~t this ability is subject to historic 
growth.2 
But this enlargement of community and of understanding is 
based not only on some degree of detacrunent from one's 
own culture but also upon the achievement of some imagina-
~ 
tive sympathy with other peoples' ways. It involves com-
munication at a deep level, on the basis of some common 
values. 3 Thus the work of the anthropologist first pos-
tulates, and then, to the extent he is successful, achieves 
a community inclusive of his own community and of that he 
studies. 
1. Barnett, L., UDE, 127. 
2. Niebuhr, Art.{l953)2, 449. See also MacBeath, EL, 436, 
and Mead, G. H., MSS, 269. 
3. de Laguna, Art.(l942), 162-3. See also Furnas, AP, 
477; Nadel, FSA, 18-19. 
CHAPTER SIX 
EMERGENT PROBLEMS 
1. Natural Law. 
The conception of nature developed in this study 
and the possibility of discovering universal norms calls 
for a re-examination of the doctrine of natural law. One 
difficulty involved in any conception of natural law in 
recent decades has been the restriction of nature to that 
which could be apprehended by the senses and measured. 
This has meant that natural law has been limited to the 
descriptive probabilities of natural science rather than 
its earlier meaning of first principles, moral postulates 
for ev al uat ing men 1 s conduct. 1 Another difficulty, rooted 
in the earlier conceptions, has been the assumption of a 
primitive harmony, a "Golden Age" of the past. This back-
ward look has tended to give some expressions of natural 
law a rigidity, just as the association with the medieval 
church gave something of a reactionary tinge to conceptions 
of that time. But the conception of natural law has been 
h istorically a potent instrument against all tyranny and 
authoritarian institutions founded on arbitrary rule.2 · 
1. See Bidney, TA, 12. 
2. See Anshen (ed.), OEC, 308-9; Bidney, TA, 144-5; Wild, 
P:ME, 94 ff. 
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Only on the basis of some such recognized law can freedom 
be maintained against usurpers of authority. 1 For natural 
law is not a code, but a set of principles in terms of 
which every code is criticized.2 Natural law historically 
has also usually involved a subsidiary 11 1aw of nations, 11 
which again has served as a vital instrument in extending 
the community of nations and in resolving conflicts. 
Such a conception of natural law is especially 
needed in a day when men waver between anomie, or normless-
ness, and uncritical allegiance to false absolutes, and 
when some 11 law of nations" is sought so urgently. Con-
verging with this need is the evidence of thematic values 
produced by anthropology as data for more empirical laws. 
Two recent studies in this area should be noted. One is 
Plato's Modern Enemies, by a moral realist, John Wild. The 
other is The Rights of Man and Natural Law, .by a Neo-
Thomist, Jacques Maritain. 3 Maritain's conception is based 
on recognition of both the dignity of man and the common 
good, of the plurality of communities, and of a theistic 
source f'or political authority • . 
I am convinced that a democratic society is not 
necessarily an unarmed society, which the enemies 
1. See Maciver, Art.(l940). 
2. See Brightman, ML, 45-6; Casserley, MMSS, 54-68. 
3. See Bibliography. See also Maritain, Art.(l952). 
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of society may calmly lead to the slaughterhouse 
in the name of liberty. Precisely because it is a 
commonwealth of free men, it must def'end itself with 
particular energy against those who, out of princi-
ple, refuse to accept, and who even work to destroy 
the foundations of common life in such a regime, the 
foundations which are liberty and cooperation and 
mutual civic respect. What here distinguishes a 
society of free men from a despotic society is that 
this restriction of the destructive liberties takes 
place, in a society of free men, only with the 
institutional guarantees of justice and law.l 
2. Unity and Diversity. 
Development of means of communication has made pos-
sible, if not probable, the unity of the world, but has 
left open the question of the kind of unity. Unity might 
conceivably be imposed, for a time at least, and with 
tremendous costs in human welfare as well as in resources.2 
This study indicates that anthropological insights can be 
used in achieving a unity, rather than a uniformity, in-
volving the stimulus of contrasts. Interests of different 
groups are not forever in conflict, but are in principle 
reconcil able, if appeal is possible to a universal norm. 3 
Awareness of differences can still, in actual fact, breed 
anxiety, and understanding can bring contempt and heighten 
antagonism. The ach ievement of world community calls for 
1. Maritain, RWillL, 90-1. 
2. See Bidney, TA, 182. 
3. See Benedict, Art.(l943), 103; Bidney, TA, 442-8. 
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willingness to appeal to reason as well as acknowledgemen~ 
that such an appeal is possible. The transcendence and 
empathy of the anthropologist must become working tools 
for statesmen and common people. If this is possible, 
one urgent problem for social science is the creation of 
the necessary attitudes. At the same time the channels of 
communication need to be kept open, for people who interact 
1 with one another tend to develop common sentiments. 
The problem of respect for differences is posed 
especially by those who seek to work at Point IV or to 
implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Per-
petuation of ignorance and superstition cannot be justified, 
but neither should •experts" run roughshod over peoples in 
11 underdeveloped" countries in manipulating change. 2 
Sapir's conception of genuine culture may point the 
way for such work and for other efforts of the United Na-
tions. He argues against the ttfallacy that international-
ism is in spirit opposed to the intensive development of 
autonomous cultures." 
Our national-political units are too small ~or 
peace, too large for safety. They are too small 
1. See Romans, EVTC, 408-410; Frazier, Art.(l947); 
Kluckhohn, C., MEHV, 110 f.; McKeon, Art.(l950); Mead, 
M., Art.(l943), and Art.(l950). 
2. See Redfield, PWT, 146; Nadel, FSA, 52. 
for the intelligent solution of the large prob-
lems in the sphere of direct ends; they are too 
large for the fruifful enrichment of the remoter 
ends, for culture. 
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As the anthropologist moves beyond cultural relativism to 
increasing concern with thematic values, he opens the way 
to the discovery of universal norms, to finding a voice 
for man, to the achievement of genuine world community. 
1. Mandelbaum. ( ed.), .SWES, 328, 330. 
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ABSTRACT 
Statement of the Problem. 
The central concern of this study is a conceptual 
framework for anthropology. This framework, different from 
explicitly formulated anthropological theory, is in many 
ways i mplicit in the working assumptions of anthropologists, 
as they have observed cultures, reflected on these observa-
tions, consciously or unconsciously compared cultures, and 
then reflected on these comparisons. This study seeks to 
draw out the implied theory, to compare it with the explic-
it theories of cultural relativism and thematic values, and 
to develop a coherent system. It seeks further to discover 
what validity there is in cross-cultural comparisons and 
what possibility there is of moving beyond cultural rela-
tivism to universal norms. 
Procedure. 
The method does not involve new .data but rather a 
critical examination of the theory and practice of anthro-
pologists along with their empirical data. Chapter Two 
traces briefly the development of anthropology. Against 
this historical background, Chapter Three examines the con-
cept of cultural relativism. In Chapter Four attention is 
given to the concern with values and to the concept of 
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thematic· values. Chapter Five deals with the central ques-
tion of the inference of universal norms from thematic 
values and seeks categories for cross-cultural comparisons 
and for the resolution of conflicts between cultures .• 
Summary. 
Early anthropologists were interested in oddities 
and took for granted the commonplaces. From 1860 scientif-
ic anthropology reflected the Enlightenment and Darwinism 
with a theory of cultural evolution which placed institu-
tions and beliefs of nineteenth century Europe and America 
at the top of a scale of progress and their antitheses at 
the bottom as uorigins," with d,evelopmental stages between. 
-
Franz Boas led the twentieth century reaction to 
this evolutionistic and ethnocentric theory, emphasizing 
field investigation at the expense of theory and stressing 
cultural pluralism. The concept of culture toppled the 
doctrine of racism, showing the influence of custom rath~r 
than blood in man's development and the plasticity of "hu-
man nature." An important related assumption concerns 
culture as a differentiating factor between human groups. 
From the concept of culture developed that of cul-
tural relativism: the values in any culture can be under-
stood and valued only with reference to the premises and 
norms of that culture. Evaluations are based upon experi-
ence and are relative to a particular cultural background. 
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The modern versiorr of cultural relativism grew in the soil 
of historical relativism, distrust of reason, the sociology 
of knowledge, and the revolt of social sc1emce against its 
reformist background (with the accompanying quest for ob-
jectivity). The concern for tolerance was not only an 
induction from cross-cultural studies but was also a pro-
test against imperialism and a reflecrtion of the liberal 
valuation of diversity. 
Cultural relativism is valuable as a method of under-
standing a culture in its own terms rather than judging it 
wholly from the perspective of another culture. BUt the 
logical conclusion of relativism as philosophy is that no 
concepts are universally applicable and nD standards uni-
versally valid. It is of relativism as philosophy that 
the following criticisms are suggested: 
1. The basic assumptions of the doctrine are: (i) the 
concept of culture is identified with a particular concept 
of society, and (ii) each culture is a closed system, imply-
ing cultural determinism. The above assume too complete in-
tegration of each culture and ignore variations within each. 
2. Cultural relativism is also criticized in terms of 
ita logical implications: (i) relativists oppose seeking to 
change cultures but imply criticism of -those whose encul-
turation leads them to seek change; (ii) relativism is 
held as "true," while it implies there are no criteria :for 
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"truth;" (iii) relativism is an induction from comparative 
-. 
studies but denies the basis of va~id cross-cultural under-
standing ; and (1v) these implications further imply that 
t he ultimate appea~ is to force in value conflicts between 
cult ures. 
3. The cultural relativist may refuse to accept these 
as sumptions and implications. But he and other anthropolo-
gists have become involved in practical activities which 
have both consequences and implications. His tolerance 
found its limit when certain tolerated ways of life threat-
ened world order. The crisis of World War II challenged 
scientists to realize they were citizens and to commit them-
selves to democratic values and ideals and against racism. 
The perplexity of anthropo~ogists facing social re-
sponsibility was evident in the debate on the Universal Deo-
;: laration of Human Rights. After arguing that respect for 
indivi dua l differences entails respect for cultural differ-
ences, the anthropologists' "Statement on Human Rights" 
-
allows for criticism of cultures in terms of "underlying 
-
cultural values." Those who insisted t hat "should" has no 
place in science advised fellow scientists what they should 
do and not do. 
Closely related to anthropologists' discussions of 
relativism has been a concern with theoretical problems 
and with values as a part of culture, subject to scientific 
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investigation. This developed in the discovery of implicit 
culture (the linked premises underlying behavior), the 
awareness of patterning in language and in culture, and 
the emergence of the individual as anthropologists became 
familiar with the peoples they studied. 
In this setting Morris Opler introduced the concept 
of "themes" as dynamic forces underlying cultural varia-
tions . From this Ralph Linton developed the concept of 
thematic values which can be abstracted from their embodi-
ment in instrumental values for cross-cultural comparisons. 
Un i versal thematic values include communication, morality, 
"reasons .. for moral codes, religion, the family, the in-
group , and concepts of normality. Some suggested cate-
gories of thematic values fail to explain the universal as-
pects and to provide significant comparisons: the category 
of "needs" is reductioniat and cannot a.ccount for change 
or variation; that of "problema" is more adequate but still 
individualistic, with metaphysical implications not fully 
faced; the category of "functional prerequisites" takes 
accoun~ of man•s social nature but not of the men who make 
up society. 
Anthropologists• use of the concept of social coat 
implies criticism and evaluation in terms of social effic-
iency and human welfare. Both means and ends are subject 
to scrutiny, in the light of an "order of consequences," 
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justifying the postulates of a universal moral order and 
of a human nature (not as a standard phenomenon but as a 
teleological conception~. 
Conclusions. 
The category of purpose is held to be the most signi-
ficant clue to the nature of cultural institutions. Pat-
terns are understood and judged in terms of what a people 
is trying to do, not in isolated acts but in a total way of 
life. The category of purpose enables the comparison of 
cultures, but they must be evaluated in terms of a norm. 
The norm to which anthropological evidence points is per-
sonality (personality-in-community-made-possible-by-culture). 
The implicit appeal of an.thropologists, even in arguing for 
relativism, is to a norm and also to a criterion of coher-
ence, verified not by appeal to another criterion but by 
its use. 
The function of universal norms (themselves judged 
by the norm of personality) is the resolution of conflicts, 
as indicated in the following conclusions: 
l. Thematic values point to purposes common to all men 
and all human societies which require adequate instrumenta-
tion if the society is to remain viable and if its members 
are to realize their full potentialities as human beings. 
2. These purposes do not have to be instrumented in 
just ~ way, nor can they be instrumented in just any way, 
but there are objectively given limits within which 
instrumentation must be accomplished. 
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3. Thus the values and norms of a culture are relative 
not only to the background and conditions of that culture 
but also to a universal ground and human nature, postu-
lated and progressively discovered through the norm of 
personality and the criterion of coherence. 
4. It is to this norm of personality that appeal ought 
to be and often is made in resolving value conflicts within 
the experience of a single person, or between members of a 
single society, or in proposing or opposing change in a 
culture. 
5. Values and norms are comparable across cultures 
as they are within cultures, and it is by appeal to the 
norm of personality that value conflicts between cultures 
(or between members of different cultures) can, in 
principle, be resolved. 
The work of the anthropologist first assumes and 
then progressively makes possible the discovery of 
universal norms and the achievement of an inclusive 
community. 
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